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Abstract 
 
 
This study estimates the impact of various economic flows including government-subsidized 
micro-credit, informal credit, public and private transfers, international remittances, and 
migration on poverty and inequality for Vietnam using Vietnam Household Living Standard 
Surveys in 2004 and 2006. Impact evaluation methods employed in the study include fixed-
effects regression and difference-in-differences with propensity score matching. Poverty is 
measured by three Foster-Greer-Thorbecke poverty indexes, while inequality is measured by 
the Gini coefficient, Theil’s L and Theil’s T indexes. It is found that the impact of the 
governmental micro-credit, public transfers and international remittances on poverty 
reduction is very limited. On the contrary, informal credit, domestic (internal) private 
transfers and migration have positive and statistically significant impacts on poverty 
reduction. The domestic private transfers have the largest effect on the total poverty of the 
population due to a high impact on expenditure and a large coverage of the poor. Regarding 
inequality, both government-subsidized micro-credit and informal credit do not affect 
inequality significantly. Public transfers and international remittances increase inequality 
slightly, while domestic private transfers and migration lead to a decrease in inequality. 
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Chapter 1  Introduction 
 
 
1.1 Research background 
 
Vietnam is often mentioned as an example of a country successful in poverty reduction. Over 
the past decade, Vietnam has witnessed a remarkable reduction in poverty. According to the 
Vietnam Household Living Standard Surveys, the poverty incidence decreased from 58 
percent in 1993 to 29 percent in 2002, and continued to decrease to 16 percent in 2006.1 The 
incidence of food poverty or ultra poverty decreased from 25 percent to 7 percent during the 
1993-2006 period. During this period, the poverty gap index, which measures the poverty 
depth, was also reduced from 0.185 to 0.038, equivalent to a reduction of nearly 80%. 
Both rural and urban Vietnam experienced a fast reduction in poverty. During the 1993-
2006 period, the proportion of rural people below the poverty line fell by 46 percentage points 
from 66 percent to 20 percent. Meanwhile, the poverty incidence decreased by 21 percentage 
points from 25 percent to 4 percent in the urban areas during the same period. However, rural 
areas experienced a slower pace of poverty reduction. Between 1993 and 2006, the poverty 
rate was reduced by 70 percent and 84 percent in the rural and urban areas, respectively. As a 
result, the share of the rural population in the poor increased from 91 percent in 1993 to 94 
percent in 2006, and poverty has become mainly a rural phenomenon in Vietnam. 
There is a strong spatial or geographic dimension in Vietnam’s poverty (World Bank, 
2004a, 2008a). The poverty incidence varies substantially across regions. Although all the 
regions experienced significant poverty reduction, the speed of poverty reduction is different 
across regions. There are eight regions in Vietnam, and the North West (mountainous areas) is 
the poorest region, followed by the North Central Coast and the Central Highlands. The 
region which has the lowest poverty rate is the South East. The Red River Delta and Mekong 
Delta have the second and the third lowest poverty rates, respectively. These three regions are 
also the three largest deltas of the country. 
Unlike other developing countries such as China where high economic growth and fast 
poverty reduction are accompanied by a high increase in inequality, Vietnam has achieved a 
remarkable decrease in poverty with only a slight increase in inequality. According to the 
Vietnam Household Living Standard Surveys, the Gini index based on expenditure per capita 
increased from 0.33 in 1993 to 0.36 in 2006. 
Vietnam’s success in poverty reduction results from different factors including 
economic growth and state poverty reduction programs. During the 1991-2008 period, the 
country achieved high economic growth with an average annual growth rate of around 6 
percent in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita. Over the last decade only China and 
Ireland have experienced higher growth rates (World Bank, 2004a). Broad-based economic 
growth can have a positive impact on poverty reduction through numerous channels such as 
increasing household income and consumption, raising private transfers and promoting the 
credit market. In addition, the extensive public safety net including a large number of poverty 
alleviation programs maintained by the Vietnamese government may have contributed to 
                                                 
1 The poverty line is equivalent to the expenditure level that allows for nutritional needs with food consumption 
securing 2100 calories per day per person and some essential non-food consumption such as clothing and 
housing. This poverty line is estimated by the General Statistics Office of Vietnam and the World Bank in 
Vietnam. 
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poverty reduction. Up to now, a huge amount of funds have been spent on assistance 
programs targeted at the poor. In the 2006-2010 period, the government plans to spend 44,855 
billion thousand VND (approximately 2.8 billion USD) on the poverty alleviation program.2 
At the micro level, a large number of factors can have direct and positive effects on 
income promotion and poverty reduction. Important factors may be micro-credit, cash 
transfers, remittances, and migration. In 2003, the government of Vietnam launched the 
Vietnam Bank for Social Policies (VBSP), which provides micro-credit for the poor. The poor 
can borrow from the bank at low interest rates without collateral. In addition to the VBSP, 
informal credit is an important source of finance for people in Vietnam (McCarty, 2001; 
Pham and Lensink, 2007; Barslund and Tarp, 2007). Regarding cash transfers, both public 
and private transfers have increased over time. Public transfers include contribution-based 
health benefits and social security schemes and non-contributory transfers such as social 
allowances disbursed to support war invalids and heroes, the elderly, children without 
guardians, disabled people, and households adversely affected by natural calamities 
(Government of Vietnam, 1993b, 2003). Private transfers are sent to households by their 
relatives and friends both from within Vietnam and abroad. More than 80 percent of 
Vietnamese households currently receive domestic private transfers, and international 
remittances increased from 26.5 to 57.9 thousand billion VND (in 2001 prices) during the 
2001-2007 period. The increase in remittances results from increased migration. Migration 
can have positive impacts on household wellbeing by increasing not only remittances but also 
household productivity and income diversification (Stark and Levhari, 1982; Stark and 
Bloom, 1985, Rosenzweig, 1988; Stark, 1991; Taylor and Martin, 2001; Taylor and Lopez-
Feldma, 2007). 
 
1.2 Research objective and questions 
 
The objective of this research is to examine how well economic flows including micro-credit, 
public and private transfers, international remittances and migration affect the poor, and to 
measure the extent to which these factors impinge on household welfare, poverty and 
inequality in Vietnam using Vietnam Household Living Standard Surveys in 2004 and 2006. 
More specifically, the study aims to answer four empirical research questions: 
- How extensive is the access of the poor to governmental micro-credit and 
informal credit? And what is the impact of these credit sources on consumption 
expenditure, poverty and inequality? 
- How well do public transfers and domestic private transfers reach the poor? And 
to what extent do public and private transfers affect household consumption 
expenditure, poverty and inequality? 
- How extensive is the access of the poor to international remittances? And what is 
the impact of international remittances on household consumption expenditure, 
poverty and inequality? 
- What is the pattern of work and non-work migration of the poor? And what is the 
impact of work and non-work migration on household consumption expenditures, 
poverty and inequality? 
                                                 
2 In January 2008, 1 USD ≈ 16 thousand VND.  
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Although these research questions are policy relevant for both developed and 
developing countries, we concentrate on Vietnam. Vietnam is a country which has achieved a 
remarkable reduction in poverty. Understanding the impact of several important economic 
factors on poverty can provide some information on the ‘story’ behind the successful 
reduction in Vietnam’s poverty. Information on the impact evaluation is highly relevant. It 
can be helpful for policy-makers and researchers in designing and implementing poverty 
reduction programs. 
 
1.3 Research contribution 
 
It is surely undeniable that poverty and inequality alleviation is what economic development 
is all about. Many countries throughout the world have made poverty reduction a major goal 
of development policy and have implemented numerous policies and programs to increase 
people’s income and consumption and reduce poverty. 
An important means to increase income and consumption is credit. As is well-known, 
micro-finance is often seen as a tool for reaching the Millennium Development Goal of 
halving the proportion of poor people between 1990 and 2015. Micro-credit and other 
financial services would enable the poor to build assets, increase incomes, and reduce their 
vulnerability to economic stress. Credit markets are severely rationed, and commercial banks 
are not interested in poor clients because of information problems and lack of collateral (Hoff 
and Stiglitz, 1990; Nagarajan, et al., 1995; Kochar, 1997; Bell et al., 1997; Bose, 1998; 
Boucher et al., 2008). Governments and NGOs have stepped into the gap and have provided 
credit to the poor, often at highly subsidized interest rates. Although microfinance programs 
have been set up all over the developing and even the developed world, informal credit 
remains popular (Nagarajan et al., 1995; Kochar, 1997; Bell et al., 1997; Agénor and Montiel, 
1999; Conning and Udry, 2005; Guirkinger, 1998). Micro-credit programs do not require 
collateral, but they do screen borrowers by other eligibility criteria such as poverty status or 
repayment capacity. As a result, not all poor households may be able or willing to obtain 
micro-credit, and some may resort to informal credit. Despite the popular view of 
moneylenders as usurers, informal loans may help to increase capital and mitigate 
consumption fluctuations and thus enable the poor to grow out of poverty. 
Income transfers are another tool for poverty reduction and living standard 
improvement. Income transfers to a household can come from public and private sources, 
which are popular in both developed and less developed countries. The important role of 
public transfers in improving household welfare can be found in a large number of studies. 
For example, empirical studies such as Barrientos and DeJong (2006), Maluccio (2005), 
Behrman and Hoddinott (2000), Skoufias and McClafferty (2001) show that programs 
providing conditional cash transfers help the recipients reduce child labour, increase child 
schooling, and improve nutrition and health. Positive effects of social security transfers on 
income and consumption are also found in Devereux (2002), Hoddinott et al. (2000), Sadoulet 
et al. (2001), etc. Regarding the impact on poverty, Morley and Cody (2003) find the 
Progresa program in Mexico helps the beneficiaries reduce the poverty gap by 36 percent. The 
effects of private transfers, especially international remittances, on poverty reduction are 
found in many empirical studies such as Adams (1991), Adams (2004), Lopez (2005), Taylor 
et al. (2005), Adams (2006), and Acosta et al. (2007). 
Chapter 1 
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Migration is also an important strategy of households for income increases and poverty 
reduction. Migration can help households increase their income and consumption through not 
only increased remittances but also increased productivity and income diversification (Stark 
and Levhari, 1982; Stark and Bloom, 1985, Rosenzweig, 1988; Stark, 1991; Taylor and 
Martin, 2001; Taylor and Lopez-Feldma, 2007). 
Although credit, cash transfers, remittances and migration are important for poverty 
reduction in general, they are not always a panacea. In certain cases, credit, cash transfers and 
migration can have limited positive impacts or even harmful impacts on household income 
and poverty reduction. Empirical research is also inconclusive about the sign and the extent to 
which credit, cash transfers and migration affect poverty and inequality. For example, micro-
credit is found not to have a significant impact on poverty reduction and income in several 
developing countries (Diagne and Zeller, 2001; Coleman, 1999; Morduch, 1998). Regarding 
public transfers, poor people may receive less from social security programs than people from 
middle and high income groups (e.g. Friedman and Friedman, 1979; Howe and Longman, 
1992; Castles and Mitchell, 1993). Regarding the impact on inequality, the effect of credit and 
cash transfers on inequality can be positive and negative depending on whether credit and 
cash transfers reach the poor more or the non-poor more. As both positive and negative 
indirect effects are possible, the quantitative effects of credit, cash transfers and migration on 
poverty and inequality are ambiguous. 
This study is expected to contribute new empirical evidence on the impact of different 
microeconomic factors including credit, cash transfers, remittances and migration on poverty 
and inequality. This study has several special features. First, we concentrate on the case of 
Vietnam. Vietnam is interesting to look at since over the past decade Vietnam has achieved a 
remarkable result in poverty reduction with only a moderate increase in inequality, and there 
are few studies on quantitative evaluation of credit, cash transfers, remittances and migration 
on both poverty and inequality in Vietnam. In addition, there are no studies which jointly 
assess and compare the impact of these factors on poverty and inequality while accounting for 
potential behavioural responses. Secondly, the study shows not only the ultimate impacts of 
credit, cash transfers, remittances and migration on poverty and inequality in Vietnam but also 
some of the underlying mechanisms: the distribution of these factors over the poor and the 
non-poor, the potential effect of these factors on work effort, income and expenditures. 
Thirdly, this study is the first study that uses data from the two most recent Vietnam 
Household and Living Standard Surveys (VHLSS) of 2004 and 2006 to estimate the impact of 
different economic factors. The use of two years of data allows us to use panel data 
techniques. This dramatically improves the estimation strategy since biases that arise due to 
omitted variables, endogeneity and selection, can be addressed by using panel data. 
 
1.4 Data set 
 
The study uses data from the two most recent Vietnam Household Living Standard Surveys 
(VHLSS), which were conducted by the General Statistics Office of Vietnam (GSO) with 
technical support from the World Bank (WB) in the years 2004 and 2006. The 2004 and 2006 
VHLSS covered 9,188 and 9,189 households, respectively. The samples are representative for 
the national, rural and urban, and regional levels. The 2004 and 2006 VHLSS set up a panel 
of 4,216 households, which are representative for the whole country, and for the urban and 
rural population. 
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The sample selection of VHLSS 2004 and 2006 follows a method of stratified random 
cluster sampling. GSO selected households in all rural and urban provinces of Vietnam, i.e. 
rural and urban areas of all provinces are strata. There were 64 provinces in 2004 and 2006. 
This means that there were 128 strata. Among each stratum, communes were selected 
randomly as primary sampling units. The number of communes per stratum is proportionate 
to the population proportion of the strata over the total population. The number of selected 
communes in each VHLSS is 3,063. In each commune, around 3 households were selected 
randomly. It is expected that a large number of communes selected throughout the country 
will reduce the sampling error of the collected data. 
The surveys collected information through household and community level 
questionnaires. Information on households includes basic demography, employment and 
labour force participation, education, health, income, expenditure, housing, fixed assets and 
durable goods, participation of households in poverty alleviation programs, and especially 
information on credit, international remittances, private transfers, pensions and social 
allowances that households had received during the 12 months before the interview. In the 
rare cases that pensions and social allowances are provided in kind, VHLSS reports their 
equivalent estimated values. 
Expenditures and income per capita are collected using very detailed questionnaires in 
VHLSS. Expenditure includes food and non-food expenditure. Food expenditure includes 
purchased food and foodstuff and self-produced products of households. Non-food 
expenditure comprises expenditure on education, healthcare expenditure, expenditure on 
houses and commodities, and expenditure on power, water supply and garbage. Regarding 
income, household income can come from any source. Income includes income from 
agricultural and non-agricultural production, salary, wage, pensions, scholarship, income from 
loan interest and house rental, remittances and social transfers. Income from agricultural 
production comprises crop income, livestock income, aquaculture income, and income from 
other agriculture-related activities. 
Information on commune characteristics was collected from 2,181 and 2,280 rural 
communes in the 2004 and 2006 surveys, respectively. This data can be linked with the 
household data. Commune data include demography, general economic conditions and aid 
programs, non-farm employment, agriculture production, local infrastructure and 
transportation, education, health and health facilities, and social problems. 
 
1.5 Methodology 
 
The main objective of this study is to investigate the poverty targeting and quantitative 
impacts of several microeconomic flows including credit, cash transfers, remittances and 
migration on consumption expenditures, poverty and inequality. To assess how an economic 
flow covers the poor, we can use simple descriptive statistics, which measures the proportion 
of poor households involved over the total number of poor households. This measure is called 
the coverage rate. A higher coverage rate means a larger number of the poor covered by the 
economic flows. 
Quantitative evaluation of the impact of a flow is often more complicated. The main 
objective of impact evaluation is to measure the extent to which this flow has changed 
outcomes of a group of households. In this study, the impact of an economic flow is measured 
by the difference between the outcome in the presence of the flow and the counterfactual 
Chapter 1 
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outcome in the absence of the flow. For example, the effect of the governmental micro-credit 
program on income of the program’s participants is measured by the difference between the 
participants’ observed income and their counterfactual income had they not participated in the 
micro-credit program. 
Therefore, to assess the impact of a flow, we need to estimate the counterfactuals for 
outcome. This is not straightforward, as obviously there are no data for what would have been 
the outcome had participants not been affected. Simply comparing participants with a control 
group does not usually solve the problem. Both groups are likely to be systematically 
different, unless some randomization of the flow is applied. Randomization is, however, often 
considered unethical for anti-poverty measures and therefore not applied widely. Moreover, it 
is impossible to randomize private flows, such as migration and remittances. Using regression 
or matching techniques, it is relatively easy to correct for between-group and between-
household differences that are observed by the researchers. Yet, some relevant variables may 
go unobserved. For example, people with better production and business skills tend to apply 
for more micro-credit and at the same time get more earned income from the same resources. 
In this study, we rely on two methods to control for selection on observed variables and 
time-invariant unobserved variables: fixed-effect regression, which is equivalent to first 
differences regression in the context of two-year panel data, and difference-in-differences 
with propensity score matching. These are widely-used methods to evaluate the impact of 
specific programs (Moffitt, 1994; Hoynes, 1997; Heckman et al., 1997, Dehejia and Wahba, 
1998; Smith and Todd, 2005; Wagstaff et al., 2009), economic policies (Card, 1992; Card and 
Krueger, 1994; Currie and Fallick, 1996; Bazen and Skourias, 1997; Bell, 1997; Baker et al., 
1999; Stewart, 2004), and other economic factors such as education (Card and Krueger, 
1992), migration and remittances (Yang et al., 2005; Acosta et al., 2008), and private 
transfers (Kang and Lee, 2003). 
We used fixed-effect regressions to estimate the impact of credit, cash transfers and 
remittances on household income and consumption expenditure of households. We applied 
difference-in-differences with propensity score matching to estimate the impact of migration. 
Compared to the fixed-effect regressions, this method has the advantage that it does not 
impose assumptions about the functional form of the relation between flow and outcome. 
However, this method can only be used when the program variable is binary (dummy), which 
in this study only holds for migration. 
It should be noted that the methods of fixed-effects regression and difference-in-
differences only eliminate endogeneity bias caused by unobserved variables that are time-
constant between survey rounds. In this study, it is reasonable to assume that the relevant 
household-level variables, such as business and production skills and ability, or motivation for 
higher income and expenditure consumption, were time-invariant during the two periods 
covered. Fixed-effect regression will, however, fail to remove all endogeneity bias if the 
unobserved variables which affect outcome and flows are not time-invariant. It is expected 
that the estimation bias resulting from these factors is small relative to the bias eliminated by 
using fixed-effects regression or difference-in differences. Availability of valid instrumental 
variables could improve the accuracy of impact estimates. However, finding good 
instrumental variables is not an easy task. Using invalid instruments can lead to a large bias in 
the impact estimates. Actually, we tried a large number of instrument-variables regressions, 
but the estimation results were not robust and reasonable. 
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We estimate the impact of a flow on expenditure poverty and inequality in several steps. 
Firstly, we estimate the impact of the flow on expenditure and construct the counterfactual 
expenditure in the flow. Secondly, a poverty measure or an inequality measure in the state of 
no flow will be estimated using this counterfactual expenditure. Thirdly, the impact of the 
flow on the poverty or inequality measure is measured by the difference between the poverty 
or inequality measure in the presence of the flow and the counterfactual poverty or inequality 
measure in the absence of the flow. 
 
1.6 Thesis structure 
 
The present thesis is structured in eight chapters as follows: 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
Chapter 2: An introduction to alternative methods in program impact evaluation 
Chapter 3: Impact evaluation of multiple overlapping programs under a 
conditional independence assumption 
Chapter 4: The impact of micro-credit and informal credit on poverty and 
inequality 
Chapter 5: The impact of public and private transfers on poverty and inequality 
Chapter 6: The impact of international remittances on poverty and inequality 
Chapter 7: The impact of work and non-work migration on poverty and inequality 
Chapter 8: Conclusions 
 
Except Chapters 1 and 8 (the chapters on introduction and conclusions, respectively), the 
main contents of Chapters 2 through 7 are written as separate assays on impact evaluation. 
Therefore, there can be some overlaps of the contents of these chapters. 
Chapter 2 reviews several popular methods of impact evaluation, which are used to 
address the problem of program selection in impact estimation. This chapter presents an 
overview of widely-used methods in program impact evaluation. In addition to a 
randomization-based method, the impact evaluation methods are categorized into methods 
assuming ‘selection on observables’ and methods assuming ‘selection on unobservables’. 
Two popular parameters of program impacts discussed in this chapter are the Average 
Treatment Effect (ATE) and the Average Treatment Effect on Treated (ATT). The chapter 
discusses how different impact evaluation methods measure ATE and ATT under various 
identification assumptions. These assumptions are presented in a unified framework of a 
counterfactual and a two equation model. 
Among the impact evaluation methods, the matching method receives special attention 
and has increasingly been used in recent years. Under the assumption of conditional 
independence between potential outcomes and program assignment, program impacts 
measured by ATE and ATT can be identified and estimated using cross-section regression or 
propensity score matching (PSM). Traditional impact literature often deals with impact 
evaluation of a single program. In reality, one can participate in several programs 
simultaneously and these programs may be correlated. For example, the poor people can 
participate in several poverty alleviation programs at the same time. When measuring the 
impact of a program, we should note that participants and non-participants might attend other 
simultaneous programs. If there is a correlation between the selection of the program of 
interest and the selection of other programs even after observed variables are controlled, 
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neglect of the other programs will lead to biased estimation of the impact of the program. If a 
correlation between the selection of the program and the selection of the other programs 
disappears once conditional on the observed variables, we can ignore these other programs. 
However, Chapter 3 shows that controlling for the participation in the other programs leads to 
some gain in efficiency in terms of mean-squared-error (MSE) using Monte Carlo simulation. 
More specifically, Chapter 3 shows that under the PSM method, the impact of a program of 
interest can be measured as a weighted average of program impacts on groups with different 
program statuses. In other words, it combines the propensity score matching on the 
conditioning variables and exact matching on the participation in the other programs. Using 
the Monte Carlo simulation it is also found that when impacts of the programs are high, this 
PSM method leads to lower MSE compared with other PSM estimations. 
It should be noted that Chapters 2 and 3 do not address the main research questions of 
the study on the impacts of credit, transfers, remittances and migration on poverty and 
inequality. These chapters are independent essays which present the literature on program 
impact evaluation. Chapter 3 contributes to the literature on program impact evaluation by 
discussing impact evaluation of multiple correlated programs using regression and matching 
methods. The matching method which is developed in Chapter 3 is not applied in other 
empirical chapters, since this matching method is developed in the context of a conditional 
independence assumption and single-cross section data, whereas the other empirical chapters 
employ fixed-effects regressions and difference-in-differences methods which use panel data 
and do not rely on a conditional independence assumption. Although the matching method 
discussed Chapter 3 is not applied in other chapters, Chapter 3 is still included in this study 
for two reasons. Firstly, Chapter 3 also discusses an impact evaluation method which is 
somewhat related to the topic of this study. Secondly, this chapter reports an effort of the 
author to study the impact evaluation literature during his PhD research period. 
Chapters 4, 5 and 6 examine the poverty targeting and impacts of the micro-credit from 
Vietnam Bank for Social Policies (VBSP), informal credit, public and private transfers, and 
international remittances on household consumption expenditure, poverty and inequality 
using the fixed-effect regressions. More specifically, Chapter 4 investigates how well the 
micro-credit from VBSP and informal credit reach the poor and to what extent they affect 
poverty and inequality in Vietnam. There are several reasons why the findings from this are 
interesting. First, the microfinance program is the biggest poverty reduction program in 
Vietnam. Second, nominal interest rates of VBSP are highly subsidized at about half the 
‘market’ rates charged by most of the other microfinance programs (World Bank, 2007). The 
low and even negative real interest rates may have pushed out informal credit suppliers, 
weakened alternative programs, and/or caused high leakage rates to non-poor households 
(Burgess and Pande, 2005; Adams et al., 1984). VBSP credit may therefore not only not have 
reached the poor, but also limit the availability of alternative sources of credit which 
otherwise would have been available. Third, informal credit has mostly been ignored in both 
research and policy, while it is presumably a very important source of finance for the poor, 
given the substantial size of the informal sector and its generally low entrance barriers. If 
informal credit is indeed important for the poor, the government may shift their focus at least 
partly away from direct provision of credit to stimulating the linkages between the formal and 
the informal credit market. 
The main objective of Chapter 5 is to estimate and compare the impacts of public and 
private transfers on poverty and inequality in Vietnam. In addition, this chapter contributes to 
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the existing literature on public and private transfers through a stepwise analysis showing not 
only the impact of public and domestic private transfers on poverty and inequality in Vietnam 
but also some of the underlying mechanisms. The first step of the analysis concerns a study of 
who the recipients of transfers are: do transfers reach the poor and are they equally spread 
over rural and urban areas? The second step involves analysis of potential interaction effects 
between transfers: do public transfers affect the level of private transfers? The third and fourth 
steps are an assessment of the effect of transfers on work effort and the ultimate effect of 
transfers on both household income and expenditure. The final step of this chapter is to 
measure the consequences of public and private transfers for poverty and inequality. 
Chapter 6 provides empirical evidence on the poverty targeting and the impact of 
international remittances. International remittances to Vietnam are increasing in size and 
importance. Similar to the other empirical chapters, we will investigate the distribution of 
international remittances across the poor and non-poor and estimate the impacts of 
international remittances on work effort, household income and expenditure, poverty and 
inequality. 
Chapter 7 aims to estimate impacts of work and non-work migration on several welfare 
indicators including working effort, remittances, income, income diversification, expenditure 
of the households sending out migrants, and poverty and inequality. In doing so, the chapter is 
expected to make several empirical contributions to the migration literature. First, it 
investigates how work and non-work migration affect different aspects of households from 
working efforts to expenditure and poverty of the migrant-sending households. Second, we 
estimate the impact of migration on poverty and inequality of the total population to examine 
the role of migration in reducing total poverty and inequality. Third, we use the panel data of 
VHLSS 2004 and 2006 to define the migration for the period 2004-2006. As a result, we can 
apply the difference-in-differences with matching to measure impact of migration. The 
difference-in-differences with matching is very popular in impact evaluation but as far as we 
know has never been applied in migration evaluation. Fourth, we compare the impacts 
between work and non-work migration. 
It should be noted that we wrote separate chapters on migration and remittances for 
several reasons. First, migration does not necessarily lead to remittances, and the effect of 
migration can differ from the effect of remittances. Secondly, migration which is investigated 
in Chapter 7 includes both international and internal migration, while remittances analyzed in 
Chapter 8 refer to international remittances. Because of the features of VHLSS, we cannot 
distinguish between international migration and internal migration. 
Finally, Chapter 8 presents the main empirical findings on the research questions which 
are posed by this study and proposes policy implications. A discussion on the limitations of 
the study and an outlook for future research finalizes the study. 
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Chapter 2  An introduction to alternative methods in program 
impact evaluation 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The main objective of impact evaluation of a program is to assess the extent to which the 
program has changed outcomes for the subjects. In other words, the impact of the program on 
the subjects is measured by the change in welfare outcome that is attributed only to the 
program. The magnitude of a program impact on a subject’s outcome depends on many 
factors, but in general these factors can be grouped into three groups: intervention of the 
program, time of program implementation to program evaluation, and the characteristics of 
the subjects. 
Obviously, the magnitude of program impact depends on what the program offers to the 
subject. Any change in the design of an intervention can lead to a change in program impact. 
For example, a vocational training provides courses in two ways: courses in the morning and 
course in the evening. For a given person, the impact of participating in morning courses can 
be higher than the impact of participating in evening courses, since her learning ability is 
better during the morning. Another example is a program of micro-credit that provides a small 
amount of credit for a targeted group of people. Eligible people, who meet the conditions for 
borrowing, can receive two specific amounts of credit, say C1 and C2, depending on their 
demand for credit. It is obvious that the impact of receiving C1 credit is different from the 
impact of receiving C2 credit. 
A second factor that affects the measured impact of a program is when the data on 
outcome are collected. The results from an impact evaluation conducted one year after 
program implementation can be different from the results of an impact evaluation conducted 
two years after implementation. It is possible to assume that program impact can be stable 
after a period of time, i.e. the program can move the outcome level (in the no-program state) 
to a new level of outcome (in the program state) in the long term. 
Thirdly, the impact of a program on a subject depends on her own characteristics. 
Different people will gain different benefits from a program. 
Impact evaluation of a program provides very helpful information for decisions as to 
whether the program should be terminated or expanded. If a program has no impact on its 
participants, it needs to be terminated or modified. The impact of a program on a subject is 
defined as the difference between its outcome with the program and its outcome without the 
program. However, for participants of the program, we can observe only their outcome in the 
program state, but not their outcome had they not participated in the program – their 
counterfactual. Similarly, for non-participants we can observe the outcome in the no-program 
state, but not the outcome in the program state. This problem is sometimes referred to as a 
missing data problem, and it complicates impact evaluation. 
Although it is virtually impossible to measure program impact for each subject 
(Heckman et al., 1999), we can estimate the average impact for a group of subjects. The main 
difficulty is to estimate the average counterfactual outcomes. If there are concurrent factors 
that affect outcome and we are unable to net out the impact of these factors from program 
impact, the counterfactual estimates will be biased. 
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This chapter presents an overview of several widely-used methods in program impact 
evaluation. In addition to a randomization-based method in which participants are selected 
randomly, these methods are categorized into: (1) methods assuming ‘selection on 
observables’, and (2) methods assuming ‘selection on unobservables’. If the impact of the 
program of interest is correlated with other factors affecting the population, we need to isolate 
the program impact. ‘Selection on observables’ methods are based on an assumption that we 
can observe all these correlated factors. In contrast, if we are not able to observe all correlated 
factors, we need to resort to ‘selection on unobservables’ methods. This chapter discusses the 
identification assumptions and estimation strategy of each method using a unified framework 
of counterfactuals and a two-equation model. 
The chapter is structured into six sections. Section 2 gives an overview of the problems 
in program impact assessment. Section 3 illustrates how random selection can solve these 
problems. Next, sections 4 and 5 introduce methods relying on selection of observables and 
methods relying on selection of unobservables, respectively. Finally, section 6 presents some 
conclusions. 
 
2.2 Problems in program impact evaluation 
 
2.2.1 Parameters of interest 
 
To make the definition of impact evaluation explicit, suppose that there is a program assigned 
to some people in a population P. For simplicity, let’s assume that there is a single program, 
and denote by D the binary variable of participation in the program, i.e. 1=D  if she/he 
participates in the program, and 0=D  otherwise. D is also called the variable of treatment 
status. Further let Y denote the observed value of the outcome. This variable can receive two 
values depending on the participation variable, i.e. 1YY =  if 1=D , and 0YY =  if 0=D .3 These 
outcomes are considered at a point in time or over a period of time after the program is 
implemented. 
The impact of the program on the outcome of person i is measured by: 
01 iii YY −=Δ , (2.1) 
which is the difference in outcome between the program state and the no-program state. The 
problem is that we cannot observe both terms in Equation (2.1) for the same person. For those 
who participated in the program, we can observe only Y1, and for those who did not 
participate in the program we can observe only Y0. 
It is practically impossible to estimate the program impact for each person (Heckman et 
al., 1999), because we cannot know the counterfactual outcome exactly. If we constructed an 
estimator for individual effects, the associated standard error would be very large. Program 
impact can, however, be estimated for a group of people. In the literature on program impact 
evaluation, two popular parameters are the Average Treatment Effect (ATE), and the Average 
Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT). 
ATE is the expected impact of the program on a person who is randomly selected and 
assigned to the program. It is defined as: 
)()()()( 0101 YEYEYYEEATE −=−=Δ= . (2.2) 
                                                 
3 Y can be a vector of outcomes, but for simplicity let’s consider a single outcome of interest.  
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This is the traditional average partial effect (APE) in econometrics. To see this, let’s 
write the observed outcome in a switching model (Quandt, 1972): 
01 )1( YDDYY −+= , (2.3) 
where Y is observed outcome, which is equal to Y1 and Y0 for participants and non-
participants, respectively. 
Then, 
ATEYEYEDYEDYEAPE =−==−== )()()0|()1|( 01 . (2.4) 
Most programs are targeted to certain subjects. The important question is the program 
impact on those who participated in the program. If the program has a positive impact, policy 
makers would be interested in expanding the program for similar groups. The expected 
treatment effect on the participants is equal to: 
)1()1()1()1|( 0101 =−===−==Δ= DYEDYEDYYEDEATT . (2.5) 
Except for the case of randomized programs that is discussed in section 3, ATE and 
ATT are, in general, different from each other, since program participation often depends on 
the potential outcomes, and as a result )1|()( 11 =≠ DYEYE , and )1|()( 00 =≠ DYEYE . To see 
this, Equation (2.2) can be rewritten as: [ ]
[ ]
[ ]{ }
[ ]{ },)0Pr()0|()0|(                                     
)1Pr()1|()1|(                                
)0Pr()0|()1Pr()1|(                                     
)0Pr()0|()1Pr()1|()()(
01
01   
00
1101
==−=+
==−==
==+==−
==+===−=
DDYEDYE
DDYEDYE
DDYEDDYE
DDYEDDYEYEYEATE
 (2.6) 
where )1Pr( =D  and )0Pr( =D  are the proportions of participants and non-participants of the 
program, respectively. 
Define the average treatment effect on the non-treated (ATNT) as: 
)0|()0|( 01 =−== DYEDYEANTT . (2.7) 
This parameter can be interpreted as the effect that non-participants would have gained 
had they participated in the program. 
Then, ATE can be written as follows: 
)0Pr()1Pr( =+== DATNTDATTATE . (2.8) 
Estimation of ATE and ATT is not straightforward, since there are some components 
that cannot be observed directly. We can observe the mean outcomes of participants and non-
participants. As a result, the terms )1|( 1 =DYE  and )0|( 0 =DYE  in (2.4) and (2.6) can be 
estimated directly. However, the counterfactual terms )0|( 1 =DYE  and )D|Y(E 10 =  are not 
observed. )1|( 0 =DYE  is the expected outcome of the participants had they not participated 
in the program, while )0|( 1 =DYE  is the expected outcome of non-participants had they 
participated in the program. Thus the estimation of ATE and ATT is not straightforward, and 
the different methods discussed in this chapter provide estimates under certain assumptions on 
how the program is assigned to the population and how the outcome is determined. 
Note that we can allow program impact to vary across a vector of observed variables, X, 
since we might be interested in the program impact on certain groups that are specified by the 
characteristics, X. The so-called conditional parameters are expressed as follows: 
( ) )|()|()|( 01 XYEXYEXEATE X −=Δ= , (2.9) 
and 
( ) )1,|()1,|()1,|( 01 =−===Δ= DXYEDXYEDXEATT X . (2.10) 
If we denote by ATNT(X) the ATNT conditional on X: 
( ) )0,|()0,|()0,|( 01 =−===Δ= DXYEDXYEDXEATNT X , (2.11) 
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then, similar to (2.8): 
( ) )|0Pr()|1Pr( )()( XDATNTXDATTATE XXX =+== , (2.12) 
where )|1Pr( XD = and )|0Pr( XD = are the proportion of the participants and non-participants 
given the X variables, respectively. 
In the following discussion, we will focus on the conditional parameters − ATE(X) and 
ATT(X) − since if they are identified, the unconditional parameters − ATE and ATT − can also 
be identified: 
∫= X )X( dF(X)ATE ATE , (2.13) 
∫ = == 1| )( )1DX X D|dF(XATT ATT . (2.14) 
 
2.2.2 Econometric framework of program impact evaluation 
 
As mentioned, the selection of a method to estimate ATE and ATT for a program depends 
crucially on assumptions on how people are selected in the program as well as on how the 
potential outcomes are affected by the program and other factors. Although the assumptions 
are often not tested, they need to be stated explicitly so that one can judge whether the results 
are valid and robust. A popular way to discuss assumptions is to use the model of two 
outcome equations of Rubin (1974), in which potential outcomes Y0 and Y1 are expressed as 
functions of individual characteristics (conditioning variables), X:4 
0000 εβα ++= XY , (2.15) 
1111 εβα ++= XY . (2.16) 
Y0 and Y1 can be any functions of X, not necessarily linearly or parametrically specified, 
and all the identification strategies presented in this chapter are still valid. However, to 
illustrate ideas and links with the traditional linear regression framework, we assume linearity. 
For simplicity and identification of program impact in some parametric regressions, we 
require X to be exogenous in the potential outcome equations. 
 
Assumption 2.1. 010 == )X|(E)X|(E εε  (A.2.1) 
In addition, two additional assumptions are needed for the validity of the micro-
approach of program impact evaluation. The first assumption is common in the partial 
equilibrium approach, and required in the literature on program impact evaluation. This 
assumption is called the stable unit treatment assumption. 
 
Assumption 2.2. jiDY ji ,  ∀⊥  (A.2.2) 
i.e. realized (observed) outcome of individual i, Yi, is independent of the program status of 
individual j, Dj. 
This assumption implies that there is no spill-over effect of the program. In other words, 
an individual’s participation in the program does not affect the outcome of other people. For 
programs that cover a large proportion of the population, this assumption can be violated. For 
example, if a large number of farmers receive preferential credit, they can reduce production 
costs and increase their market share, which can affect the revenue of farmers who do not 
                                                 
4 For simplicity, subscript i is dropped.  
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receive similar credit.5 When the assumption does not hold, one might use general equilibrium 
analysis.6 
The second assumption is implicit in the two-equation model. Writing the same X 
variables in the two Equations (2.15) and (2.16) means that for each person the status of 
program participation (treatment status) does not affect X. Formally speaking, once 
conditional on potential outcomes, X are independent of D. 
 
Assumption 2.3.7 10 Y,Y|DX ⊥  (A.2.3) 
This assumption does not mean that X is uncorrelated with D, but that X is uncorrelated 
with D given the potential outcomes. Under this assumption D does not affect X once 
conditioning on the potential outcomes. Although this assumption is not an indispensable 
condition to identify program impact, it is maintained for simplicity. If D affects X, it is much 
more complex to capture the true impact of program. In the following discussions of different 
methods in impact evaluation, assumptions 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 are implicitly assumed to hold. 
In the two-equation framework, the parameters of interest for impact evaluation are 
expressed as follows: 
)(X)(              
]X|X[E]X|X[E              
)X|Y(E)X|Y(EATE )X(
0101
000111
01
ββαα
εβαεβα
−+−=
++−++=
−=
 (2.17) 
and, 
).1,|())(
]1,|[]1,|[
)1,()1,(
010101
000111
01)(
=−+−+−=
=++−=++=
=−==
DXE(X             
DXXEDXXE             
DXYEDXYEATT X
εεββαα
εβαεβα  (2.18) 
It should be noted that even if coefficients 1010 ββαα ,,,  can be estimated, ATT(X) still 
includes an unobservable term )D,X|(E 101 =− εε , while ATE(X) does not. To identify ATT(X), 
in some cases, we need the following additional assumption: 
 
Assumption 2.4. )1,|()1,|( 10 === DXEDXE εε  (A.2.4) 
This assumption states that given X, the expectation of the unobserved variables for the 
participants is the same regardless of the program so that the unobserved term in (2.18) 
vanishes. It is worth noting that assumption (A.2.4) does not involve the expectation of the 
error terms conditional on all the X variables. Instead, this assumption should hold for a 
subset of the conditional parameters that we are interested in. There might be many 
explanatory variables X, but we are often only interested in )X(ATE and )X(ATT  conditional on 
a certain number of variables in X, not all X. For example, if we want to estimate impacts of a 
program on income for different age groups, we need (A.2.4) for age only, i.e. 
)1,|()1,|( 10 === DageEDageE εε . 
To link the counterfactual data with the observed data, substitute (2.15) and (2.16) into 
the switching model in (2.3). This results in: 
                                                 
5 For other examples on the violation of this assumption, see e.g. Heckman et al. (1999) and Rubin (1978). 
6 For a more detailed discussion on general equilibrium approach in impact evaluation, see e.g. Heckman et al. 
(1999) and Heckman et al. (1998b). 
7 Another expression for conditional independence ),,|(),|( 1010 YYDXfYYXf = , where f(.) is conditional 
density of X. For discussion on conditional independence, see e.g. Dawid (1979). 
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[ ] .)()(X)(DX
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εεεββααβα
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 (2.19) 
Equation (2.19) is a rather general model of program impact, in which program impact 
measured by the coefficient of variable D varies across subjects. This coefficient depends on 
both observable and unobservable variables, X and ε. It can also be correlated with D if D is 
correlated with X and ε. This is a random coefficient model in which the coefficient is 
correlated with observed and unobserved characteristics variables. 
The remaining problem is how to estimate 1010 ,,, ββαα without bias. The error term in 
(2.19) is required to have conventional property: [ ] 0,|)( 001 =+− DXDE εεε . (2.20) 
To complete this section, a model of program participation is introduced. The 
participation of a person in the program can depend on the selection criteria of the program 
and own decisions of the person. The program participation model is often expressed in a 
latent index framework: 
vWD +=θ* , (2.21) 
01 >= *D if  D , 
0=D  otherwise, 
where D* is the latent index of the program selection that is correlated with observable 
variables, W and unobservable term, v. W and v are all the variables that affect program 
participation. 
 
2.3 Method based on randomized design 
 
2.3.1 Impact measurement of randomized programs 
 
In the ideal situation for impact evaluation, a program is assigned randomly to subjects, and 
those who are assigned the program are willing to participate. The non-participants will form 
the control group, and do not participate in similar programs. In this case, program 
assignment D is said to be independent of the potential outcomes Y0 and Y1. We can state this 
condition as an assumption. 
 
Assumption 3.1. DY,Y ⊥10  (A.3.1) 
 
Proposition 3.1. ATE(X), ATT(X), ATE and ATT are identified under assumption (A.3.1). 8 
 
Proof: As a result of assumption (A.3.1), conditional on D the value of the potential 
outcomes does not alter: 
)D,X|Y(E)D,X|Y(E)X|Y(E 01 111 ==== , (3.1) 
)D,X|Y(E)D,X|Y(E)X|Y(E 01 000 ==== . (3.2) 
Hence: 
( )
),0,|()1,|(
)|()|(
01
01
=−==
−=
DXYEDXYE             
XYEXYEATE X  (3.3) 
and 
                                                 
8 Assumption (A.2.1) is made for all methods in impact evaluation. 
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( )
).0,|()1,|(             
)1,|()1,|(
01
01
=−==
=−==
DXYEDXYE
DXYEDXYEATT X  (3.4) 
Thus, ( )X)X( ATTATE = . Since it is possible to observe all terms in ATE(X) and 
ATT(X), these parameters are identified.  
 
The program impact is estimated simply by comparing the mean outcome between the 
participants and non-participants. When we have post-program data from a representative 
sample on participants and non-participants in a randomized program, we can use sample 
mean of outcomes for treatment and control group to estimate ATE, ATT, and their 
conditional version ATE(X) and ATT(X). 
Another way to estimate the program impact is to use a regression model. In the 
framework of the two-equation model, assumption (A.3.1) implies: 
10 εε ,D ⊥ . (3.5) 
In order to get unbiased estimators of ATE(X) and ATT(X) using regression, we need the 
assumption on exogeneity of X, i.e. (A.2.1). 
 
Proposition 3.2. Under assumptions (A.3.1), ATE(X), ATT(X), ATE and ATT can be estimated 
without bias by OLS regression. 
 
Proof: Under (A.3.1) and (A.2.1), ATE(X) and ATT(X) are the same: 
))( 0101)()( ββαα −+−== (XATTATE XX . (3.6) 
The coefficients can be estimated without bias from the equation: [ ] [ ]001010100 εεεββααβα +−+−+−++= )(D )(X)(DXY , (3.7) 
since the error term has the following property: [ ] 0)|(),|(),|(,|)( 0001001 ==+−=+− XEDXEDXDEDXDE εεεεεεε . (3.8) 
Thus the estimator of the parameters is: 
X(TTAETA XX )ˆˆ)ˆˆ(ˆˆ 0101)()( ββαα −+−==  (3.9) 
Once the conditional parameters are identified, the unconditional parameters are 
also identified because of (2.13) and (2.14). 
 
2.3.2 Program impact evaluation under experiment 
 
In reality, we are often interested in the impact of a program that is targeted at specific 
subjects. For example, poverty reduction programs aim to provide the poor with supports to 
eliminate poverty. Vocational training programs are targeted at the unemployed. The program 
is not assigned randomly to people in the population. In this case, experimental designs can be 
used to evaluate the impact of the targeted program. 
A randomization design or experiment is conducted by choosing a group of people who 
are willing to participate in the experiment. Denote by *D  the variable indicating the 
experiment participation. 1=*D  for those in the experiment, and 0=*D  otherwise. Among 
people with 1=*D , we randomly select people for program participation. Denote R  as a 
variable that 1=R  for the participants, and 0=R  for non-participants in the experiment. The 
participants are called the treatment group, while the non-participants (among those in the 
experiment) are called the control group (or comparison group). 
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The randomization of the program among those in the experiment is stated formally as 
follows: 
 
Assumption 3.2.9 110 =⊥ *D|RY,Y  (A.3.2) 
To estimate both ATE(X) and ATT(X), we need an additional assumption: 
 
Assumption 3.3. )1,|()1,|()0,|( *111 ===== DXYEDXYEDXYE  
)1,|()1,|()0,|( *000 ===== DXYEDXYEDXYE  (A.3.3) 
That is, once conditional on X, the expected outcome of those in the experiment is the same as 
the expected outcome of those not participating in the experiment. It is implied that people 
who participate in the experiment are similar to those in the reality once conditional on X. 
 
Proposition 3.3. ATE(X), ATT(X), ATE and ATT are identified under assumptions (A.3.2) and 
(A.3.3). 
 
Proof: 
Under (A.3.2) and (A.3.3), ATT is identified: 
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and similarly, the average treatment effect on the non-treated (ATNT) is the same: 
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Thus, the ATE(X) is identified and the same as ATT(X) due to (2.12). 
 
As a result, (3.10) is the unbiased estimator of ATT(X) and ATE(X). We simply calculate 
the difference in the mean outcome between the participants and non-participants of the 
program among those attending the experiment. Once the conditional parameters are 
identified, the conditional parameters are also identified because of (2.13) and (2.14). 
 
2.3.3 Advantages and disadvantages of the method based on randomization 
 
There is no dispute that among methods of program impact evaluation, the method that is 
based on randomization of the program produces the most reliable results. When the 
randomization of a program is properly conducted, the average impact of the program is 
identified without any further assumptions. The randomization of programs ensures that there 
is no systematic difference in both observable and unobservable characteristics between 
treatment and control groups. As a result, any difference in the average outcome between 
                                                 
9 Assumption (A.3.2) states that the selection of participants among the experimental people is independent of 
the potential outcomes. In fact we only need a weaker version to identify ATT: 
)R,D|Y(E)R,D|Y(E ** 1111 11 =====  and )R,D|Y(E)D|Y(E ** 011 00 ==== . 
However this assumption is difficult to interpret. Thus we mention the assumption (A.3.2) in discussing the 
identification of the program impact. 
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these groups can be attributed to the program effect. Another advantage of the method is the 
ease in explaining its results to program designers and policy makers, who often do not have 
much knowledge of statistics and econometrics. 
The randomized-program method, however, suffers from several drawbacks. Firstly, it 
is hard to randomize a program which is targeted at a specific group due to issues of ethics 
and politics. Randomization of a program means exclusion of some eligible people from the 
program. It is unfair to deny (or delay) a program that provides supports such as health care or 
education for some eligible people. Policy makers will be criticized if they cannot explain 
why some eligible people are not allowed to participate in programs. Nevertheless, the 
randomization of a program can be conducted if the fund for the program is not sufficient to 
cover all eligible people. Some people have to participate at a later date, and they can serve as 
the control group for those who participate at the beginning. 
Secondly, the implementation and evaluation of a socio-economic program that is based 
on randomization is often expensive. Subjects are scattered in the population, which increases 
the cost of program administration and data collection for impact evaluation. 
Thirdly, there can be some factors that bias the estimates from randomization-based 
evaluation. These factors invalidate the key identification assumption (A.3.1), 10 Y,YD ⊥ . Two 
problems that are widely mentioned are attrition and substitution effects. 
Attrition means that some people in the treatment group quit the program during 
implementation. As a result, their observed outcome is not the potential outcome in the 
presence of the program, Y1. If this drop-out is random, there is no concern about this problem 
since the randomization feature remains preserved. If attrition is not random but correlated 
with some characteristics of the drop-outs, the remaining subjects in the treatment group who 
actually take the program will be systematically different from the subjects in the control 
group. In other words, there is self-selection into the program of the participants, which is 
dealt with by the alternative methods discussed in the following sections. Estimation of 
program impact is no longer straightforward: the mean difference in outcome between the 
treatment and control group is not an estimator of the program impact, but an estimator of ‘the 
mean effect of the offer of treatment’ (Heckman et al., 1999). However, if we expect that 
program impact is negligible for the drop-outs, we can measure the ATE by this mean 
difference. This is because the drop-outs are not interested in the program, and there would be 
no impact on them if we force them to follow the whole program. 
The substitution effect means that some people in the control group might try to get 
access to programs that are similar to the program to be evaluated. The substitution programs 
can contaminate the outcome of the control group. It is implied that if the program had not 
been implemented, the participants would have taken other similar programs. The mean 
difference in outcome between the control and treatment groups reflects ‘the mean 
incremental effect of the program relative to the world in which it does not exist’ (Heckman et 
al., 1999). To truly capture the program impact, we need to have information on impacts of 
the substituted programs, and subtract them from the outcome of the control group to estimate 
the potential outcome of the treatment group in the absence of the program. 
Finally, a randomized program that is used for impact-evaluation purposes is often a 
pilot program, and the impact of the pilot program can be far from the impact of the program 
when it is implemented in reality. A pilot program is often smaller and more easily 
administered. In addition, people involved in a pilot program including the administrators, 
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control and treatment group, may follow the program rules more strictly if they know the 
program is a pilot. 
 
2.4 Methods assuming selection on observables 
 
2.4.1 Selection bias and conditional independence assumption 
 
As mentioned, most programs are not randomized in reality. When a program is not assigned 
randomly, the potential outcomes of the participants will be different from those of non-
participants. Assumption (A.3.1) no longer holds, and simple comparison of mean outcomes 
between participants and non-participants does not produce unbiased estimators of the 
program impact. The bias in these estimators is called the selection bias in the literature. 
To see the selection bias in estimating the average treatment effect ATE(X) conditioning 
on X, rewrite the formula of ATE(X): 
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When we use the following estimator: 
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the bias is equal to: 
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Even though X are controlled for, selection bias in estimating ATE(X) can arise if the 
conditional expectation of unobserved variables in potential outcomes, 0ε and 1ε , is different 
for the participants and non-participants. 
Similarly, if we use the same estimator in (4.2) for ATT(X), the selection bias will be: 
)D,X|(E)D,X|(EATTTTˆA )X()X( 01 00 =−==− εε . (4.4) 
The selection bias stems from the difference in the conditional expectation of unobserved 
variables, 0ε , between the participants and non-participants.10 
One intuitive way to avoid the selection biases, (4.3) and (4.4), in estimating ATE(X) 
and ATE(X) is to invoke assumptions so that the selection biases are equal to zero. The 
                                                 
10 If one has data before and after a program, they sometimes use the before and after estimator to estimate the 
program impact. The bias is equal to )D|Y(E)D|Y(E AB 11 00 =−= , where )D|Y(E B 10 = and 
)D|Y(E A 10 = are the expectation of participants’ outcome in the state of no program before and after the 
program, respectively. The assumption is valid if there is no change in the participants’ outcome during the 
program implementation if they had not participated. Intuitively, this assumption seems plausible in the short 
term, but might be unreasonable in the long term. 
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assumption on ‘selection on observables’ assumes that one is able to observe all variables that 
affect both the program selection and potential outcomes so that once conditioned on these 
variables, the potential outcomes Y0 and Y1 are independent of the program assignment. In 
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), this assumption is called ignorability of treatment or 
conditional independence. Formally, it is written as: 
 
Assumption 4.1. XDYY ⊥10  ,  (A.4.1) 
Assumption (A.4.1) can be considered as a conditional version of assumption (A.3.1). Once 
we have controlled for X, the assignment of the program becomes randomized. Actually, we 
just need a weaker form of (A.4.1) in order to identify the program impact parameters. 
 
Assumption 4.1’. )|(),|( 00 XYEDXYE =  
)|(),|( 11 XYEDXYE =  (A.4.1’) 
This is called the conditional mean independence assumption. It is weaker than (A.4.1) in the 
sense that (A.4.1) implies (A.4.1’) but the reverse is not correct. Although assumption 
(A.4.1’) is weaker and sufficient to identify the program impacts, it is difficult to imagine that 
it will hold in reality since it involves the expectation terms. Thus, we will use assumption 
(A.4.1) in the discussion of program impact evaluation. 
A corollary of assumption (A.4.1) is that the error terms in the potential outcomes are 
also independent of D given X, i.e.: 
XD⊥10 ,εε . (4.5) 
Under condition (4.5), we have (Dawid, 1979): 
)1,|()0,|( 00 === DXEDXE εε , (4.6) 
)1,|()0,|( 11 === DXEDXE εε . (4.7) 
As a result of equation (4.6) and (4.7), the selection biases given in (4.3) and (4.4) are 
equal to zero. ATE(X) and ATT(X) are identified, and so are ATE and ATT. 
In addition, assumption (4.5) results in: 
0)|()1,|( 0101 =−==− XEDXE εεεε . (4.8) 
Hence, ATE(X) is equal to ATT(X). 
Assumption (A.4.1) is the key assumption for identifying program impacts that several 
methods rely on. Thus the methods are called methods based on ‘selection on observables’. 
This does not mean that we have to observe all information on the program selection, i.e. D is 
deterministic, but it implies that all the X variables that correlate D with Y0 and Y1 are 
observed. Put differently, the unobserved variables are required to be uncorrelated with Y0 
and Y1 given X. Three widely-used sets of methods that use this assumption are presented in 
this chapter, namely regression methods, matching methods, regression discontinuity. All 
these methods can be conducted using single cross section data. 
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2.4.2 Regression methods assuming selection on observables 
 
2.4.2.1 Linear regression 
 
For simplicity we maintain the assumption of linearity in outcome equations for this section. 
Next we will discuss the case of nonlinear functions of potential outcomes. 
 
Proposition 4.1. Given assumptions (A.4.1), OLS regression produces unbiased estimators of 
ATE(X), ATT(X), ATE and ATT. 
 
Proof: The observed outcome is as follows: [ ] [ ]001010100 )())( εεεββααβα +−+−+−++= D(XDXY  (4.9) 
The proof is now similar to the proof of Proposition 3.2. The error term has the 
following property: [ ] 0)|(),|(),|(,|)( 0001001 ==+−=+− XEDXEDXDEDXDE εεεεεεε . (4.10) 
Under assumption (A.4.1), )X(ATE and )X(ATT  are the same, and the estimators of 
these conditional parameters are: 
XTTAETA XX )ˆˆ()ˆˆ(ˆˆ 0101)()( ββαα −+−== . (4.11) 
ATE and ATT are identified simply by taking the expectation of ATE(X) and 
ATT(X) over the distribution of X for the whole population, and the distribution of X for 
the participant population, respectively.  
 
Instead of running one regression for the whole sample on the participants and non-
participants, it is possible to run two separate regressions for the sub-samples of the 
participants and non-participants, respectively. Under assumption (A.4.1), we can write: 
)|()|()0,|( 00000 XEXXYEDXYE εβα ++=== , (4.12) 
)|()|()1,|( 11111 XEXXYEDXYE εβα ++=== . (4.13) 
 
2.4.2.2 Nonlinear regression 
 
In some cases, the assumption about linearity of the potential outcome function is not 
reasonable. One important case is that the outcome variable is binary, e.g. one can be 
interested in the impact of a vocational training program on the probability of getting a job. 
The outcome variable equals 1 if a person is employed, and 0 otherwise. As we know, the 
widely-used models are logit or probit instead of the linear model. 
In general, we write the potential outcome equations as follows: 
000 ),( εβ += XgY , (4.14) 
111 ),( εβ += XgY , (4.15) 
where g(X) is any function of X which can be linear or non-linear in X and parameters 0β  and 
1β . Under assumption (A.4.1) we can estimate the two equations separately using the sub-
samples of non-participants and participants, respectively. ATE(X) and ATT(X) are identified: 
),(),( 01)()( ββ XgXgATTATE XX −== . (4.16) 
ATE and ATT are then identified simply by taking the expectation of ATE(X) and 
ATT(X) over the distribution of X for the whole population, and the distribution of X for the 
participant population, respectively. 
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As a matter of estimation, equation (4.16) can suggest the following general estimators 
for the treatment parameters: 
)ˆ,X(g)ˆ,X(gTTˆAETˆA )X()X( 01 ββ −=− , (4.17) 
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where n is the number of the total observations (including participants and non-participants), 
n1 is the number of the participants in sample data, and SX are the space of the X variables in 
the data sample. 
 
2.4.2.3 Advantages and disadvantages of the regression methods 
 
The above-described regression methods have the advantage of simple implementation, but 
also have three main drawbacks. Firstly, they impose a specific functional form on the 
relation between outcome and conditioning variables and the program participation variable. 
Secondly, the estimator of the program impact will be inefficient if the parametric regressions 
are plagued by problems of multicollinearity or heteroscedasticity. Finally, the method relies 
on the assumption of program selection based on observable variables. This assumption is 
strong. 
 
2.4.3 Matching methods 
 
2.4.3.1 Identification assumptions 
 
There is a large amount of literature on matching methods of impact evaluation. Important 
contributions in this area can be found in studies such as Rubin (1977, 1979, 1980), 
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983, 1985a), and Heckman et al. (1997b). The matching method can 
be used to estimate the two program impact parameters, ATE and ATT under the conditional 
independence assumption (A.4.1). The basic idea of the matching method is to find a control 
group (also called comparison group) that has the same (or at least similar) distribution of X 
as the treatment group. By doing so, we have controlled for the difference in X between the 
participants and non-participants. The potential outcomes of the control and treatment group 
are now independent of the program selection. The difference in outcome of the control group 
and the treatment group then can be attributed to the program impact. 
However for the matching method to be implemented, we must find a control group that 
is similar to the treatment group but does not participate in the program. This similarity 
assumption is called common support. If we denote p(X) as the probability of participating in 
the program for each subject, i.e. )|1()( XDPXp == , the assumption can be stated formally 
as follows: 
 
Assumption 4.2. 10 << )X(p  (A.4.2) 
 
Proposition 4.2. Under assumptions (A.4.1) and (A.4.2), ATE(X), ATT(X), ATE and ATT are 
identified by the matching method. 
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Proof: the proof is straightforward using the conditional independence assumption. 
)0,|()1,|()|()|( 0101)()( =−==−== DXYEDXYEXYEXYEATTATE XX . (4.20) 
Both terms in (4.20) can be observed. In addition, assumption (A.4.2) ensures that 
there are some participants and non-participants whose values of X are similar so that 
we are able to use sample information to estimate (4.24). 
ATE and ATT are identified as in (2.13) and (2.14). 
 
2.4.3.2 Alternative matching methods 
 
Construction of a comparison group 
To implement the matching method, we need to find a comparison group for which the 
conditioning variables are comparable to those of the treatment group. The comparison group 
is constructed by matching each participant i in the treatment group with one or more non-
participants j whose variables Xj are closest to Xi of the participant i. The weighted average 
outcome of non-participants who are matched with an individual participant i will form the 
counterfactual outcome for the participant i. 
For a participant i, denote nic as the number of non-participants j who are matched with 
this participant, and w(i,j) the weight attached to the outcome of each non-participant. These 
weights are defined non-negative and sum up to 1, i.e.: 
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The estimator of the conditional program parameters is then equal to: 
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where Y1i and Y0j are the observed outcomes of participant i and non-participant j. In practice, 
when there are many variables X, it is difficult to have a large number of observations that 
have the same variables X in a sample. Estimates of program impact conditional on a large 
number of X will be associated with a huge standard error. Thus formula (4.22) should be 
used only to estimate the program impact for several subgroups defined by one or only a few 
binary or discrete variable X. 
ATT is simply the average of differences in outcome between the treatment and 
comparison group: 
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where n1 is the number of the participants in the data sample. 
To estimate the ATE, we use formula (2.8) in which there remains a component 
)D|Y(E 01 = that requires an estimator. A similar matching procedure is applied to estimate 
this term. Each non-participant is matched with one or more participants who have the closest 
value of X. Put differently, we can estimate the effect of non-treatment on the non-treated: 
)0|()0|( 01 =−== DYEDYEANTT  
using an estimator similar to (4.23): 
An introduction to alternative methods in program evaluation 
Essays on impact evaluation: new empirical evidence from Vietnam 39
∑ ∑
= = ⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ −= 2
1 1
10
2
),(1ˆ
n
j
n
i
ij
jt
YijwY
n
TTAN  (4.24) 
where n2 is the number of the non-participants in the sample. njt is the number of participants 
matched with a non-participant j, and w(j,i) are weights attached to each participant i in this 
matching. 
Thus using (2.8) the estimator of ATE is expressed as follows: 
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To this end, there are still two essential issues that have not been discussed. The first is 
how to select non-participants and participants for matching. The second is how to determine 
weights w(i,j) among these matched people. 
 
Methods to find a matched sample 
Clearly, matched non-participants should have X closest to X of participants. There will be no 
problem if there is a single conditioning variable X. However X is often a vector of variables, 
and finding ‘close’ non-participants to match with a participant is not straightforward. In the 
literature on impact evaluation, there are three widely-used methods to find matched non-
participants for a participant (and vice versa matched participants for a non-participant). 
The first method is called subclassification of the treatment and control group based on 
X (see e.g. Cochran and Chambers, 1965; Cochran, 1968). All participants and non-
participants are classified into blocks according to the value of X. This means that subjects in 
a block have the same value of X. Then non-participants will be matched with participants in 
each block. However the subclassification becomes difficult when there are many variables X 
or when some variables of X are continuous or discrete with many values. 
The second method is called covariate matching and matches participants with non-
participants based on their distance of variables defined on some metric (Rubin, 1979, 1980). 
Since X can be considered as a vector in a space, the closeness between two sets of X can be 
defined by a distance metric. A non-participant j will be matched with a participant i if the 
distance from Xj to Xi is smallest as compared with other non-participants. A quickly 
emerging metric in space is the traditional Euclidean metric: 
( ) ( )jijiEjiE XXXXXXjid −′−=−=),(  (4.26) 
However this metric is sensitive to the measure unit of X. To get a unit-free metric 
distance, a natural way is to standardize the Euclidean metric by multiplying it with the 
inversed covariance matrix of X to get the Mahalanobis metric (Rubin, 1979, 1980) or the 
inversed variance matrix of X (Abadie and Imbens, 2002):11 
( ) ( )jiXjiMjiM XXSXXXXjid −′−=−= −1),(  (4.27) 
( ) ( )jiXjiVjiV XXVXXXXjid −′−=−= −1),(  (4.28) 
where SX and VX are the covariance and variance of X in the sample. 
The third way to find the matched sample is the propensity score matching. Since a 
paper by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), matching is often conducted based on the probability 
of being assigned to the program, which is called the propensity score. Rosenbaum and Rubin 
                                                 
11 The Mahalanobis metric is presented in Mahalanobis (1936).  
Chapter 2 
 Essays on impact evaluation: new empirical evidence from Vietnam 40 
(1983) show that if the potential outcomes are independent of the program assignment given 
X, then they are also independent of the program assignment given the balance score. The 
balance score is any function of X but finer than p(X), which is the probability of participating 
in the program (the so-called propensity score). 
 
Proposition 4.3 (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). )(),(, 1010 XbDYYXDYY ⊥⇒⊥ , where )(Xb  
is any function such that [ ])()( XbfXp =  and )|()|1Pr()( XDEXDXp === . 
 
Proof: It is sufficient to show that: 
)](|1[)](,,|1[ 10 XbDPXbYYDP === . (4.29) 
 
Using the law of iterated expectation and noting that [ ])()( XbfXp = , we have the 
following equations: 
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Using the results of Proposition 4.3, the program impacts can be identified as follows: 
).0),(|()1),(|(
)0,|()1,|(
01
01)()(
=−==
=−===
DXbYEDXbYE                              
DXYEDXYEATTATE XX  (4.31) 
In fact, the propensity score is often selected as the balance score in estimating the 
program impacts. The propensity score can estimated parametrically or non-parametrically by 
running a regression of the treatment variable D on the conditioning variables X. Since D is a 
binary variable, a logit or probit model is often used. Once the propensity score is obtained for 
all subjects in the sample, non-participants can be matched with participants based on the 
closeness of the propensity scores12. 
Researchers can combine the three above methods - subclassification, covariate 
matching and propensity score matching - to find the matches (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1984, 
1985a). Subclassification can be performed for certain important variables X to ensure that 
participants and matched non-participants have the same value of these variables. 
 
Weighting methods of matched comparisons 
Once a metric distance, D(i,j), between a participant i and a non-participant j is defined, one 
can select methods to weight their outcomes. If each participant is matched with the one non-
participant with the minimum value of D(i,j), the weight w(i,j) equals 1 for all pairs of 
matches. This is called one nearest neighbour matching. When more than one non-participant 
                                                 
12 The propensity score can also be used instead of X in regressions to estimate program impact (see e.g. 
Wooldridge, 2001; Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1985a). 
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is matched with each participant (or vice versa), we need some way to define the weights 
attached to each non-participant. 
A number of methods use equal weights for all matches. N-nearest neighbour matching 
involves matching each participant with n non-participants who have the closest distances 
D(i,j). Each matched non-participant will receive weight njiw /1),( = . Caliper matching (see, 
e.g. Dehejia and Wahba, 1998; Smith and Todd, 2005) uses equal weights for matched 
subjects whose distance D(i,j) is smaller than a specific value, say 0.05 or 0.1. This criterion 
aims to ensure the quality of matching. Stratification (interval) matching divides the range of 
estimated distances into several strata (blocks) of equal ranges. Within each stratum, a 
participant is matched with all non-participants with equal weights (see, e.g. Dehejia and 
Wahba, 1998; Smith and Todd, 2005). 
However, it could be reasonable to assign different weights to different non-participants 
depending on metric distances between their covariates and the covariates of the matched 
participant. This argument motivates some other matching schemes such as kernel, local 
linear matching (see, e.g. Heckman et al., 1997b; Smith and Todd, 2005), and matching using 
weights of inversed propensity score (see, e.g. Hahn, 1998; Hirano et al., 2003). 
The kernel matching method matches a participant with one or many non-participants 
depending on a kernel function G and a selected bandwidth h. The weight is defined as: 
∑
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Kernel matching can be explained as kernel (non-parametric) estimation of 
counterfactual )1,|( 0 =DXYE  using sample information on non-participants. However, the 
kernel function results in biased estimation if the true regression line is linear. Fan (1992) 
shows that a so-called method of local linear regression is more flexible and robust in the face 
of different types of outcome function. This method estimates the regression curve by a series 
of local linear regression lines. Weights estimated from the local linear regression are as 
follows (Smith and Todd, 2005): 
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Finally, Hahn (1998) and Hirano et al. (2003) use the inversed propensity scores as 
weights to estimate the potential outcomes as follows: 
)(
)|( 1 Xp
YDXYE = , (4.34) 
)(1
)1()|( 0 Xp
DYXYE −
−= . (4.35) 
As a result, the conditional program impact is equal to: [ ]
[ ])(1)(
)(
)()( XpXp
XpDYATTATE XX −
−== . (4.36) 
Thus, these conditional impacts are estimated by: 
Chapter 2 
 Essays on impact evaluation: new empirical evidence from Vietnam 42 
[ ]
[ ]⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧
−
−== ∑
= )(ˆ1)(ˆ
)(ˆ1ˆˆ
)()(
ii
iii
XX  withi i
XX XpXp
XpDY
D
TTAETA
i
, (4.37) 
and the unconditional versions: 
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2.4.3.3 Advantages and disadvantages of matching method 
 
The main advantage of the matching method is that it does not rely on a specific functional 
form of the outcome, thereby avoiding assumptions on functional form, e.g. linearity 
imposition, and problems such as multicollinearity and heteroscedasticity. Compared with 
linear regression, the matching method does not require assumption (A.2.1) about the 
exogeneity of X. In addition, the matching method emphasizes the problem of common 
support, thereby avoiding the bias due to extrapolation to non-data region. Results from the 
matching method are easy to explain to policy-makers, since the idea of comparison of similar 
group is quite intuitive. 
However, the matching method has several limitations. It relies on the assumption of 
conditional mean independence. It also requires the assumption of common support. If this 
assumption does not hold, one can use a method of regression discontinuity, which will be 
discussed in the next section. Finally, the matching estimators can work very poorly in small 
samples if the quality of matches is not good, i.e. participants are matched with non-
participants who have very different conditioning variables X.13 
 
2.4.4 Discontinuity design 
 
For the matching method, the assumption about the common support is required to identify 
the program impacts. When the conditioning variables X are different for participants and 
non-participants, we cannot implement matching methods. In other words, if there are some 
variables X that predict the treatment variable D perfectly, the assumption of common support 
no longer holds. In Van der Klaauw (2002), it means that there is a conditioning variable S 
belonging to X such that D equals 1 if and only if S is larger than a specific value S .14 The 
assignment of the program is called deterministic. To make this assumption consistent with 
notation in this chapter, we assume that 1=D  if and only if XX ~≥ . Then we have: 
1)~|1( =≥= XXDP , (4.40) 
0)~|1( =<= XXDP . (4.41) 
Which means that the common support assumption 1)|1(0 <=< XDP  is not valid. 
We know that the regression method does not require a common support. As a result it 
can be applied in this context taking into account some important notes. Under the assumption 
about conditional mean independence, the conditional and unconditional program impact 
parameters are the same because of: 
                                                 
13 See e.g. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985b), and Heckman et al. (1998a)  
14 Heckman et al. (1999) presents the case in which 1=D  only if SS < . These two cases are similar.  
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)DX,|E(Y1)DX,|E(Y 00 0=== , (4.42) 
)DX,|E(Y1)DX,|E(Y 11 0=== , (4.43) 
which can be expressed as follows due to (4.40) and (4.41): 
)~,|()~,|( 00 XXXYEXXXYE <=≥ , (4.44) 
)~,|()~,|( 11 XXXYEXXXYE <=≥ . (4.45) 
If the potential outcomes are monotonous (as in the case of linear function with first-
order variables X), (4.44) and (4.45) are obtained only at the point X~X =  under a condition 
that the potential outcome are continuous at this point. Since the potential outcomes are 
functions of the error terms, we can state this assumption with respect to the error terms. 
 
Assumption 4.3. The conditional means of the error terms )|( 0 XE ε , and )|( 1 XE ε are 
continuous at X~ . (A.4.3) 
Under assumption (A.4.3) the matching method and other non-parametric estimation 
methods can be used to estimate the program impacts at the mass of X~ . This is called local 
treatment effect at X~  (see, e.g.Van der Klaauw, 2002; Hahn et al., 2001). 
The parametric approach can identify the program impact at the entire range of X. 
Thus the regression method presented in section 4.2 can be used to estimate the program 
impact parameters. But we need to assume that the parameters, i.e. 1100 βαβα ,,, , in the 
potential outcomes are the same in the ranges XX ~≥  and XX ~< . By running a regression of 
the potential outcomes (or observed outcomes), we use data on outcome of participants Y1 
with XX ~≥  to extrapolate the value of potential outcome Y1 for non-participants with XX ~< . 
Similarly, data on the outcome of non-participants Y0 with XX
~<  are used to extrapolate the 
value of potential outcome Y0 for participants with XX
~≥ . This method might lead to a so-
call extrapolation bias since we predict outcome values in regions of no observations. 
 
2.5 Methods assuming selection on unobservables 
 
As discussed, the main assumption that the methods of selection on observables rely on is the 
conditional independence between the potential outcomes and program assignment (or a 
weaker version of conditional mean independence). This assumption does not hold if there is 
an unobserved variable affecting both the potential outcome and program participation. This 
section presents three methods that are widely used in dealing with the problem of ‘selection 
on unobservables’. The methods include instrumental variable regression, sample selection 
models, and panel data models. 
 
2.5.1 Instrumental variables 
 
2.5.1.1 Program impact identification 
 
If there are unobserved variables affecting both the potential outcome and program 
participation, the program variable is endogenous in the outcome equation and OLS gives 
biased estimates. A standard solution to this endogeneity problem is to use one or more 
instrumental variables for the program assignment variable D. An instrumental variable has 
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two properties: (1) it is correlated with program assignment; and (2) it is uncorrelated with the 
error term in the potential outcomes.15 
To illustrate how the instrumental variables method identifies program impact, recall 
Equation 2.19: [ ] [ ]001010100 )())( εεεββααβα +−+−+−++= D(XD  XY . (5.1) 
Unless we can assume conditional mean independence between potential outcome and 
program assignment, D is endogenous, and we need an instrumental variable for D to estimate 
program impact. 
 
Assumption 5.1. There is at least an instrumental variable Z such that: 
0),( ≠ZDCov , 
)()|( 00 εε EZE = , (A.5.1) 
)(E)Z|(E 11 εε = . 
 
Proposition 5.1. Under assumptions (A.2.4) and (A.5.1), ATE(X), ATT(X), ATE and ATT are 
identified and estimated by the instrumental variables method. 
 
Proof: 
Firstly we show that: [ ]( ) 0,)( 001 =+− ZDCov εεε . (5.2) 
Note that 00101 =−=− )D|(E)Z,D|(E εεεε  because of (A.2.4) and (A.5.1), 
hence: [ ]( ) [ ]( ) ( )
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Similarly, we have: [ ]( ) 0,)( 001 =+− XDCov εεε , (5.3) 
[ ]( ) 0,)( 001 =+− XZDCov εεε . (5.4) 
Then we have the following covariance equations due to (5.2), (5.3) and (5.4): [ ] [ ]{ }
),)(Z,XD(Cov))(Z,D(Cov)Z,X(Cov                  
Z,)(D)(X)(DXCov)Z,Y(Cov
01010
001010100
ββααβ
εεεββααβα
−+−+=
+−+−+−++=
 (5.5) 
[ ] [ ]{ }
),)(X,XD(Cov))(X,D(Cov)X(Var                  
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 (5.6) 
[ ] [ ]{ }
))(XZ,XD(Cov))(XZ,D(Cov)XZ,X(Cov                  
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01010
001010100
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 (5.7) 
It is obvious that the number of unknown parameters is equal to the number of 
equations. Thus the parameters in (2.19) are estimated without bias, and so are the 
conditional and unconditional ATE and ATT. 
 
                                                 
15 Examples of instrumental variables can be seen in econometrics textbooks such as Wooldridge (2001), Greene 
(2003) or papers on review of impact evaluation such as Moffitt (1991). 
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It should be noted that Equation (2.19) includes the interaction between X and D. Thus 
it is considered to include endogenous variables D and XD, and we use instrumental variables 
Z and XZ to solve the endogeneity problem. 
While Equation (2.19) imposes equal expectation of the error terms between program 
and no-program state conditional on X for participants (A.2.4), it allows for the program 
impact to be different across subjects. If we are willing to invoke an assumption on 
homogenous impact given X, i.e. 10 εε = , which is stronger than assumption (A.5.1), then 
(5.1) becomes simpler: [ ] 0010100 )()( εββααβα +−+−++= XDXY . (5.8) 
There is no component 1ε in (5.8), thus the condition 01 =)Z,(Cov ε in (A.5.1) can be dropped. 
The instrumental variable method is presented above for just-identification, i.e. only 
one instrumental variable. The case of over-identification in which there are more than one 
instrumental variable for the treatment variable D can be solved easily by applying two-stage 
least square regression (see, e.g. Wooldridge, 2001).16 
 
2.5.1.2 Local average treatment effect 
 
The instrumental variable method presented in the above section is standard. It requires 
assumption (A.2.4) to identify program impact. Imbens and Angrist (1994) propose another 
method of instrumental variables that does not rely on assumption (A.2.4) in identifying a so-
called local average treatment effect (LATE). The LATE parameter measures the effect of the 
program on those who change program status due to a change in an instrumental variable Z. 
As Z is defined as a policy or a set of policies, one would be interested in the impact of a 
program on those who are included in the program as a result of policy changes. 
To formalize the definition, suppose there is an instrumental variable Z, whose value 
changed from 0zZ =  to 1zZ = . As a result, there are a number of subjects who changed their 
status from non-participation to participation in the program. Furthermore, let D(z,X) denote 
the treatment variable D but be conditional on zZ =  for subjects with X. Then LATE is 
defined: [ ]1),(),(,| 0101),,( 10 =−−= XzDXzDXYYELATE zzX  (5.9) 
In addition to the condition of instrumental variables (A.5.1), Imbens and Angrist (1994) 
impose an additional assumption to identify LATE. 
 
Assumption 5.2. For all z and z’ of Z, either ),'(),( XzDXzD ≥ or )X,'z(D)X,z(D ≤ for all 
subjects. (A.5.2) 
In other words, if D can be expressed in a latent variable context, in which D = 1 if D* 
is greater than zero, and otherwise, then D* is required to be monotonous in Z. Once 
conditional on X, any subject should prefer to participate (or quit) the program as the 
instrument Z changes its value from z to z’. 
 
Proposition 5.2 (Imbens and Angrist, 1994). Under assumption (A.5.1) and (A.5.2), LATE is 
identified as follows: 
                                                 
16 For example, in the first stage the propensity score is estimated using instrumental variables. Then in the 
second stage, the predicted propensity score is used as an instrumental variable in the outcome equation.  
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where Y is the observed outcome, and the denominator is different from zero. 
 
Proof: We have [ ]{ }
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Subtract (5.11) from (5.12), we get 
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The last line results from assumption (A.5.2) that there is no person who quits the 
program due to the change in Z from z0 to z1. 
Hence: 
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 (5.14) 
The unconditional LATE is identified by taking the expectation of (5.10) over X. 
The parameters can be estimated non-parametrically since all variables in (5.10) are 
observed in sample data. 
 
Finally, it should be noted that Z can be a vector of instrumental variables, and LATE is 
defined as the program impact on those who participate in the program due to a change in a 
set of program policies. 
 
2.5.1.3 Advantages and disadvantages of instrumental variable methods 
 
The main advantage of the instrumental variable method is that it allows for the program 
selection based on unobservables. In addition, LATE can be identified by this method under 
very general conditions. However, the main problem in this method is to find good 
instrumental variables. A variable that is correlated with the program selection is often 
correlated with outcomes and error terms in the potential outcome equations. Using an invalid 
instrumental variable that does not satisfy the instrument conditions will lead to biased and 
inconsistent estimates of the program impacts. In contrast, a variable that is uncorrelated with 
the error terms can be very weakly correlated with the program selection. Estimation with 
weak instruments can result in large standard errors in small samples. In addition, explanation 
of this method to policy-makers is not straightforward. 
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2.5.2 Sample selection models 
 
2.5.2.1 Program impact identification 
 
Impacts of a program can be identified using a sample selection model (Heckman, 1978). 
Recall that we cannot run regression of the potential outcomes using sample data in the 
presence of the selection bias because of the non-random missing data. For example, in the 
equation of Y0 there is no data on the dependent variable for those who participated in the 
program. This is similar to the case of the censored dependent variable model, in which the 
dependent variables is censored according to a selection mechanism. Under assumptions 
about distribution between the error term in the program selection and the error terms in the 
potential outcome equations, we can estimate coefficients in the potential outcomes without 
any bias. 
Let’s write the impact evaluation model again: 
The potential outcomes: 
0000 εβα ++= XY , 
1111 εβα ++= XY , 
and the outcome that we observe is: 
01 )1( YDDYY −+= , 
where D is determined by the following framework: 
vWD* +=θ , 
1=D  if 0>*D , 
0=D  otherwise. 
As in (2.19), the equation of the observed outcome is: [ ] [ ]001010100 )())( εεεββααβα +−+−+−++= D(XDXY  
ATE(X) and ATT(X) can be estimated without bias if we are able to get unbiased estimators of 
)( 01 αα − , and )( 01 ββ − , and the term, )1,|( 01 =− DXE εε . 
If we estimate coefficients in (2.19) directly, the term [ ]001 εεε +− D)(  that is correlated 
with X and D will enter the error term. As a result, the coefficient estimators will be biased 
due to the endogeneity of X and D. To avoid this problem, we need to model the term [ ]001 εεε +− D)(  under an assumption about the relation between error terms 10 ,, εεv . 
 
Assumption 5.3. The error term v in the program participation equation and each of the error 
terms ε0, ε1 in the potential outcome equations follows the following bivariate normal 
distributions: 
),(0,0,1,N~)(v, 2 00 0 ρσε ε  
),(0,0,1,N~)(v, 2 11 1 ρσε ε  (A.5.3) 
To get the unbiased estimators of the conditional parameters, we need an assumption on 
the exogeneity of X in the potential outcome equations, i.e. assumption (A.2.1). 
 
Proposition 5.3. Under assumptions (A.5.3), ATE(X), ATT(X), ATE and ATT are identified. 
 
Proof: We have the conditional expectation of the observed outcome in Equation (2.19): [ ] [ ]{ }DXDE (XDXDXYE ,)())(),|( 001010100 εεεββααβα +−+−+−++= , (5.15) 
in which: 
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where the fourth lines results from the definition of the truncated distribution (see, e.g. 
Greene (2003)). (.)φ  and (.)Φ  are the probability density function and the cumulative 
probability function of the standard normal distribution, respectively. 
Hence (5.15) has the form: [ ]
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 (5.17) 
where u is an error term. (5.17) can be estimated by OLS or maximum likelihood 
methods. Estimates of θ  are obtained from estimation of the program selection 
equation, while )|1( XDP = is the propensity score that can be estimated parametrically 
or non-parametrically. 
To identify ATT(X), we need an estimage of the term )1,|( 01 =− DXE εε , which is 
equal to: 
( ) ( )( ) ,
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εε Φ=
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 (5.18) 
in which 
11 εσρ  and 00 εσρ are estimated from (5.17). 
 
Although there is no strict requirement on exclusion restriction, i.e. at least an 
instrumental variable included in W, such an instrumental variable should be included in W to 
avoid high multicollearity in (5.17). In addition, if we are able to find instrumental variables 
in W, the expectation of the error terms conditional on X and D can be estimated semi-
parametrically or non-parametrically without assumptions about the bivariate normal 
distribution of the error terms (see, e.g. Heckman, 1990; Powell, 1994). 
 
2.5.2.2 Advantages and disadvantages 
 
Similar to the method of instrumental variables, the main advantage of the sample selection 
method is that it allows for selection of a program based on unobservable. In addition, it is 
robust in the face of heterogeneous impacts of the program. However, the main problem in 
this method is that it requires the assumption about the functional form of the join distribution 
of the error terms in the selection equation and the potential outcome equations. In addition, a 
good instrumental variable is often needed to get efficient estimators of the program impact. 
However, finding a good instrument is rather difficult. It is also difficult to explain the 
method to policy-makers as well as the program administrators. 
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2.5.3 Panel data methods 
 
When longitudinal data or panel data on the participants and non-participants in a program 
before and after the program implementation are available, we can get unbiased estimators of 
program impacts which allow for ‘selection on unobservables’. Methods discussed here are 
based on the panel data at two points in time, since this type of data is most widely available. 
Panel data with many repeated observations are rare in reality. In addition, although there are 
different types of panel models such as pooled OLS regression, random effects, fixed effects, 
Hausman-Taylor regressions, and panel models combined with instruments, we discuss two 
popular methods which can be used to deal with the ‘selection on unobservables’. The first is 
called first-differences regression. The second is the difference-in-differences with matching 
methods. It should be noted that fixed-effects regression is also a widely-used method to deal 
with the ‘selection on unobservables’. Fixed-effect regression and first-differences regression 
rely on the same identification assumptions. In this section, we present the first-differences 
regression model, since it is relatively easier to illustrate the estimation strategy. In addition, 
the fixed-effects method and the first-differences method give the same estimation results in 
the context of two-period panel data. 
 
2.5.3.1 First-differences method 
 
To illustrate how the method identifies the program impact, let’s write the model of the 
outcome before the program implementation as follows: 
BBBBB XY 0000 εβα ++=  (5.19) 
where Y, X, and ε are outcome, conditioning variables, and error term, respectively. But they 
have the subscripts ‘0’ and ‘B’ that means ‘no program’ and ‘before the program’, 
respectively. Before the program, all people are in status of no program, and the observed 
outcome is the outcome in the absence of the program. 
After the program, the denotation of the potential outcomes is similar to the case of 
single cross-section data, but has an additional subscript ‘A’ that means ‘after the program’: 
AAAAA XY 0000 εβα ++=  (5.20) 
AAAAA XY 1111 εβα ++=  (5.21) 
Then, the conditional parameters of interest are expressed as follows: 
)|())( 010101)( AAAAAAAAX XE(XATE εεββαα −+−+−=  (5.22) 
)1,|())( 010101)( =−+−+−= DXE(XATT AAAAAAAAX εεββαα  (5.23) 
The key assumption in the first-differences method is that the error term includes a 
time-invariant component and any correlation between D and the error is included in this 
component. The time-invariant component can be called the fixed and unobserved effect. 
 
Assumption 5.4. Error terms in the potential outcome equations are decomposed into 
components with the following properties: 
BB 00 ηπε += , 
AA 00 ηπε += , 
AA 11 ηπε += , 
where: 
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ABAAB XXD ,|,, 100 ⊥ηηη  (A.5.4)17 
For identification of the program impact, we require a weaker assumption, in which the 
assumption (A.5.4) is stated in terms of expectation of errors. 
 
Assumption 5.4’. Error terms in the potential outcome equations are decomposed to 
components with the following properties: 
)|(),|(),|(),|(),|( 000 BABBABABBABAB XEDXEDXEDXEDXE ηπηπε +=+=  (5.24) 
)|(),|(),|(),|(),|( 000 BAABABAABABAA XEDXEDXEDXEDXE ηπηπε +=+=  (5.25) 
)|(),|(),|(),|(),|( 111 BAABABAABABAA XEDXEDXEDXEDXE ηπηπε +=+=  (5.26) 
where π  is a component with the expectation unchanged over time for the state of no 
program. η  is a component that is allowed to change over time, but its expectation is 
independent of D given the variables, { }ABBA XXX ,= . (A.5.4’) 
This assumption holds if the time-variant component of the error terms is independent 
of the program selection. However, assumption (A.5.4’) requires only the conditional mean 
independence of this component with respect to the program selection. 
In addition, to identify ATE(X) and ATT(X), we need assumptions on exogeneity of X, i.e. 
an assumption similar to (A.2.1): 
 
Assumption 5.5. 0),|(),|(),|( 100 === ABAABAABB XXEXXEXXE εεε  (A.5.5) 
 
Proposition 5.4. Under assumptions (A.5.4) and (A.5.7), ATE(X), ATT(X), ATE and ATT are 
identified and can be estimated by OLS regression. 
 
Proof: 
Firstly, under assumption (A.5.4) and (A.5.5), ATE(X) and ATT(X) are identified and the 
same, since: 
0)|( 01 =− AAA XE εε , 
0,                                              
XXE                                              
XXE                                              
DXXEDXXE
ABAA
ABAA
ABAAABAA
=
−=
−=
=−==−
),|(
),|(
)1,,|()1,,|(
01
01
0101
εε
ηη
ηηεε
 
As a result, 0DXE AAA ==− )1,|( 01 εε . 
The estimator of ATE(X) and ATT(X) is the coefficient of D in the following 
equation: [ ] [ ]AAAAAAAAAAAA D(XDXY 001010100 )())( εεεββααβα +−+−+−++= , (5.27) 
To estimate )( AA 01 αα −  and )( AA 01 ββ − , subtract (5.19) from (5.25) to obtain: [ ]
[ ],)()(
))()()(
0001
010100000
BAAA
AAAAABBAABABA
D                   
(XDXXYY
εεεε
ββααββαα
−+−+
−+−+−+−=−
 (5.28) 
in which the error term has the traditional property due to the (A.5.4) and (A.5.5): 
                                                 
17 In some econometrics text, ABAAB X,X|D,, ⊥100 ηηη  is called strict exogeneity condition.  
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Thus, we can estimate all coefficients in (5.28) (also in (5.27)) without bias by 
running regression of the difference in observed outcome before and after the program 
on XB and XA, and the program selection variable D. Then, the estimates of these 
coefficients will be used to estimate the conditional and unconditional parameters of the 
program impact. 
 
2.5.3.2 Difference-in-differences with matching method 
 
The method of difference-in-differences with matching can be regarded as a non-parametric 
version of the first-differences method. It allows the program selection to be based on 
unobservable variables in the sense that it does not require the conditional independence 
assumption (A.4.1). It allows for bias in using the conditional expectation of outcome of non-
participants to predict the conditional expectation of outcome of participants if they had not 
participated in the program. However, it requires the bias to be time-invariant. Compared with 
the first-differences method, it has the advantage of requiring the assumption about the 
exogeneity of X to identify the program impact parameters. 
 
Proposition 5.4. Under assumptions (A.5.4), ATE(X), ATT(X), ATE and ATT are identified 
and can be estimated non-parametrically by the matching method. 
 
Proof: 
From (A.5.4), we get: 
),|(
)|(
),,|(),,|(
00
00
0000
ABBA
ABBA
ABBAABBA
XE                                          
XE                                          
DXXEDXXE
εε
ηη
ηηεε
−=
−=
−=−
 (5.30) 
where XBA denote all XB and XA. Thus, )( 00 BAE εε − is independent of D given XB and XA 
before and after the program. As a result: 
)1,|()0,|( 0000 =−==− DXEDXE BABABABA εεεε  (5.31) 
)1,|()1,|()0,|()0,|( 0000 =−===−=⇔ DXEDXEDXEDXE BABBAABABBAA εεεε  
)1,|()1,|()0,|()0,|( 0000 =−===−=⇔ DXYEDXYEDXYEDXYE BABBAABABBAA  (5.32) 
Recall that ATT(X) is equal to: 
1)D ,X|E(Y - 1)D ,X|E(Y  ATT BA0ABA1A)X,(X AB === . (5.33) 
Insert (5.32) into (5.33) to obtain: 
[ ] [ ][ ] [ ])0,|()1,|( - )0,|(-1)D ,X|E(Y  )1,|()1,|( )0,|()0,|(     
- 1)D ,X|E(Y - 1)D ,X|E(Y  ATT
0001A
0000
0A1A)X,(X AB
=−====
=−=+=−=
===
DXYEDXYEDXYE
DXYEDXYEDXYEDXYE
BABBABBAABA
BABBAABABBAA
BABA
 (5.34) 
Similarly, we can identify the conditional average effect of non-treatment on the 
non-treated (ANTT): 
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[ ] [ ][ ] [ ], )0,|()1,|( -)0,|(-1)D ,X|E(Y             )1,|()1,|( )0,|()0,|(                
 - )0D ,X|E(Y - )0D ,X|E(Y  ANTT
BA0BA0BA0BA1A
BA0BA1BA0BA1
BA0ABA1A)X,(X AB
=−====
=−=+=−=
===
DXYEDXYEDXYE
DXYEDXYEDXYEDXYE
BBA
BABA
 (5.35) 
which is the same as ATT(X). As a result, ATE(X) is identified, and it is equal to ATT(X). 
The unconditional parameters are also identified due to (2.13) and (2.14). 
 
The method of matching in this context is similar to what is described in section (4.2). 
However, as (5.35) indicates, a participant is matched with a non-participant based on their 
conditioning variables before and after the program, XB and XA. 
The above matching method requires panel data. If only independently pooled cross 
section data are available, the matching will be performed in a slightly different way. The 
identification assumption is revised as follows. 
 
Assumption 5.6. The difference in the conditional expectation of outcomes before and after 
program is the same for the participant and non-participants, i.e.:   [ ] [ ])0,|()0,|()1,|()1,|( 0000 =−===−= DXYEDXYEDXYEDXYE BBAABBAA  [ ] [ ])0,|()0,|()1,|()1,|( 0101 =−===−= DXYEDXYEDXYEDXYE BBAABBAA  (A.5.6) 
(A.5.6) is different from (A.5.4). For example, in condition (5.32) which results from 
assumption (A.5.4), all expectation terms include both XB and XA, while in the first equation 
of (A.5.6) the expectation terms include either XB or XA. 
There is no argument for whether assumption (A.5.6) is stronger than (5.32) or vice 
versa. 
Then, under this assumption (A.5.6), the ATT(X) is equal to: 
[ ] [ ][ ] [ ]. )0,|()1,|()0,|(-1)D ,X|E(Y               )1,|()1,|()0,|()0,|(-                
1)D ,X|E(Y - 1)D ,X|E(Y  ATT
000A1A
0000
A0AA1A)(XA
=−=−===
=−=+=−=
===
DXYEDXYEDXYE
DXYEDXYEDXYEDXYE
BBBBAA
BBAABBAA  (5.36) 
In implementation, firstly participants are matched to non-participants based on XB to 
estimate the difference in their outcome before the program. Secondly, after the program 
participants are matched to non-participants again but based on XA to estimate the difference 
in their outcome. Then, the estimate of the program impact ATT(X) is equal to the difference in 
the estimates before and after the program. That is why this method is also called double-
matching. 
Note that the term [ ])0,|()1,|( 00 =−= DXYEDXYE AA  in (A.5.6) is set equal to zero in 
conditional independence assumption (A.4.1). This is bias when the conditional expectation 
of outcome of non-participants is used to predict the conditional expectation of outcome of 
participants if they had not participated in the program. The matching method using single 
cross-section data assumes this bias equals zero once conditional on X. Thus, the difference-
in-difference matching method is more robust than the cross-section matching method in the 
sense that it allows this bias to differ from zero. However, it requires that this bias be time-
invariant. 
Similarly, under the second condition of (A.5.6), ANTT(X) is identified. It is the same as 
ATT(X). As a result ATE(X) is also the same as ATT(X). 
Based on (5.36), we can have the difference-in-differences with matching estimator of 
ATT as follows: 
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where n1 is the number of the participants in the data sample. AiY1  and AjY0 are the observed 
outcomes of participant i and matched non-participant j after the program, respectively. BiY0  
and BjY0  are the observed outcomes of participant i and matched non-participant j before the 
program, respectively. nic is the number of non-participants j who are matched with this 
participant, and w(i,j) the weight attached to the outcome of each non-participant.18 
 
2.5.3.3 Advantages and disadvantages of the panel data methods 
 
The main advantage of the panel data methods is that they allow for the program selection 
based on some unobservable variables. However, the methods have two disadvantages. The 
first is the requirement of the data set. Panel data that are collected before and after the 
program are not widely available as single cross-section data. The second is that the methods 
require two assumptions to identify ATE(X) and ATT(X). The assumptions require that 
unobservable variables that affect program selection are unchanged over time and unaffected 
by program status. These assumptions might be violated if the time period between two panel 
data sets is relatively long. In addition, the unobservable variables can be changed as subjects 
participate in the program. 
 
2.6 Conclusions 
 
The main issue in impact evaluation is missing data. We cannot observe subjects at the same 
time in both statuses: participation in a program and non-participation in the program. Unless 
the program is randomized, the missing data is not random. Subjects are selected in the 
program based on their decisions and program administrators’ decisions. Different methods in 
impact evaluation rely on different assumptions about the relation between the outcome 
process and the program selection process to construct the counterfactual so that the program 
impacts are identified. The chapter discusses alternative methods in terms of identification 
assumptions and estimation strategies in contexts of the two potential outcome equations and 
program selection equations with the allowance for heterogeneous program impacts. 
The selection of a method to evaluate the impact of a specific program depends mainly 
on the availability of the budget for impact evaluation and data sources. Ideally, impact 
evaluation based on randomization produces the most reliable results. However, 
randomization is often costly and not easily conducted, especially for targeted programs. Non-
randomized or non-experimental evaluation methods tend to be less costly, especially when 
available data can be used (there is no additional data collection). When the program selection 
is based on ‘observables’, simple impact evaluation methods such as regression and matching 
can be used. When the program selection is based on ‘unobservables’, instrumental variables 
regression is a reliable method provided that valid instruments are found. However, finding 
the instruments is not an easy task. If the instruments are lacking and panel data on the 
participants and non-participants are available, one can use fixed-effects regression or 
                                                 
18 These weights are defined non-negative and sum up to 1, i.e.: 1),(
1
=∑
=
icn
j
jiw . 
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difference-in-differences methods which are robust in the face of the program selection based 
on time-invariant unobservables. 
Finally, the measurement of program impact is often very complicated. In reality, the 
treatment variable D can be continuous instead of binary. In addition to the program to be 
assessed, there might be many other programs that can affect the participants and non-
participants of the program in question. Unless the program selection of others programs is 
uncorrelated with the selection program of the program to be assessed, the omission of other 
contemporaneous programs can lead to serious bias. Furthermore, subjects can participate in a 
program, e.g. training program or micro-credit program several times. Even if they are 
allowed to participate in a program one time, they can join the program at different points in 
time. However, data on subjects’ outcomes are often collected at the same point in time. 
Ignorance of these issues can mean that the results from impact evaluation are misinterpreted. 
All of these issues require further study to improve the literature on program impact 
evaluation. 
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Chapter 3  Impact evaluation of multiple overlapping programs 
under a conditional independence assumption 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The main objective of impact evaluation is to assess the extent to which a program has 
changed the outcomes of subjects.19 The average impact of a program on a group of subjects 
is defined as the difference between their outcome in the status of the program and their 
outcome in the status of no-program. However, for each subject, we are not able to observe 
the two potential outcomes at the same time. For example, for a participant in a program, we 
can observe her outcome in the presence of the program, but we cannot observe her outcome 
if she had not participated in the program, i.e. the outcome in the absence of the program. This 
missing data problem can be solved if the assumption of conditional independence of 
treatment and potential outcomes holds true (Rubin, 1977). Under this assumption, the 
program impact can be estimated by traditional cross-section regression and matching 
methods. The idea of the matching method is to compare the outcomes of participants and 
non-participants who have the similar distribution of conditioning pre-treatment variables. 
Matching by conditioning variables becomes difficult when there are a large number of 
these variables. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) prove that the program impact can be identified 
conditional on the probability of being assigned to the program (the so-called propensity 
score). Thus, multidimensional matching can be achieved by matching based on the 
propensity score instead of the conditioning variables. 
The literature on program impact evaluation often neglects other programs that 
simultaneously impact on participants and non-participants of the program in question. 
Imbens (1999) and Lechner (2001) extend the method of the propensity score matching 
(PSM) to multiple mutually exclusive programs. Frölich (2002) discusses different impact 
evaluation methods including those based on the conditional independence assumption (CIA) 
in a similar context. However, in reality the programs are often overlapping. Some people can 
join several programs at the same time. For example, for evaluation of a micro-credit program 
that is provided by a bank, the participants and non-participants in the program can receive 
credit from other sources such as private lenders, relatives and other credit institutions. 
Without taking into account the impacts of the other programs, the estimation of the impact of 
the program of interest can be biased. 
This chapter discusses the CIA-based methods consisting of cross-section regression 
and PSM in this more general context in which people may participate in several programs 
simultaneously. It is shown that the impact of a particular program can be identified and 
estimated using the methods of cross-section regression and PSM. Under the matching 
method, the impact of a program can be measured as a weighted average of impacts of the 
program on groups with various program statuses. Evidence from Monte Carlo simulation 
shows that this matching method can lead to lower mean-squared-error (MSE) than matching 
that simply uses variables of participation in other programs as conditioning variables. 
The chapter is organized as follows. The second section discusses the methods of cross-
section regression and PSM in impact evaluation of a single program. The third section 
                                                 
19 In the literature on impact evaluation, a broader term ‘treatment’ instead of program/project is sometimes used 
to refer to an intervention whose impact is evaluated. 
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extends the methods to the case of multiple overlapping programs. Simulation results are 
presented in the fourth section. Finally, the fifth section draws conclusions. 
 
3.2 Impact evaluation of a single program 
 
3.2.1 Problems and parameters of interest 
 
Suppose that some people in population P are assigned to a program, and denote D  as a 
binary variable for participation in the program, i.e. D  equals 1 if one participates in the 
program, and D  equals 0 otherwise. Further let 0Y  and 1Y  denote the potential outcomes 
corresponding to the states of program and no-program.20 
The impact of the program on the outcome of person i is measured by the following 
difference: 
iii YY 01 −=Δ  (2.1) 
This is the difference between the outcome of the person when she participates in the 
program and the potential outcome of that person when she does not participate in the 
program. The problem is that we cannot observe both outcomes in equation (2.1) for one 
person. The unobservable outcome is called counterfactual. 
It is almost impossible to estimate the program impact for each person (Heckman et al., 
1999), since we never know the counterfactual outcome. However, an average program 
impact can be estimated for a group of subjects. Two parameters that are most popular are the 
Average Treatment Effect (ATE), and the Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT) 21. 
ATE is the expected impact of the program on a person who is randomly selected and 
assigned into the program. It is defined as:22 
)()()()( 0101 YEYEYYEEATE −=−=Δ= . (2.2) 
ATT is the expected impact of the program on the actual participants: 
)1()1()1()1|( 0101 =−===−==Δ= DYEDYEDYYEDEATT . (2.3) 
More generally, we can allow these parameters to vary across observed variables X, 
since one might be interested in program impact on certain groups that are specified by the X 
variables: 
( ) )|()|()|( 01 XYEXYEXEATE X −=Δ= , (2.4) 
and 
( ) )1,|()1,|()1,|( 01 =−===Δ= DXYEDXYEDXEATT X . (2.5) 
Estimation of ATE and ATT is not straightforward, since there are some components 
that we cannot observe directly. Equation (2.2) can be rewritten as: [ ]{ }
[ ]{ },)0Pr()0|()0|(
)1Pr()1|()1|()()(
01
0101
==−=+
==−==−=
DDYEDYE                                    
DDYEDYE YEYEATE
 (2.6) 
where Pr(D=1) and Pr(D=0) are proportions of participants and non-participants in the 
program, respectively. The first term in (2.6) is the very parameter ATT multiplied by the 
proportion of the participants, while the second term is the Average Treatment Effect of the 
                                                 
20 Y0 and Y1 can be vectors of outcomes, but for simplicity let’s consider a single outcome of interest. 
21 There are other parameters such as local average treatment effect, marginal treatment effect, or even effect of 
‘treatment on non-treated’ which measures what impact the program would have on the non-participants if they 
had participated in the program, etc. 
22 For simplicity, subscript i is dropped in some formulas. 
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Non-Treated (ATNT) multiplied by the proportion of the non-participants, which measures 
the effect that the non-participants would have gained if they had participated in the program: 
)0|()0|( 01 =−== DYEDYEATNT . (2.7) 
The problem with measuring ATE and ATT is that the counterfactual terms 
)D|Y(E 01 =  and )D|Y(E 10 =  are not observed and cannot be estimated directly. Different 
methods have been devised to estimate ATE and ATT under certain assumptions about how 
the program is assigned to people in the population and how the outcomes are determined. 
This chapter will discuss methods of regression and matching which rely on the conditional 
independence assumption (CIA). 
 
3.2.2 Impact evaluation under the conditional independence assumption 
 
A popular way to discuss program impact evaluation is to use a model of potential outcome 
equations (Heckman et al., 1999; Heckman, 2005), in which the potential outcomes 0Y  and 1Y  
are expressed as functions of conditioning variables, X: 
0000 εβα ++= XY , (2.8) 
1111 εβα ++= XY . (2.9) 
In fact, 0Y  and 1Y  can be any functions of X, not necessarily linearly or parametrically 
specified, and all identification strategies presented in this chapter are still valid when 0Y  and 
1Y  are non-linear functions of X. The assumption about the linear function is made for 
simplicity of the description of the regression methods. For the matching method, there is no 
assumption imposed on the functional form of the outcomes. 
Substituting (2.8) and (2.9) into (2.4) and (2.5), we get the conditional parameters, 
)X(ATE and )X(ATT : 
)|())( 010101)( XE(XATE X εεββαα −+−+−= , (2.10) 
)1,|())( 010101)( =−+−+−= DXE(XATT X εεββαα . (2.11) 
Without additional assumptions, (2.10) and (2.11) cannot be identified since they contain the 
unobserved terms, )|( 01 XE εε −  and )1,|( 01 =− DXE εε . The key assumption to identify the 
parameters using cross-section regressions or matching methods is the conditional 
independence assumption. 
 
Assumption 2.1 (CIA). XDY Y ⊥10 ,  (A.2.1) 
The assumption states that once conditioned on the variables X, the potential outcomes 
10  and YY  are independent of the program assignment. In Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), this 
assumption is called ignorability of treatment or conditional independence.23 
To estimate the conditional parameters using the regression method, it is required that X 
be exogenous in the potential outcome equations: 
 
                                                 
23 The assumption is sometimes stated in a weaker version called the conditional mean independence 
assumption, i.e. )|(),|( 00 XYEDXYE =  and )|(),|( 11 XYEDXYE = . In addition, if the parameter of interest is 
ATT, the required assumption is )|(),|( 00 XYEDXYE =  (or we only need XDY ⊥0  instead of XDYY ⊥10  , ). 
In the paper we often mention the CIA, since the conditional mean independence assumptions which involve the 
expectation terms are a bit abstract and difficult to interpret. 
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Assumption 2.2. 0)|()|( 10 == XEXE εε  (A.2.2) 
Under assumptions A.2.1 and A.2.2, the unobserved terms in the parameters 
)X(ATE and )X(ATT  vanish: 
0)|()|()|()1,|( 010101 =−=−==− XEXEXEDXE εεεεεε . (2.12) 
The two parameters )X(ATE and )X(ATT are the same, and they can be estimated without 
bias if coefficients 1010 ,,, ββαα  are estimated. It should be noted that the observed outcome 
equation can be written using a switching model (Quandt, 1972) as follows: [ ] [ ]00101010001 )()()()1( εεεββααβα +−+−+−++=−+= DXDX YDDYY . (2.13) 
The coefficients in (2.13) can be estimated without bias using OLS, since the error term 
has the conventional property [ ] 0),|(),|(,|)( 001001 =+−=+− DXEDXDEDXDE εεεεεε . (2.14) 
Matching is a non-parametric method to estimate )X(ATE and )X(ATT under the CIA. We 
have: 
)0,|()1,|()|()|( 0101)( =−==−= DXYEDXYEXYEXYEATE X , (2.15) 
)0,|()1,|()1,|()1,|( 0101)( =−===−== DXYEDXYEDXYEDXYEATT X . (2.16) 
As a result, )X(ATE and )X(ATT  are the same, and they can be estimated by comparing 
the outcome of the participants and the outcome of a so-called comparison group, which 
comprises subjects who do not participate in the program but have variables X identical to 
those of the participants. Thus the matching method assumes the existence of such a 
comparison group. This assumption is called common support. Let p(X) denote the propensity 
score, the conditional probability of participating in the program, given the pre-treatment 
variables X. Then, the common support assumption can be stated formally as follows: 
 
Assumption 2.3. 1)|1()(0 <==< XDPXp  (A.2.3) 
Compared with the parametric regression, it relaxes assumption on exogeneity of X, A.2.2 at 
the cost of the assumption on common support, A.2.3. 
The difficulty in the matching method is to how find matched non-participants for the 
participants when there are many variables X. A popular solution is proposed by Rosenbaum 
and Rubin (1983) who show that if the potential outcomes are independent of the program 
assignment given the variables X, then they are also independent of the program assignment 
given the propensity score.24 
 
Proposition 2.1 (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). 
)(),(, 1010 XpDYYXDYY ⊥⇒⊥ , 
where )|()|1Pr()( XDEXDXp === . 
Using this proposition, )X(ATE and )X(ATT are rewritten as: 
)0),(|()1),(|( 01)()( =−=== DXpYEDXpYEATTATE XX . (2.17) 
Thus non-participants are matched with the participants based on the propensity score. Once 
the comparison is constructed, the parameters of program impact can be estimated by 
comparing the outcome of the comparison and treatment groups. 
Finally, the unconditional parameters, ATE and ATT, can be identified and estimated by 
simply taking the expectation of the conditional parameters, )X(ATE and )X(ATT , since: 
                                                 
24 Other matching methods are subclassification (Cochran and Chambers, 1965) and (Cochran, 1968), and 
covariate matching (Rubin, 1979, 1980).  
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( ) ∫== X XXX dF(X)ATEATEE ATE )()( , (2.18) 
( ) ∫ == === 1| )()(1| )1DX XXDX D|dF(XATTATTE ATT , (2.19) 
where F(.) and F(.|D=1) are the distribution functions of X and X|D=1, respectively. 
 
3.3 Impact evaluation in multiple correlated programs under the conditional 
independence assumption 
 
For an illustration of the ideas, this section discusses impact evaluation in the case of two 
programs under the CIA. Estimation of program impacts in the case of multiple programs is 
very similar and presented in Appendix 3.2. 
 
3.3.1 Parameters of interest 
 
Suppose that there are two programs that are assigned to some people in the population. 
Denote D  as a vector variable of program participation for a person. D  contains two binary 
variable elements: 1d  and 2d , i.e. 
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=
2
1
d
d
D . 
where 11 =d  if the person receives program 1, and 01 =d  otherwise; similarly 12 =d  if the 
person receives program 2, and 02 =d  otherwise. As a result, the set of the potential 
treatments has 4 values: 
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⎛
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⎜⎜⎝
⎛
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=Ω
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0
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1
0
;
0
1
;
1
1
   D . (3.1) 
Further, let Y denote the observed value of an outcome of interest. This variable equals 
one of the potential outcomes in { }00011011 ;;; YYYYP
DY
=Ω . These potential outcomes correspond 
to the values of the participation variable D. The potential outcome PDY  can be written as a 
function of observed variables X and unobserved variables ε: 
11111111 εβα ++= XY , 
10101010 εβα ++= XY , 
01010101 εβα ++= XY , 
00000000 εβα ++= XY .25 
The observed outcome can be written in terms of the potential outcomes as follows: 
0002221111212122
21
0021012110211121
)()()(
)()()
)1)(1()1()1(
εβαεβαεβαεβα +++++++++++=
+−+−++−=
−−+−+−+=
XXdXdXdd    
YYYdYYdYYY -(Ydd    
YddYddYddYddY
211
00000100100001101121  (3.2) 
where: 
000 αα = , 
00101 ααα −= , 
00012 ααα −= , 
0001101112 ααααα +−−= , 
000 ββ = , 
                                                 
25 In some equations, the superscript ‘P’ is dropped for simplicity.  
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00101 βββ −= , 
00012 βββ −= , 
0001101112 βββββ +−−= , 
000 εε = , 
00101 εεε −= , 
00012 εεε −= , 
0001101112 εεεεε +−−= . 
This way of denotation has two advantages. Firstly, it implies the program variables d1 
and d2 that are interacted with the potential outcomes. For example, 12α means that a linear 
combination of α parameters that is multiplied with d1d2, while 1α means that a linear 
combination of α parameters that is multiplied with d1. Secondly, it allows for simple algebra 
when there are more than two programs (see Appendix 3.2), since there is a relation between 
the denoted parameters as follows: 
01000101 ααααα −=−= , 
00100012 ααααα −=−= , 
021110001101112 ααααααααα −−−=+−−= . 
We will focus on the impact of program 1d . The discussion of program 2d  is the same. 
Impact of program 1d on a person is equal to: 
)()()( 1111212122,,,0,,,11 2121 εβαεβαεε +++++=−=Δ == XXdYYd XddXddi . (3.3) 
The conditional parameters )X(ATE  and )X(ATT for 1d  are expressed as follows: [ ]
( )
[ ] [ ])|())(|(
|)(1
11112122
,,,0,,,1
1)(
2121
XEX)|E(dXXXdE                
XYYE                
XdEATE
122
XddXdd
iX
εεβαβα
εε
+++++=
−=
Δ=
==  (3.4) 
[ ]
( )
[ ] [ ])1,|(1))(1,|(
1,
1,|)(1
1111211121212
1,,,0,,,1
11)(
2121
=+=++++==
=−=
=Δ=
==
dXE)dX,|E(dXXdXdE               
dXYYE               
dXdEATT
2
XddXdd
iX
εεβαβα
εε  (3.5) 
Similar to the case of a single program, )X(ATE1  and )X(ATT1  are not identified without 
additional assumptions, since (3.4) and (3.5) contain unobserved components. It should be 
noted that there are two possibilities for correlation between 1d  and 2d . In the first case, 1d  is 
correlated with 2d  but once conditional on X, they are independent of each other, i.e. 
X|dd 21 ⊥ . (3.6) 
In this case the program impact of 1d  can be estimated similarly to the case of the single 
program, i.e. the program 2d  can be ignored provided that all variables X are controlled for. 
In the second case, there is a correlation between 1d  and 2d  even after conditional on X. 
This can be the case if participation in one program affects participation in the other program. 
For example, people getting the vocational training might be more eager to borrow micro-
credit given their characteristics X. 
To identify the program impacts, the CIA is expressed as follows: 
 
Assumption 3.1. XDY,Y,Y ,Y ⊥00011011 , where ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=
2
1
d
d
D . (A.3.1) 
We allow the correlation between 1d  and 2d  given X, thus the identification assumption that 
the methods rely on is the assumption A.3.1. Under the assumption A.3.1, the program 
impacts can be identified parametrically using the OLS regression method, and non-
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parametrically using the matching method. The unconditional parameters, ATE and ATT, can 
then be identified and estimated due to (2.18) and (2.19). 
 
3.3.2 Linear regression method 
 
Although regression can be estimated in any form, e.g. linear or non-linear, or even 
nonparametric, for simplicity this section shows how to estimate the program impacts 
parametrically using the linear regression method. 
As with a single program, we need an assumption on exogeneity of X in the potential 
outcome equations, i.e.: 
 
Assumption 3.2. ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 000011011 ==== X|EX|EX|EX|E εεεε  (A.3.2) 
 
Proposition 3.1. Under the assumptions A.3.1 and A.3.2, the linear regression produces 
unbiased estimators of all the conditional and unconditional parameters, )X(ATE1 , )X(ATT1 , 
1ATE  and 1ATT . 
The proof is very simple as follows. Firstly, the program impact parameters are 
identified under the assumption A.3.1 and A.3.2, since: [ ] 0)|( 112 =+ XEX)|E(d2 εε , (3.7) [ ] 0)1,|(1 11112 ==+= dXE)dX,|E(d2 εε .26 (3.8) 
Secondly, parameters 111212 ,,, βαβα  are estimated in an unbiased way from equation 
(3.2). Rewrite (3.2) as: 
).()()()( 0221112222111212200 εεεεβαβαβαβα +++++++++++= ddddXdXdXddXY 1211  (3.9) 
In which the error term has the following conventional property: 
.0                                                              
),,|(),,|(                                                                     
),,|(),,|(),,|d(
1201222
121112122112022111221
=
++
+=+++
ddXEddXEd
ddXEdddXEddddXdddE
εε
εεεεεε
 
Thus unbiased estimators of )X(ATE1  and )X(ATT1  are: [ ]1121212)( ˆˆ)|(ˆ)ˆˆ(1ˆ βαβα XXdEXETA X +++= , (3.10) [ ]11121212)( ˆˆ)1,|(ˆ)ˆˆ(1ˆ βαβα XdXdEXTTA X ++=+= , (3.11) 
where )|(ˆ 2 XdE  can be a sample mean of the variable d2 for given X. The unconditional 
parameters are estimated using (2.18) and (2.19). 
There are two points that should be noted. Firstly, the equation (3.9) allows for the 
overlap between participation in program 1d  and participation in program 2d . If the two 
programs are mutually exclusive, 21dd  will be equal to zero. Secondly, )X(ATE1  is not 
necessarily equal to )X(ATT1  as in the case of a single program. These two parameters are the 
same if the following equation holds: 
)d,X|d(E)X|d(E 1122 == . (3.12) 
Equation (3.12) holds if condition (3.6) is satisfied, i.e. 1d  and 2d  are independent conditional 
on X. 
 
                                                 
26 The proofs of (3.7) and (3.8) are presented in Appendix 3.1. 
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3.3.3 Matching method 
 
Suppose we are interested in the impact of program d1. The program impact is measured by 
the parameters )X(ATE1  and )X(ATT1  as follows: 
)|(1 01)( 11 XYYEATE ddX == −= , (3.13) 
)1,(1 101)( 11 =−= == dXYYEATT ddX . (3.14) 
To express the two parameters in terms of the four potential outcomes, we rearrange 
(3.14): 
[ ][ ][ ][ ]      ).1,|0Pr()0,1,|()0,1,|(                   )1,|1Pr()1,1,|()1,1,|(               
)1,|0Pr()0,1,|()1,|1Pr()1,1,|( -                  
)1,|0Pr()0,1,|()1,|1Pr()1,1,|(               
)1,|()1,|(1
1221002110
1221012111
122100122101
122110122111
1011)( 11
====−==+
====−===
====+====
====+=====
=−== ==
dXdddXYEddXYE
dXdddXYEddXYE
dXdddXYEdXdddXYE
dXdddXYEdXdddXYE
dXYEdXYEATT ddX
 (3.15) 
It is worth noting two points in (3.15). Firstly, (3.15) allows for the overlap between 
participation in program 1d  and participation in program 2d . If the two programs are mutually 
exclusive, then )d,X|dPr( 11 12 ==  will be equal to 0, and )d,X|dPr( 10 12 == is equal to 1. 
In this case the implementation of the matching method is similar to the case of a single 
binary program, taking into account that the comparison group should exclude those who 
participate in program 2d . 
Secondly, (3.15) allows for correlation between 1d  and 2d given X. If the two programs 
are uncorrelated given X (i.e. condition (3.6) holds), then: 
)0,1,|()1,1,|( 21102111 ===== ddXYEddXYE , 
)0,1,|()1,1,|( 21002101 ===== ddXYEddXYE . 
As a result, the estimation of the program impacts is similar to the case of a single program. 
Similarly, the average treatment effect on the non-treated conditional on X is written as 
follows: 
[ ]
[ ]      dXdddXYEddXYE                   
 dXdddXYEddXYE                 
dXYEdXYEATNT ddX
).0,|0Pr()0,0,|()0,0,|(
)0,|1Pr()1,0,|()1,0,|(
)0,|()0,|(1
1221002110
1221012111
1011)( 11
====−==+
====−===
=−== ==
 (3.16) 
)X(ATE1 can be expressed in terms of the potential outcome 00011011 Y,Y,Y,Y  using Equation 
(2.6) and the results from (3.15) and (3.16): 
)X|dPr(ATNT)X|dPr(ATTATE )X()X()X( 01111 11 =+== . (3.17) 
In addition to the assumption A.3.1, to estimate )X(ATE1 and )X(ATT1 for program 1d  the 
matching method requires that there be remaining people who do not participate in the 
program 1d  but have identical distribution of the X variables given program 2d . This is the 
common support assumption: 
 
Assumption 3.3.  
1010 21 <==< )d,X|d(P  
1110 21 <==< )d,X|d(P  (A.3.3) 
Where )d,X|d(P 21 1=  is the conditional probability of being assigned the program 1d  given 
the X variables and 2d . 
This assumption can be written using denotation of the vector variable D: 
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10 <=< )X|DD(P *  where 
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=∈
0
0
1
0
0
1
1
1
 ; ; ;D D
* Ω  
However, assumption A.3.3 is mentioned to emphasize that the program of interest is 1d . 
 
Proposition 3.2. Under assumptions A.3.1 and A.3.3, the conditional and unconditional 
parameters, )X(ATE1 , )X(ATT1 , 1ATE  and 1ATT  are identified by the matching method. 
This proposition results from assumptions (A.3.1) and (A.3.3), which allow the 
unobservable outcomes in (3.15) and (3.16) to equal the observable outcomes: 
)1,0,|()1,1,|( 21012101 ===== ddXYEddXYE  (3.18) 
)0,0,|()0,1,|( 21002100 ===== ddXYEddXYE  (3.19) 
)1,1,|()1,0,|( 21112111 ===== ddXYEddXYE  (3.20) 
)0,1,|()0,0,|( 21102110 ===== ddXYEddXYE  (3.21) 
As a result, )X(ATT1  and )X(ATNT1  are identified. The parameter )X(ATE1  is identified as in 
(3.17). The unconditional parameters 1ATE  and 1ATT  can be identified simply by taking the 
expectation of the conditional parameters over the range of the X variables and 2d  as in 
Equations (2.18) and (2.19).27 
To estimate the parameters, the non-participants of program 1d  will be matched to 
participants of this program based on the closeness of the distance between the pre-treatment 
variables. The matching is performed for people who have the same program variable 2d , i.e. 
the participants and matched non-participants have the same participation status in program 
2d . 
Let icn  denote as the number of non-participants who are matched with the participant i, 
and let )j,i(w be the weight attached to the outcome of each matched non-participant j, 
j=1,…,nic. These weights are non-negative and sum up to 1, i.e. 
1),(
1
=∑
=
icn
j
jiw . 
Weights can be equal weights, e.g. as in n-nearest neighbour matching or different weights 
e.g. kernel matching. 
The estimator of )X(ATT1  at a given value X of the pre-treatment variables X is: 
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11 , (3.22) 
where 
1xn  is the number of units who have xX;d;d === 01 21 . 
2xn  is the number of units who have xX;d;d === 11 21 . 
iY1  and jY0  are the observed outcomes of participant i and non-participant j with X = X. 
To estimate )X(ATNT1 , each non-participant j is matched with jcn participants based on 
the closeness of variables X. The formula of the estimator of )(1 XATNT  is similar to (3.22): 
                                                 
27 If we are interested in the impact of the d1 program, we only need assumptions which are specified by (3.18) 
through (3.21) to identify the program impact. Assumption A.3.1 is a general (strong) one which is required to 
estimate impacts of any change in the program status on any group. For example, one can be interested in joint 
impact of the two programs on the treated, which is defined as: 
)1,1,(12 210011)( ==−= ddXYYEATT X . 
Then assumption A.3.1 guarantees that )0,0,()1,1,( 21002100 ===== ddXYEddXYE  so that )(12 XATT  can 
be identified. 
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where 
1xn′  is the number of units who have xX;d;d === 00 21 . 
2xn′  is the number of units who have xX;d;d === 10 21 . 
)j,i(w  is the weight attached to the outcome of participant i who is matched to non-
participant j. The weights are also non-negative and sum up to 1. 
iY1  and jY0  are the observed outcomes of participant i and non-participant j with X = X. 
The estimator of )X(ATE1 is the weighted average of the estimators of )X(ATT1  and 
)(1 XATNT  according to formula (3.17). 
Finally the estimators of the unconditional parameters are: 
{ } ∑∑ =∈ =∈== 1| )(1 1 1ˆ;1
11ˆ
dSx
xX
X X
TTA
SxdI
TTA , 
{ }∑∑ ∈ =∈= XSx xXX ETASxIETA )(1ˆ
11ˆ , 
where I{} is an indicator function that equals 1 if the value of {} is true, and 0 otherwise; SX is 
the space of the X variables in the data sample. 
 
3.3.4 Matching using the propensity score 
 
As mentioned, a popular way to perform matching is to use the propensity score (Rosenbaum 
and Rubin, 1983). Proposition 2.1 is simply extended to the case of two multiple overlapping 
programs as follows: 
 
Proposition 3.5. XDY,Y,Y ,Y ⊥00011011  ⇒  )|(,, , 00011011 XDPDYYYY ⊥ , 
where: 
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The proof is very similar to the case of one binary program in Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). 
The proposition means that if the CIA holds for the X variables, it also holds for the 
propensity scores. To perform the propensity score matching, a multinomial model can be 
used to predict the conditional probability of being assigned to each program status (4 statues) 
given X, i.e. ( )XddP |1,1 21 == , ( )XddP |0,1 21 == , ( )XddP |1,0 21 ==  and ( )XddP |0,0 21 == . 
The propensity scores will be selected depending on the program statuses of matched people. 
For example, if we want to match people having program status { }1,1 21 == dd  with those 
having { }0,1 21 == dd , the probabilities ( )XddP |1,1 21 ==  and ( )XddP |0,1 21 ==  will be used 
as the propensity scores. The inconvenience of this matching method is that the matching is 
performed using two propensity scores. 
Since we focus on the impact of a program of interest, (e.g. program 1d ), and use the 
estimators based on (3.22) and (3.23), we perform the matching with exact match on the 
participation in another program (program 2d in this discussion). As a result, we do not need to 
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use propensity score estimates from a multinomial model. More specifically, we can use a 
probit or logit model to predict ( )XdP |11 =  using one sample with 12 =d  and another sample 
with 02 =d . The predicted probabilities can be used as propensity scores to match participants 
with non-participants in the 1d  program who have the same participation status of the 
2d program. 
 
3.4 Results from Monte Carlo simulation 
 
3.4.1 Simulation design 
 
This section presents the simulation results of measuring ATT using the regression and PSM 
methods when there are two overlapping programs. Suppose that two programs 1d  and 2d  are 
implemented simultaneously, and we are interested in the impact of program 1d . 
Corresponding to the values of 1d  and 2d , there are 4 potential outcomes, which are 
expressed as functions of covariates X and error terms ε: 
002100 10 ε+++= XXY , (4.1) 
102110 10 ε+++= kXkXY , (4.2) 
012101 10 ε+++= kXkXY , (4.3) 
112111 10 ε+++= kXgXY . (4.4) 
Where X1 and X2 follow a bivariate normal distribution ).5.0 ,5 ,5 ,15 ,15(),,,,( 2121 NN =ρσσμμ  
Each error term follows a normal distribution ) ,(N),(N 50=σμ . Impacts of programs 1d  and 
2d  are changed by varying the coefficients of X1 and X2 from (1, 1) to (k, g). That the same 
coefficient k is specified in both (4.2) and (4.3) means if there is no correlation between 1d  
and 2d , ATE and ATT of 1d  are the same as those of 2d . The values of g and k will be 
changed to examine the sensitivity of the estimates to the magnitude of the program impacts. 
The assignment of programs 1d  and 2d  is designed in the two following scenarios: 
Scenario 1. 1d  and 2d  are correlated, but once conditional on X1 they are independent: 
111 uXW += , 
11 =d  if *1 WW 1< , 
01 =d  otherwise, 
and 
212 uXW += , 
12 =d  if *2 WW 2< , 
02 =d  otherwise, 
where error terms 1u  and 2u  each follow a normal distribution ) ,(N),(N 50=σμ . 
Scenario 2. Conditional on X1, 1d  and 2d  are still correlated. This happens when one 
participating in 1d  is more promoted to participate in 2d . 
111 uXW +=  
11 =d  if *1 WW 1<  
01 =d  otherwise, 
and 
2112 10 udXW +−= , 
12 =d  if *2 WW 2< , 
02 =d  otherwise, 
where error terms 1u  and 2u  each follow a normal distribution ) ,(N),(N 50=σμ . 
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3.4.2 Simulation results 
 
Table 3.1 and 3.2 present the simulation results of estimation of ATT of program 1d  using 
different estimators. In each table, there are four panels corresponding to the values of g and 
k. There are two OLS regression estimators, one without interactions between X and 1d , 2d : 
εββββββ ++++++= 215241322110 ddddXXY , 
and one with the interaction: 
εββββββββββ ++++++++++= 229218127116215241322110 dXdXdXdXddddXXY . 
There are three methods of matching estimation using the metric of the propensity 
score. The first is matching using two covariates X1 and X2. The second is matching using 
three covariates X1, X2 and 2d . The third uses the matching estimator given in (3.22). For each 
estimation strategy, there are three matching schemes to select non-participants and weight 
their outcomes, i.e. nearest-neighbour matching, three-nearest-neighbours matching, and 
kernel matching with bandwidth of 0.01. 
Table 3.1 presents the results in scenario 1. It is shown that in terms of MSE, the 
regression methods perform best since the models are correctly specified. When the value of 
the coefficients g and k are small, matching method 3 gives a slightly smaller MSE compared 
with matching methods 1 and 2. As the value of g and k increases, difference in MSE between 
the three matching methods increases. Method 3 results in the smallest MSE, then method 2, 
and method 1 gives the largest MSE. The trend happens regardless of sample size and 
matching scheme. In addition, compared with methods 1 and 2, method 3 works very well 
when the sample size is small (i.e. n = 250 and n = 500), and the kernel matching estimator is 
used. This result suggests matching method 3 should be used when the impacts of 1d  and 2d  
are expected to be large. 
The results of scenario 2 are presented in Table 3.2. Again the regression methods 
perform better than matching, especially in small samples. Matching method 1 gives 
substantial magnitude of MSE, since it is a biased estimator. It is evidence that although the 
participation in program 2d  does not affect the participation on program 1d , failing to control 
program 2d  will lead to bias in measuring the impact of program 1d  if they are correlated. 
Matching method 3 has a slightly smaller MSE compared with matching method 2 
when the value of g and k are small. As the value of g and k increases, method 3 results in 
much lower MSE compared to method 2, especially in the case of small sample sizes and 
kernel matching scheme. 
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Table 3.1. Mean impact ratio and MSE for two correlated programs: scenario 1. 
 
Measurement n = 250 n = 500 n = 1000 n = 3000 
Model parameter: k = 1.3; g = 1.5 
ATT   4.932  4.800  4.895  4.897 
Observed outcome  42.849  42.795  42.846  42.829 
Proportion with D1=1  0.241  0.240  0.240  0.240 
Proportion with D2=1  0.241  0.240  0.240  0.240 
Correlation between D1 and D2  0.303  0.305  0.305  0.306 
 IM  MSE IM MSE IM MSE IM  MSE 
Regression method         
Without interaction 0.978 0.879 0.983 0.407 0.964 0.242 0.962 0.100 
With interaction  0.998 0.906 0.992 0.436 0.974 0.244 0.972 0.089 
1 nearest neighbour matching        
Method 1 0.954 3.780 0.973 1.945 0.959 0.926 0.984 0.375 
Method 2 0.966 3.393 0.970 1.881 0.955 0.959 0.981 0.340 
Method 3 0.909 3.257 0.942 1.707 0.959 0.906 0.978 0.300 
3 nearest neighbours matching       
Method 1 0.891 2.912 0.936 1.309 0.945 0.721 0.973 0.257 
Method 2 0.888 2.615 0.937 1.258 0.942 0.676 0.973 0.226 
Method 3 0.820 2.797 0.904 1.138 0.926 0.664 0.966 0.213 
Kernel matching (bandwidth = 0.01)       
Method 1 1.220 3.192 1.163 1.465 1.081 0.574 1.032 0.197 
Method 2 1.225 2.939 1.158 1.244 1.076 0.519 1.032 0.163 
Method 3 1.129 3.509 1.090 1.167 1.049 0.457 1.018 0.134 
Model parameter: k = 1.5; g = 1.8 
ATT   8.066  8.033  8.008  8.053 
Observed outcome  44.709  44.692  44.678  44.706 
Proportion with D1=1  0.240  0.240  0.239  0.240 
Proportion with D2=1  0.240  0.241  0.240  0.240 
Correlation between D1 and D2  0.304  0.304  0.304  0.305 
 IM  MSE IM MSE IM MSE IM  MSE 
Regression method         
Without interaction 0.958 1.002 0.965 0.562 0.967 0.277 0.966 0.161 
With interaction  0.973 0.976 0.977 0.526 0.978 0.236 0.976 0.123 
1 nearest neighbour matching       
Method 1 0.941 5.953 0.970 3.030 0.982 1.374 0.993 0.467 
Method 2 0.937 4.472 0.979 2.393 0.981 1.219 0.995 0.419 
Method 3 0.897 4.595 0.953 2.084 0.971 0.959 0.988 0.334 
3 nearest neighbours matching       
Method 1 0.919 3.952 0.952 2.073 0.967 0.939 0.985 0.335 
Method 2 0.906 3.125 0.951 1.594 0.967 0.759 0.985 0.263 
Method 3 0.862 3.365 0.921 1.491 0.951 0.700 0.979 0.228 
Kernel matching (bandwidth = 0.01)       
Method 1 1.212 5.699 1.139 2.817 1.085 1.125 1.039 0.335 
Method 2 1.206 5.033 1.141 2.375 1.084 0.867 1.039 0.263 
Method 3 1.083 3.508 1.065 1.438 1.049 0.595 1.024 0.184 
Model parameter: k = 1.8; g = 2.1 
ATT   12.075  12.161  12.040  12.148 
Observed outcome  47.345  47.324  47.346  47.354 
Proportion with D1=1  0.239  0.239  0.240  0.240 
Proportion with D2=1  0.240  0.239  0.242  0.240 
Correlation between D1 and D2  0.304  0.306  0.308  0.305 
 IM  MSE IM MSE IM MSE IM  MSE 
Regression method         
Without interaction 0.945 1.648 0.953 0.909 0.955 0.580 0.957 0.379 
With interaction  0.959 1.322 0.963 0.683 0.965 0.423 0.967 0.251 
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Measurement n = 250 n = 500 n = 1000 n = 3000 
1 nearest neighbour matching       
Method 1 0.959 8.217 0.984 4.006 0.993 2.229 0.995 0.732 
Method 2 0.952 6.067 0.973 3.219 0.987 1.515 0.996 0.582 
Method 3 0.926 4.892 0.963 2.410 0.980 1.233 0.991 0.395 
3 nearest neighbours matching       
Method 1 0.936 6.168 0.975 2.715 0.985 1.484 0.989 0.526 
Method 2 0.934 3.805 0.967 1.913 0.979 0.942 0.989 0.347 
Method 3 0.888 4.378 0.939 1.862 0.968 0.812 0.984 0.266 
Kernel matching (bandwidth = 0.01)       
Method 1 1.223 12.339 1.156 5.595 1.097 2.522 1.041 0.632 
Method 2 1.218 10.153 1.148 4.459 1.091 1.818 1.040 0.452 
Method 3 1.072 5.609 1.061 1.908 1.047 0.823 1.022 0.234 
Model parameter: k = 2.1; g = 2.5 
ATT   16.557  16.528  16.594  16.618 
Observed outcome  50.016  50.087  50.082  50.075 
Proportion with D1=1  0.241  0.240  0.240  0.240 
Proportion with D2=1  0.240  0.240  0.240  0.240 
Correlation between D1 and D2  0.308  0.305  0.305  0.305 
 IM  MSE IM MSE IM MSE IM  MSE 
Regression method         
Without interaction 0.954 2.121 0.955 1.250 0.954 1.030 0.955 0.676 
With interaction  0.966 1.363 0.965 0.809 0.967 0.589 0.966 0.391 
1 nearest neighbour matching        
Method 1 0.987 12.143 0.985 6.430 0.988 3.286 0.992 1.155 
Method 2 0.974 8.933 0.990 4.593 0.995 2.412 0.994 0.804 
Method 3 0.956 5.398 0.969 2.660 0.985 1.452 0.994 0.454 
3 nearest neighbours matching       
Method 1 0.968 8.927 0.975 4.688 0.983 2.433 0.991 0.787 
Method 2 0.965 5.152 0.971 2.416 0.983 1.496 0.990 0.440 
Method 3 0.917 4.631 0.948 2.152 0.973 0.983 0.987 0.308 
Kernel matching (bandwidth = 0.01)       
Method 1 1.238 23.626 1.157 10.168 1.091 4.152 1.039 1.136 
Method 2 1.231 20.282 1.155 8.904 1.092 3.387 1.039 0.717 
Method 3 1.074 7.078 1.062 2.609 1.044 1.104 1.021 0.306 
IM: mean ratio of the impact estimate over the true impact. 
n is number of observations. 
Number of replications: 500. 
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Table 3.2. Mean impact ratio and MSE for two correlated programs: scenario 2. 
 
Measurement n = 250 n = 500 n = 1000 n = 3000 
Model parameter: k = 1.3; g = 1.5 
ATT   3.284  3.290  3.308  3.280 
Observed outcome  42.297  42.303  42.286  42.272 
Proportion with D1=1  0.241  0.240  0.241  0.240 
Proportion with D2=1  0.227  0.226  0.227  0.226 
Correlation between D1 and  0.754  0.755  0.755  0.755 
 IM  MSE IM MSE IM MSE IM  MSE 
Regression method         
Without interaction 0.950 2.554 0.940 0.226 0.932 0.616 0.930 0.246 
With interaction  1.030 3.014 0.973 0.198 0.967 0.597 0.967 0.203 
1 nearest neighbour matching        
Method 1 2.312 17.374 2.218 16.043 2.193 15.554 2.215 15.865 
Method 2 0.900 9.707 1.002 0.686 0.958 2.045 0.992 0.582 
Method 3 0.866 6.904 0.990 0.521 0.929 1.566 0.964 0.528 
3 nearest neighbours matching        
Method 1 2.253 14.679 2.194 15.341 2.153 14.282 2.202 15.464 
Method 2 0.758 7.338 0.973 0.486 0.929 1.344 0.970 0.406 
Method 3 0.726 6.863 0.963 0.333 0.897 1.155 0.951 0.334 
Kernel matching (bandwidth = 0.01)       
Method 1 2.929 28.542 2.298 18.037 2.399 20.617 2.301 18.027 
Method 2 1.444 6.788 1.027 0.414 1.081 1.290 1.025 0.333 
Method 3 1.108 6.794 1.002 0.273 1.002 0.869 0.991 0.236 
Model parameter: k = 1.5; g = 1.8 
ATT   5.266  5.260  5.227  5.230 
Observed outcome  43.766  43.761  43.740  43.768 
Proportion with D1=1  0.239  0.239  0.239  0.240 
Proportion with D2=1  0.225  0.225  0.225  0.226 
Correlation between D1 and  0.752  0.758  0.754  0.755 
 IM  MSE IM MSE IM MSE IM  MSE 
Regression method         
Without interaction 0.945 2.615 0.911 1.736 0.928 0.857 0.931 0.342 
With interaction  0.989 2.876 0.951 1.614 0.962 0.702 0.965 0.233 
1 nearest neighbour matching        
Method 1 2.278 44.531 2.257 42.849 2.257 43.195 2.269 44.006 
Method 2 0.956 9.136 0.957 4.939 0.955 2.447 0.999 0.801 
Method 3 0.898 8.430 0.913 4.423 0.974 2.058 0.991 0.584 
3 nearest neighbours matching        
 Method 1 2.250 41.065 2.231 40.399 2.252 42.483 2.254 42.872 
Method 2 0.884 7.425 0.894 4.036 0.950 1.856 0.979 0.572 
Method 3 0.847 6.742 0.876 3.008 0.940 1.336 0.972 0.370 
Kernel matching (bandwidth = 0.01)       
Method 1 2.720 75.047 2.559 63.849 2.456 57.008 2.350 49.565 
Method 2 1.375 8.810 1.148 3.696 1.064 1.740 1.024 0.491 
Method 3 1.055 8.671 0.997 2.644 1.019 1.122 1.002 0.292 
Model parameter: k = 1.8; g = 2.1 
ATT   7.018  7.098  7.051  7.042 
Observed outcome  45.703  45.698  45.663  45.693 
Proportion with D1=1  0.239  0.242  0.240  0.240 
Proportion with D2=1  0.225  0.227  0.226  0.226 
Correlation between D1 and  0.755  0.749  0.754  0.755 
 IM  MSE IM MSE IM MSE IM  MSE 
Regression method         
Without interaction 0.892 4.696 0.900 2.311 0.896 1.392 0.900 0.767 
With interaction  0.926 4.165 0.932 1.892 0.930 0.974 0.935 0.443 
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Measurement n = 250 n = 500 n = 1000 n = 3000 
1 nearest neighbour matching        
Method 1 2.576 114.75 2.481 107.54 2.497 110.28 2.504 111.82 
Method 2 0.955 14.142 0.964 6.556 0.965 2.869 0.984 0.971 
Method 3 0.896 13.929 0.937 5.256 0.949 2.532 0.978 0.785 
3 nearest neighbour matching        
Method 1 2.552 109.60 2.467 104.52 2.484 107.71 2.496 110.51 
Method 2 0.873 13.271 0.909 4.950 0.950 2.053 0.972 0.691 
Method 3 0.832 10.659 0.893 3.338 0.930 1.455 0.969 0.499 
Kernel matching (bandwidth = 0.01)       
Method 1 3.047 188.06 2.810 157.47 2.705 141.69 2.595 125.42 
Method 2 1.498 21.826 1.200 6.489 1.068 2.173 1.013 0.581 
Method 3 1.003 11.925 0.998 2.970 0.990 1.191 0.993 0.331 
Model parameter: k = 2.1; g = 2.5 
ATT   9.530  9.439  9.551  9.536 
Observed outcome  47.750  47.766  47.788  47.779 
Proportion with D1=1  0.240  0.239  0.239  0.240 
Proportion with D2=1  0.226  0.226  0.225  0.226 
Correlation between D1 and  0.754  0.755  0.755  0.755 
 IM  MSE IM MSE IM MSE IM  MSE 
Regression method         
Without interaction 0.895 5.788 0.894 3.284 0.901 2.032 0.900 1.279 
With interaction  0.947 4.572 0.934 2.138 0.938 1.234 0.936 0.643 
1 nearest neighbour matching        
Method 1 2.591 218.83 2.568 213.13 2.534 211.74 2.528 211.66 
Method 2 0.943 16.232 0.953 7.744 0.978 3.651 0.991 1.136 
Method 3 0.930 12.843 0.936 5.958 0.971 2.608 0.982 0.885 
3 nearest neighbours matching        
Method 1 2.569 209.68 2.562 210.29 2.530 209.77 2.523 210.13 
Method 2 0.888 14.143 0.932 5.849 0.954 2.892 0.982 0.727 
Method 3 0.861 11.994 0.910 4.118 0.949 1.853 0.972 0.488 
Kernel matching (bandwidth = 0.01)       
Method 1 3.051 353.52 2.899 308.65 2.737 270.06 2.619 237.12 
Method 2 1.460 31.838 1.198 8.592 1.078 3.134 1.023 0.647 
Method 3 1.054 11.051 1.001 3.159 1.002 1.395 0.996 0.299 
IM: mean ratio of the impact estimate over the true impact. 
n is number of observations. 
Number of replications: 500. 
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3.5 Conclusions 
 
When measuring the impact of a program, one should be aware that participants and non-
participants can attend other simultaneous programs. If correlation between the selection of 
the program and the selection of the other programs vanishes once conditional on variables X, 
one can ignore those other programs. However, the simulation shows that controlling for the 
participation in the other programs leads to some gain in efficiency in terms of MSE. If the 
correlation remains even conditional on the X variables, neglect of the other programs will 
lead to biased estimation of the impact of the interested program. The PSM method can be 
used to measure the program impact in this case. In this chapter, the matching estimator is 
written as a weighted average of program impacts on groups with different program statuses. 
In other words, it combines the propensity score matching on the X variables and exact 
matching on the participation in the other programs. It is shown by the simulation that when 
impacts of the programs are high, this PSM method leads to lower MSE compared to other 
PSM estimations. The example of measurement of impacts of international and internal 
remittances also shows that this PSM method tends to result in lower standard errors, 
especially for the kernel matching scheme. 
Finally, it should be noted that this chapter is written as an independent essay on the 
matching method. This matching method is not applied in other empirical chapters, since it is 
developed in the context of a conditional independence assumption and single-cross section 
data, whereas the other empirical chapters employ fixed-effects regressions and difference-in-
differences methods which use panel data and do not rely on a conditional independence 
assumption. Developing efficient matching methods in a more general context which allows 
for program selection on unobservables and multiple correlated programs is beyond the scope 
of the paper, but certainly important for future research. 
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Appendix 3.1 Proof of equations 
 
The assumption (A.3.1) is equivalent to: 
X|D,,, ⊥00011011 εεεε  
As a result: [ ]
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Similarly, we will have 
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Appendix 3.2 The case of multiple overlapping binary programs 
 
Parameters of interest 
 
Now suppose that there are m programs that are assigned to subjects in population P. Denote 
participation in the programs by a vector variable D: 
( )md,...,d,dD 21= . 
where kd  is a variable that equals 1 if she participates in program k, and 0 otherwise. Subjects 
who do not participate in any program will have the value of the vector D equal 
to ( )000 ,...,,D = . In contrast, subjects who participate in all the programs will have the value of 
the vector D equal to ( )111 ,...,,D = . The set of the potential treatments has 2m values: 
⎪⎪
⎪
⎭
⎪⎪
⎪
⎬
⎫
⎪⎪
⎪
⎩
⎪⎪
⎪
⎨
⎧
⎟⎟
⎟⎟
⎟⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎜⎜
⎜⎜
⎝
⎛
⎟⎟
⎟⎟
⎟⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎜⎜
⎜⎜
⎝
⎛
⎟⎟
⎟⎟
⎟⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎜⎜
⎜⎜
⎝
⎛
=Ω
1
.
.
1
1
;;.
0
.
.
0
1
;
0
.
.
0
0
  ...  D .  
Corresponding to each value of the vector variable D, there is a potential outcome, 
denoted by PDY . Thus for each subject, there are 2
m potential outcomes. However we are able 
to observe only one outcome of those, depending on the realization of the vector variable D. 
The potential outcomes can be written as functions of the observed variables X and 
unobserved variable ε: 
DDD
P
D XY εβα ++= . (1) 
For example, when there are three programs, i.e. m=3, the potential outcomes are as 
follows: 
321321321321 ,,,,,,,, ddddddddd
P
ddd XY εβα ++= , 
which can be more specific as eight equations: 
000000000000 εβα ++= XY P , 
100100100100 εβα ++= XY P , 
010010010010 εβα ++= XY P , 
001001001001 εβα ++= XY P , 
110110110110 εβα ++= XY P , 
101101101101 εβα ++= XY P , 
011011011011 εβα ++= XY P , 
111111111111 εβα ++= XY P . 
Similar to (3.2), the observed outcome can be written in terms of 2m potential outcomes 
and the program variables, and then the variables X and ε as follows: 
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 (2) 
where: 
00\,1 === −= DdDdi ii ααα  with idD \ denotes the vector of the program variables not including id . 
Parameter 0\,1 == ii dDdα belongs to the equation of potential outcome with the participation in 
only the program di. And: 
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and the denotation is similar for β and ε. It should be noted that in this section, i (i=1,...,m) 
denotes program i, not observation i. 
For example, with three programs (m=3), Equation (2) becomes: 
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where: 
0000 αα = , 
00010001001 ααααα −=−= , 
00001000102 ααααα −=−= , 
00000100013 ααααα −=−= , 
02111012 ααααα −−−= , 
03201123 ααααα −−−= , 
03110113 ααααα −−−= , 
0321132312111123 ααααααααα −−−−−−−= , 
and the denotation is similar for β and ε. 
Suppose that we are interested in the impacts of program k which are measured by the 
two parameters: 
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(4) 
where kdDD \= , i.e. D  is the vector of program variables not including the dk program. 
In a more general case, one can estimate the impact of a treatment state gDD = relative 
to a treatment state hDD = : 
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)X|Y(E)X|Y(EATEgh P DD
P
DD)X( hg == −= , (5) 
)DD,X|Y(E)DD,X|Y(EATTgh g
P
DDg
P
DD)X( hg =−== == . (6) 
However, explanation of (5) and (6) is complicated and less practical. For simplicity, we 
focus on the impact of a particular program, e.g. program kd . 
 
Regression method 
 
Identification of the impact parameters of the program kd  is not straightforward, since there 
are unobserved terms in (3) and (4). As with two binary programs, to identify the parameters 
we need the CIA assumption:28 
 
Assumption 1. XDY PD |⊥ . (A.1) 
In addition, the assumption about the exogeneity of the X variables in all the equations of 
potential outcomes, i.e.: 
 
Assumption 2. 0=)X|(E Dε . (A.2) 
 
Proposition 1. Under the assumptions A.1 and A.2, the regression method produces unbiased 
estimators of all the conditional and unconditional parameters )X(ATEk , )X(ATTk , ATEk  and 
ATTk . 
The proof is similar to the case of two binary programs. The unobserved terms in (3) 
and (4) are equal to 0. In addition, the error term in Equation (2) has the conventional property 
that 0=)D,X|(E ε . Thus the conditional parameters )X(ATEk  and )X(ATTk  are estimated 
based on (3) and (4) using the coefficient estimates from Equation (2). Once the conditional 
parameters are estimated, the unconditional ones can also be estimated using Equations (2.18) 
and (2.19). It should be noted that the observed outcome Y can be any function of X, and the 
identification assumptions and estimation strategy are the same as the case of the linear 
function. 
 
Matching method 
 
In addition to the CIA, the matching method requires the assumption on common support to 
identify the impact parameters: 
 
Assumption 3. 1),|1(0 <=< DXdP k . (A.3) 
),|1( DXdP k =  is the conditional probability of participating in program dk given the X 
variables and other program variables. It is required that there be still subjects who do not 
participate in program dk but have the same variables X and participation statuses of the other 
programs (not including program dk) as those of the participants of program dk. 
It should be noted that the common support can be stated in terms of the probability of 
being assigned the treatment variable D, i.e.: 
10 <=< )X|DD(P * , 
                                                 
28 We can require a weaker assumption ‘conditional mean independence’ in order to identify the program impact 
parameters: ( ) ( )X|YED,X|YE P )D(P )D( = . 
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Proposition 2. Under the assumptions A.1 and A.3, the conditional and unconditional 
parameters )X(ATEk , )X(ATTk , ATEk  and ATTk for program kd  are identified by the 
matching method. 
 
Proof: 
Similar to (3.15), the )X(ATTk  is written as follows: 
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and )X(ATNTk : 
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where DΩ is the set of potential treatments (programs) kdDD \= . 
There are unobserved terms in (7) and (8), i.e.  
)0,,|( 1, ==== kgP dDD dDDXYE kg  
and 
)1,,|( 0, ==== kgP dDD dDDXYE kg .  
However, under assumptions (A.1) and (A.3), we have: 
)1,,|()0,,|( 1,1, ===== ==== kgP dDDkgP dDD dDDXYEdDDXYE kgkg , (9) 
)0,,|()1,,|( 0,0, ===== ==== kgP dDDkgP dDD dDDXYEdDDXYE kgkg . (10) 
If we substitute (9) and (10) into the conditional parameters of )X(ATTk  and 
)X(ATNTk , we can identify these parameters since all the terms are observed. The 
parameter )X(ATEk  is the weighted average of the )X(ATTk  and )X(ATNTk . The 
unconditional parameters are also identified by formulas (2.18) and (2.19). 
 
 
To estimate the program impacts, the participants of program kd  will be matched to the non-
participants based on the closeness of the distance in the X variables. In addition, the matching 
is performed for people who have the same program statuses D (except program kd ). The 
estimator of the )X(ATTk  has a similar form as in the case of two programs, i.e. formula 
(3.22), in which the sample mean outcomes of the participants are estimators of  
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)0,,|( 1, ==== kgP dDD dDDXYE kg , and the sample mean outcomes of the matched non-participants 
are estimators of )1,,|( 0, ==== kgP dDD dDDXYE kg .  
The estimator of the )X(ATNTk  has the formula similar to (3.23). Finally, the estimator 
of the )X(ATEk  is the weighted average of the estimators of the )X(ATTk  and )X(ATNTk . 
 
Matching using the propensity score 
 
Proposition 2.1 is extended to the case of multiple overlapping programs as follows: 
 
Proposition 3. )|(| XDPDYXDY PDPD ⊥⇒⊥ , 
As a result, if the CIA holds for the X variables, it also holds for the propensity score. Since 
we focus on the impact of a program of interest, e.g. program kd , and use the estimators 
based on (7) and (8), we will state the proposition in a different way which emphasizes a 
program of interest. 
 
Proposition 3’. ( )DXdPdYDXdY kkPDkPD ,|1, =⊥⇒⊥ , 
where kdDD \=  i.e. D  does not include kd , 
The proof is very similar to the case of one binary program in Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). 

Essays on impact evaluation: new empirical evidence from Vietnam 79
Chapter 4 The impact of a governmental micro-credit program and 
informal credit on poverty and inequality29 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Micro-finance is seen as an important tool for reaching the Millennium Development Goal of 
halving the proportion of poor people between 1990 and 2015. Micro-credit and other 
financial services would enable the poor to build assets, increase incomes, and reduce their 
vulnerability to economic stress. Credit markets are severely rationed for poor households. 
Commercial banks are not interested in poor clients because of information problems and lack 
of collateral (Hoff and Stiglitz, 1990; Nagarajan, et al., 1995; Kochar, 1997; Bell et al., 1997; 
Bose, 1998; Boucher et al., 2008). The poor do borrow from informal sources such as 
moneylenders, neighbours, relatives and local traders, but their resources are supposedly 
limited and, if charged, interest rates are mostly very high. Governments and NGOs have 
stepped into the gap and have provided credit for the poor, often at highly subsidized interest 
rates. 
While there is an intuitive appeal in providing cheap funds to the poor, these subsidies 
have been severely criticised. Subsidized banks and programs would push out informal credit 
suppliers on which the poor rely (Adams et al., 1984). They would also break down the 
rationing mechanism of the interest rate and cause credit to be allocated on the basis of 
politics or social concerns instead of productivity. Moreover, a steady inflow of money into 
financial institutions would decrease the incentives to collect savings deposits, leaving poor 
households with unattractive and inefficient ways to save. Critics of subsidized banks 
therefore argue that the poor would often have been better off without the subsidies 
(Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch, 2005). 
Given the wide popularity of microfinance, resulting in a large allocation of 
development funds, and the controversy about an essential element such as the level of the 
interest rate charged, it is important to evaluate the impact of ongoing programs. Yet, while 
there is ample anecdotal evidence consisting of individual success stories and, to a smaller 
extent, accounts of people who went bankrupt, the number of thorough quantitative 
evaluations is surprisingly limited. Although inefficient, State Banks in India are shown to 
have increased income for the poor (Burgess and Pande, 2002; Binswanger and Khandker, 
1995). Similar results have been found for, e.g. Bangladesh (Khandker, 1998, 2003; Zaman, 
2001), Indonesia (Robinson, 2001), Pakistan (Khandker and Faruqee, 2003), and a number of 
cases presented in the review paper of Morduch and Haley (2002). Other studies indicate that 
credit programs are not always effective in improving welfare and reducing poverty. For 
example, Diagne and Zeller (2001) did not find a statistically significant impact of micro-
credit programs on household income in Malawi. Similarly, Coleman (1999) found only 
negligible effects on household welfare of a micro-credit program in Thailand, and Morduch 
(1998) showed that most of the potential effects of micro-credit from the Grameen bank in 
Bangladesh were on vulnerability reduction instead of poverty reduction. 
                                                 
29 This chapter is written based on the paper Nguyen, V.C., Van den Berg M., and Bigman D. (2008), ‘The 
impact of Micro-Credit and Informal Credit on Poverty and Inequality: The Case of Vietnam’, which is currently 
submitted to a journal for possible publication. 
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Not only is the evidence mixed, there is no study yet that has achieved wide consensus 
as to its reliability (Armendáriz de Aghion and Morduch, 2005). Separating out the causal role 
of microfinance is extremely difficult. Microfinance programs do not lend to random citizens 
but carefully select areas in which they work and clients to whom they lend. Similarly, not all 
persons in the target group are equally interested in taking loans. Borrowers are therefore 
different from non-borrowers. Unfortunately, not all of these differences are easily measured. 
Borrowers may, for example, have a more entrepreneurial spirit and better business 
connections than non-borrowers. These unobserved differences, and not getting access to 
credit, may explain income and investment differences between borrowers and seemingly 
similar non-borrowers. Failing to account for this problem will lead to biased estimates of 
program impact, and the bias can be large. 
Although microfinance programs have been set up all over the developing and even the 
developed world, informal credit remains popular (Nagarajan et al., 1995; Kochar, 1997; Bell 
et al., 1997; Agénor and Montiel, 1999; Conning and Udry, 2005; Guirkinger, 1998). Micro-
credit programs do not require collateral, but they do screen borrowers by other eligibility 
criteria such as poverty status or repayment capacity. Moreover, repayment requirements are 
usually inflexible. As a result, not all the poor households may be able or willing to obtain 
micro-credit, and some may resort to informal credit. Despite the popular view of 
moneylenders as usurers, informal loans may help to increase capital and mitigate 
consumption fluctuations and thus enable the poor to grow out of poverty. While the existing 
lending capacity of the informal sector is supposedly limited, carefully designed government 
policies could help expanding available resources and thus indirectly increase the volume of 
informal loans. Moneylenders could be linked to banks to enable the use of formal sector 
money for loans to the poor (Fuentes, 1996, Varghese, 2005). On the other hand, financial 
policies can limit the terms and availability of informal loans: Subsidized programs may 
attract the best borrowers and leave the riskier clients with higher enforcement costs to non-
subsidized lenders (Morduch, 1999; Hoff and Stiglitz, 1990; Bose, 1998; Jain, 1999). When 
designing policies to increase credit access for the poor, it is therefore important to consider 
not only microfinance programs and other formal sources of credit, but also the informal 
credit market. Yet few countries have explicit policies aimed at strengthening the informal 
financial sector. 
Vietnam has set poverty reduction as a major goal of development policy. The poverty 
rate decreased remarkably from 29 percent to 16 percent during the period 2002-2006 
(according to Vietnam Household Living Standard Surveys (VHLSS) in 2002, 2004, and 
2006). The government has maintained an extensive public safety net system to support the 
poor in all dimensionalities of welfare. One of the most important antipoverty programs is the 
provision of credit for the poor. In 2003, the Vietnam Bank for Social Policies (VBSP) was 
established to provide the poor with preferential micro-credit. The poor can borrow from the 
bank at low interest rates without collateral. In December 2008, the total outstanding loans for 
the poor households were around VND 27,400 billion (VBSP, 2008). The total number of 
poor clients was around 8,100 thousand during 2003-2008. 
In addition to the VBSP, informal credit is also an important source for people in 
Vietnam. In the early 1990s, informal credit accounted for more than 70 percent of total credit 
in the rural areas (McCarty, 2001; Pham and Lensink, 2007). The proportion of informal 
loans decreased over time because of the growing role of formal credit. Using a data sample 
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of four provinces in Vietnam, Barslund and Tarp (2007) found that the informal loans still 
accounted for 36 percent of all loans in rural areas in 2003. 
This chapter analyzes the impact of VBSP and informal credit on poverty and 
inequality in Vietnam, which is interesting for at least four reasons. First, the Vietnamese 
government has spent huge amounts of money on microfinance: in 2003 it established the 
Vietnam Bank for Social Policies (VBSP) to consolidate the provision of preferential micro-
credit to the poor. The VBSP reportedly has received VND 1.515 trillion (US$ 100 million) in 
charter capital from the state budget and was scheduled to receive another VND 3.5 trillion 
(US$ 230 million). This funding is complemented by mandatory contributions of 2 percent of 
total VND deposits by the state-owned commercial banks, which will amount to 
approximately US$ 200 million, with rates negotiable (World Bank, 2004b). Second, nominal 
interest rates of VBSP are highly subsidized at about half the ‘market’ rates charged by most 
of the other microfinance programs (World Bank, 2007). The low and even negative real 
interest rates may have pushed out informal credit suppliers, weakened alternative programs, 
and/or caused high leakage rates to non-poor households (Burgess and Pande, 2005; Adams et 
al., 1984). VBSP credit may therefore not only not have reached the poor, but may have also 
limited the availability of alternative sources of credit which otherwise would have been 
available. Third, only a few previous studies have analyzed the quantitative impact of credit in 
Vietnam, and their findings are not consistent. Quach and Mullineux (2007) used the Vietnam 
Living Standard Surveys (VLSS) for 1993 and 1998 to measure the impact of total borrowing 
from both formal and informal sources. They found that credit can help increase household 
expenditure. Similarly, Nguyen (2008) found that micro-credit from VBSP had positive 
impacts on income, consumption and poverty reduction of the borrowers in the rural areas 
using the Vietnam Household Living Standard Surveys (VHLSS) for 2002 and 2004. Using 
the two most recent VHLSS − 2004 and 2006 − Pham and Lensink (2008) come to a different 
conclusion. They analyze the effects of micro-credit programs and formal credit on rural self-
employment profits and conclude that micro-credit does not affect household self-
employment profits, while credit from commercial banks seems to help households increase 
their self-employment profits. These studies indicate not only that the effect of credit may 
have changed over time, but also that the impact differs depending on the source of credit. 
Fourth, informal credit has mostly been ignored in both research and policy, while it is 
presumably a very important source of finance for the poor, given the substantial size of the 
informal sector and its generally low entrance barriers. If informal credit is indeed important 
for the poor, the government may shift their focus at least partly away from direct provision of 
credit to stimulating the linkages between the formal and the informal credit market. 
The present study adds to the limited existing evidence on the impact of credit in 
general and the contradicting and incomplete evidence of the impact of credit in Vietnam by 
studying the impact of the VBSP and informal credit on poverty and inequality in Vietnam 
using the VHLSS of 2004 and 2006. We apply fixed-effects regression using before-after 
program data from the Vietnam Household Living Standard Surveys (VHLSS) to account for 
the attribution problem described above. Based on the regressions, we compute the average 
effects of the VBSP and informal credit household expenditures and compute the impact of 
the program on poverty and inequality. 
The remainder of the chapter is structured into 4 sections. The second section presents 
background information on the VBSP and informal credit. The third section presents the 
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estimation method. Next, the empirical findings on impact measurement are presented in the 
fourth section. Finally, the fifth section concludes. 
 
4.2 The VBSP program and informal credit 
 
In this chapter and other empirical chapters, a household is classified as poor if their per 
capita expenditure is below the poverty line set up by WB and GSO. The poverty line is 
equivalent to the expenditure level that allows for nutritional needs with food consumption 
securing 2100 calories per day per person and some essential non-food consumption such as 
clothing and housing. The poverty lines for the years 2004 and 2006 are 2077 and 2560 
thousand VND, respectively.30 
Figure 4.1 shows that the poverty rate declined continuously over the period 1993-2006. 
The proportion of poor dropped dramatically from 58 percent in 1993 to 37 percent in 1998, 
and continued to decrease to 20 and 16 percent in 2004 and 2006, respectively. In rural areas, 
however, poverty was more prevalent than the country average, with a poverty rate of 20 
percent in 2006. The reduction of poverty was associated with a moderate increase in 
inequality. The Gini index based on expenditure per capita increased from 0.33 in 1993 to 
0.36 in 2006. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1. Poverty rate over the period 1993-2006 (in percent). Source: Author’s 
calculations using VHLSS in 1993, 1998, 2002, 2004, and 2006. 
 
 
The VBSP program is designed as a group-based lending scheme with credit disbursed 
among groups of 5 to 50 members living in a single village. The argument for the group-
based design is that monitoring of loan payments by group members would lead to high 
                                                 
30 1 USD is approximately equivalent to 15,777 and 16,054 VND in January 2004 and January 2006, 
respectively. 
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repayment rates (e.g. Coleman, 1999). This strategy seems to have been successful, as 
reported default rates are less than 2 percent (VBSP, 2005). 
The VBSP was established in 2003 as an independent public institute for the provision 
of government lending to the poor and other vulnerable groups. The creation of the VBSP 
meant a consolidation of government-lending for the poor, and since 2003 outreach and 
outstanding loans have increased continuously (VBSP, 2005). As indicated above, the 
program is highly subsidized. Average monthly interest rates increased from 0.26 to 0.36 
percent during the period 2004-2006, which amounts to about 4 percent on a yearly basis. 
Given that inflation was 7.7 percent over 2004, this implied that the real interest rate was 
minus 4 percent. For the sake of comparison, commercial banks used a yearly rate of 12 
percent for loans of 6-12 months with collateral. 
To apply for credit, a household first sends a formatted letter to their credit group. The 
credit group will arrange a meeting of all members to consider the relevance of the borrowing. 
They will determine which household can borrow, and the credit amount for corresponding 
households. The list of borrowing households will be prepared by the credit group and sent to 
the People Committee in that commune. Once the list has been approved by the People 
Committee, it will be sent to a VBSP branch for loan provision. Generally, the VBSP 
endorses the list sent by the People Committee. Households can then receive their loans at a 
VBSP branch in their locality or the VBSP staff brings the loans to the households. 
There are four criteria that a household should officially meet to become a member of a 
credit group. First, the household should have a long-term residence permit at the locality in 
which the group is located. Second, at least one household member should be able to work. 
Third, the household can receive credit on the condition that the credit is only used for 
income-generating activities, such as production, business, and services; the repair of a 
seriously damaged house; or to cover the education costs for primary and secondary school 
pupils. Finally, the household should be classified as poor by the local authority. The 
classification procedure is rather complicated. Basically, a village committee prepares a list of 
the poor based on their own criteria, which may for example include asset levels, food 
security, type of housing, and school attendance among children. The number and nature of 
the criteria differ widely between villages. The preliminary list is submitted to a commune-
level committee of Hunger Eradication and Poverty Reduction (HEPR), which conducts an 
income survey for all households on the list. The resulting incomes are compared to the 
income poverty line of the Ministry of Labour, War Invalids and Social Affairs (MOLISA), 
which was set relatively low at VND 80-100 thousands per capita in rural areas for the period 
2001-2005, the equivalent of about fifteen to twenty kg of rice. Those households with higher 
per capita income than this poverty line are not entitled to this credit. Finally, the refined list 
is updated by the village committee and the People’s Committee and People’s Council in an 
iterative procedure (MOLISA, 2003). 
To examine whether the program reached poor households, we classified households as 
poor if their per capita expenditure is below the poverty line as defined by GSO and WB and 
then compared credit use from the VBSP between poor and non-poor households using the 
data from VHLSS 2004 and 2006. This is not identical to the poverty criteria used as an 
eligibility criterion for credit group membership. The criteria for the latter classification are 
partly commune-specific and therefore not consistent throughout the population. Yet the 
overlap between the two classifications is quite large: more than 70 percent of those classified 
as poor according to the commune-level classification are also considered poor using the 
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GSO-WB poverty line. As noted earlier, the reverse cannot be said to be true, as poverty rates 
are more than twice as high using the GSO-WB classification. This implies that the GSO-WB 
classification, which we use in the remainder of this chapter, includes most of the poor 
according to the commune-level classification, a formal requirement for receiving VBSP 
credit, and many more households. 
The coverage rate of the VBSP was low: it includes only 7 percent of all households 
and twelve percent of the poor borrowed from the program in 2004 (Table 4.1). The share of 
poor people with VBSP loans has increased slightly to fifteen percent in 2006, with the 
overall share remaining almost constant. The average loan size was VND 3,576 thousand and 
4,414 in 2004 and 2006, respectively, which was about 23 percent of household income or 1.7 
times the per capita poverty line. 
 
 
Table 4.1. Borrowing from VBSP. 
 
 2004   2006   
Poor Non-poor Total Poor Non-poor Total 
11.8 5.7 6.8 14.5 5.9 7.0 % houses borrowing from VBSP 
[0.8] [0.3] [0.3] [1.0] [0.3] [0.3] 
3,167.0 3,749.7 3,576.2 4,118.4 4,528.4 4,413.7 Loan size per borrowing household (thousand VND) 
[116.5] [91.1] [72.9] [158.5] [121.8] [100.1] 
29.8 70.2 100 28.0 72.0 100 Distribution of the borrowing households 
[1.9] [1.9]  [1.8] [1.8]  
26.4 73.6 100 26.1 73.9 100 Distribution of loan across borrowing households 
[1.9] [1.9]  [2.0] [2.0]  
43.0 24.9 27.6 51.8 26.1 29.3 Ratio of loan to expenditure 
[2.0] [0.8] [0.8] [2.3] [1.0] [1.0] 
33.4 21.9 23.8 36.9 21.0 23.2 Ratio of loan to income 
[1.8] [0.7] [0.7] [1.6] [0.8] [0.8] 
0.26 0.26 0.26 0.34 0.36 0.36 Monthly interest (%) 
[0.02] [0.01] [0.01] [0.02] [0.01] [0.01] 
Number of observations 1,769 7,419 9,188 1,427 7,762 9,189 
Standard errors in brackets. Standard errors are corrected for sampling weights and cluster correlation. 
All money metric variables are in the 2004 price. 
Source: Author’s estimation from VHLSS 2004 and 2006. 
 
 
Leakage rates were very high. Only 30 and 28 percent of borrowing households were 
classified as poor in 2004 and 2006, respectively. Moreover, non-poor households on average 
obtained larger loans, such that in both years only 26 percent of outstanding credit was 
allocated to poor households, the official target group of the program. This indicates that 
eligibility criteria were not always upheld. According to Dufhues et al. (2002) credit groups 
and commune heads were reluctant to include poor households in the list of credit applicants 
as the non-poor are expected to be more reliable in using credit effectively and repaying 
loans. Moreover, the negative real interest rates will have added pressure to allocate loans to 
politically favoured residents, rather than the poor. Finally, the poor may tend to apply for 
fewer and lower loans than the non-poor, who have higher levels of assets and possibly skills. 
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There is a tendency towards contraction of informal credit. The percentage of 
households borrowing from informal credit was reduced from 70 percent in the early 1990s to 
20 and 16 in 2004 and 2006, respectively (Table 4.2). However, compared to the VBSP 
credit, informal credit covered a relatively large share of both poor and non-poor households: 
21 and 15 percent in 2006, respectively. The average loan size from informal sources was also 
higher than that from the VBSP. The non-poor had a much higher average loan size than the 
poor. In 2006, the informal loan size per borrowing household is VND 3,977 and 6,372 
thousand, for poor and non-poor respectively. The average informal interest rate was 0.53 
percent, nearly double that of VBSP credit, indicating that informal moneylenders provided 
an important share of informal credit. 
 
 
Table 4.2. Borrowing from informal sources. 
 
 2004   2006   
Poor Non-poor Total Poor Non-poor Total 
26.3 18.5 19.8 20.5 15.4 16.1 % houses borrowing from informal sources 
[1.2] [0.5] [0.5] [1.3] [0.5] [0.4] 
3,540.5 11,111.7 9,396.3 2,968.9 11,078.6 9,676.9 Loan size per borrowing household (thousand VND) 
[378.3] [1,151.8] [899.5] [247.9] [748.7] [629.2] 
22.7 77.3 100 17.3 82.7 100 Distribution of the borrowing households 
[1.1] [1.1]  [1.1] [1.1]  
8.5 91.5 100 5.3 94.7 100 Distribution of loan across borrowing households 
[1.3] [1.3]  [0.7] [0.7]  
45.9 63.1 61.5 38.0 53.8 52.8 Ratio of loan to expenditure 
[4.9] [9.5] [8.6] [3.3] [3.5] [3.2] 
33.8 50.0 48.3 26.2 42.6 41.4 Ratio of loan to income 
[3.5] [7.5] [6.7] [2.3] [2.9] [2.6] 
0.60 0.62 0.61 0.85 0.51 0.53 Monthly interest (%) 
[0.11] [0.09] [0.08] [0.19] [0.05] [0.05] 
Number of observations 1,769 7,419 9,188 1,427 7,762 9,189  
Standard errors in brackets. Standard errors are corrected for sampling weights and cluster correlation. 
Source: Author’s estimation from VHLSS 2004 and 2006. 
 
 
An interesting style is the coexistence of VBSP and informal credit. Among borrowers 
from the VBSP, the ratio of households also receiving informal credit was 18 percent in 2006 
(Table 4.3). This may indicate that credit from VBSP is not sufficient for households, and 
they have to resort to informal credit. Similarly, households who do not borrow from VBSP 
may use informal sources of credit. In 2006, around 16 percent of the non-borrowers from 
VBSP obtained informal credit. 
One important issue in examining the effectiveness of the credit is the use of credit. 
Tables 4.3 and 4.4 tabulate the loan size by the use purposes which are reported by 
households. Although credit is fungible, these tables might give some insight into how the 
credit are used. It shows that a large proportion of VBSP credit is used for investment and 
production capital. In 2006, the poor and non-poor households used 62 and 43 percent of 
VBSP loans for agricultural production and investment. However, the non-poor spent more 
credit on non-farm activities. In 2006, the poor and non-poor used 2 and 15 percent of the 
VBSP credit for non-farm production and investment, respectively. Credit was also used for 
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debt repayment and important needs such as house construction, healthcare and education. 
However, the food-poor households report that 7.4 percent of credit is used for consumption. 
 
 
Table 4.3. The use of VBSP credit. 
 
 2004   2006  Activities 
Poor Non-poor Total Poor Non-poor Total 
Investment and production       
Agriculture/Fishery/Aquaculture 56.5 44.5 47.6 61.7 42.8 47.8 
 [4.1] [2.6] [2.2] [4.2] [2.7] [2.3] 
Service and business 4.9 9.0 7.9 1.5 12.1 9.3 
 [1.5] [1.5] [1.1] [0.8] [2.0] [1.5] 
Other non-farm activities 2.0 5.5 4.6 0.7 2.9 2.3 
 [0.9] [1.3] [1.0] [0.5] [0.9] [0.7] 
Consumption       
Debt repayment 8.0 7.1 7.3 8.1 7.0 7.3 
 [2.3] [1.5] [1.2] [2.0] [1.2] [1.1] 
House construction/purchase 13.9 9.7 10.8 11.3 7.9 8.8 
 [3.1] [1.6] [1.5] [2.7] [1.4] [1.3] 
Education 0.9 4.6 3.6 0.5 3.3 2.6 
 [0.7] [1.2] [0.9] [0.3] [0.8] [0.6] 
Healthcare 1.0 6.2 4.8 1.2 4.1 3.3 
 [0.7] [1.2] [0.9] [0.7] [0.9] [0.7] 
Durable appliances  2.4 4.3 3.8 2.6 5.3 4.6 
 [1.0] [1.1] [0.9] [1.4] [1.4] [1.1] 
Other consumption 10.4 9.2 9.5 12.4 14.6 14.0 
 [2.5] [1.5] [1.3] [3.3] [1.9] [1.6] 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Number of observations 241 484 725 225 537 762 
Standard errors in brackets. Standard errors are corrected for sampling weights and cluster correlation. 
Source: Author’s estimation from VHLSS 2004 and 2006. 
 
 
Compared to VBSP credit, a smaller proportion of informal credit was used in 
production and investment. In 2006, the poor and non-poor households used 22 and 10 
percent of informal loans for agricultural production and investment, respectively. Regarding 
non-farm production, the poor and non-poor used around 3 and 18 percent of the informal 
credit. Most informal loans are used in consumption, especially house construction and 
purchase. 
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Table 4.4. The use of informal credit. 
 
 2004   2006  Activities 
Poor Non-poor Total Poor Non-poor Total 
Investment and production       
Agriculture/Fishery/Aquaculture 24.1 11.5 12.5 21.5 10.0 10.6 
 [3.8] [2.0] [1.9] [3.9] [1.5] [1.4] 
Service and business 3.6 24.2 22.4 1.6 15.9 15.1 
 [1.4] [6.6] [6.2] [1.0] [3.4] [3.3] 
Other non-farm activities 0.7 11.0 10.1 1.7 2.4 2.4 
 [0.4] [4.4] [4.1] [0.9] [0.7] [0.7] 
Consumption       
Debt repayment 5.3 4.1 4.2 10.3 6.0 6.2 
 [1.3] [1.1] [1.0] [2.7] [1.2] [1.2] 
House construction/purchase 29.4 21.7 22.4 36.4 31.7 32.0 
 [5.7] [3.3] [3.1] [5.5] [3.1] [3.0] 
Education 0.6 1.7 1.6 2.7 3.0 2.9 
 [0.3] [0.3] [0.3] [1.1] [0.5] [0.5] 
Healthcare 7.5 8.0 7.9 5.4 7.8 7.6 
 [1.7] [1.1] [1.0] [1.6] [1.2] [1.1] 
Durable appliances  5.7 2.7 3.0 1.5 3.5 3.4 
 [1.7] [0.5] [0.5] [0.8] [0.6] [0.6] 
Other consumption 23.1 15.3 15.9 19.0 19.7 19.7 
 [6.6] [2.5] [2.4] [2.8] [2.7] [2.6] 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Number of observations 498 1,572 2,070 305 1,363 1,668 
Standard errors in brackets. Standard errors are corrected for sampling weights and cluster correlation. 
Source: Author’s estimation from VHLSS 2004 and 2006. 
 
 
4.3 Impact evaluation methodology 
 
4.3.1 Impact of credit on expenditures 
 
To assess the impact of VBSP and informal credit, we assume welfare can be specified as 
follows: 
ijtjtijtijttijt CDXGY ηβββββ +++++= 43210 , (1) 
where Y is expenditure per capita. The subscripts i, j and t refer to household i in commune j 
at time t, respectively. Note that ‘per capita’ refers to the average per household member at 
period t. Per capita expenditure is thus calculated as total household expenditures at period t 
over the number of household members at period t. Gt is a year dummy, with a one for 2006; 
this dummy allows common macroeconomic changes between the two years to be controlled 
for. X and C are vectors of household and community level control variables. The vector D 
covers per capita VBSP credit and informal credit (i.e. average loan size per household 
member at period t). 
It should be noted that empirical studies sometime assume that income or expenditure 
follows a log-normal distribution, then (1) becomes: ( ) ijtjtijtijttijt CDXGY ηβββββ +++++= 43210ln  (1’) 
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However, we do not use this semi-log function in this chapter or other chapters, since this 
function imposes an unrealistic assumption on the increasing marginal impact of credit on 
income or consumption. We in fact experimented with including squared credit, and 
interactions between credit and other control variables (X) in (1’). However, since these terms 
appear to be insignificant, we do not present these results. Thus, we do not use semi-log 
functions. In addition, we do not estimate a double-logs function: ( ) ( ) ijtjtijtijttijt CDXGY ηβββββ +++++= 43210 lnln , (1’’) 
since there are many households without credit, and taking a logarithm of zero returns missing 
values. 
The main problem in estimating Equation (1) is the endogeneity of program 
participation. Borrowing can be correlated with unobserved characteristics of households, 
such as motivation for higher income or abilities and skills in business. Failure to control for 
such factors leads to biased estimates of program impact: if it is, for example, the better 
entrepreneurs who take a loan, and we do not directly include information on managerial 
capacity in our regression (because it is not available), a significant and positive coefficient 
for program participation is at least partly caused by these capacity differences and not by the 
program itself. 
In this study, we use the panel nature of the data to avoid endogeneity bias. A main 
assumption of the method used is that unobserved variables that are correlated with both 
outcome and program variables remained unchanged during the period 2004-2006, which is 
covered by the panel. We feel that it is reasonable to assume that the relevant variables, such 
as business and production skills or motivation for higher income, were time-invariant during 
such a short period of time. 
To show how the panel nature of the data helps solving the endogeneity problem, 
suppose the error term can be split into two components: a combined household and 
commune specific error, uij + vj, which is correlated with D but stable over time, and εijt, 
which is uncorrelated with D but is allowed to change over time. Equation (1) then becomes 
ijtjijjtijtijttijt uCDXGY ενβββββ +++++++= 43210 , (2) 
or alternatively 
ijtjtijtijttijijt CDXGY εβββββ +++++= 43210 , (3) 
which can be estimated without bias using fixed effects techniques. Please note that this 
method will fail to eliminate all endogeneity bias if the unobserved variables affect not only 
the level of the outcome but also its growth rate. Also, given the dynamic nature of the 
Vietnamese economy, income opportunities may have changed between 2004 and 2006, and, 
depending on unobserved characteristics, some households may be better able to use these 
than other households. Yet, we are confident that the estimation bias possibly resulting from 
these factors is relatively small. 
The marginal impact of credit is measured by 3β . We will also measure the impact of 
credit by calculating the Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT) (Heckman et al., 
1999). ATT is the expected impact of credit on borrowers (with D>0): ( ) ( )( )00 0 >−>= = ijtDijtijtijtt DYEDYEATT , (4) 
Where )0( )0( >= ijtDijt DYE  is the expected value of the outcome variable of the borrowers, i.e. 
expenditure per capita had they not received credit. This is not observed and has to be 
estimated. 
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Using Equation (1), we get ( ) ( )( )( )
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The ATT at time t is thus estimated by: 
∑
=
=
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i
ijt
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t Dn
TTA
1
3
ˆ1ˆ β , (6) 
where nt is the number of the borrowers at the time t. 
We estimate the standard error of the ATT estimates by using a non-parametric 
bootstrap technique. This bootstrap is implemented by repeatedly drawing samples from the 
original sample of the VHLSS panel data. Since the VHLSS sample selection follows 
stratified random cluster sampling, communes instead of households are bootstrapped in each 
stratum (Deaton, 1997). In other words, the bootstrap is made of communes (i.e. clusters) 
within strata. The number of replications is 500.31 
 
4.3.2 The impact of credit on poverty and inequality 
 
We calculate poverty by three Foster-Greer-Thorbecke poverty indexes, which can all be 
calculated using the following formula (Foster, Greer and Thorbecke, 1984): 
∑
=
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −=
q
i
i
z
Yz
n
P
1
1 α
α , (7) 
where Yi is a welfare indicator for person i. We use consumption expenditure per capita as the 
welfare indicator, since, as is well known, consumption is a better proxy for well-being than 
income. z is the expenditure poverty line, n is the number of people in the sample population, 
q is the number of poor people, and α can be interpreted as a measure of inequality aversion. 
When α = 0, we have the headcount index H, which measures the proportion of people 
below the poverty line. When α = 1 and α = 2, we obtain the poverty gap PG, which 
measures the depth of poverty, and the squared poverty gap P2 which measures the severity of 
poverty, respectively. 
To measure inequality, we use three common measures of inequality: the Gini 
coefficient, Theil’s L index of inequality, and Theil’s T index of inequality. The Gini index 
can be calculated from the individual expenditure in the population: 
∑∑
>
−−= ji j ji YYYnnG )1(
1  (8) 
where Y  is the average per capita expenditure. The double sum in (8) can be hard to calculate 
if n is relatively large, and an equivalent but computationally more convenient formula is 
(Deaton, 1997): 
∑
=−−−
+=
n
i
iiYYnnn
nG
1)1(
2
1
1 ρ  (9) 
                                                 
31 In order to examine the robustness of our bootstrap technique, we also tried to bootstrap households. The 
results were similar. 
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where iρ  is the rank of person i in the Y-distribution, counting from the richest so that the 
richest has the rank of 1. 
The value of the Gini coefficient varies from 0 when everyone has the same income to 
1 when one person has everything. The closer a Gini coefficient is to one, the more unequal is 
the income distribution. 
The Theil L index of inequality is calculated as follows: 
∑
=
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=
n
i iY
Y
n
LTheil
1
ln1_ , (10) 
The Theil L index ranges from 0 to infinity. A higher value of Theil L indicates more 
inequality. 
The Theil T index of inequality is calculated as: 
∑
=
⎟⎠
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⎛=
n
i
ii
Y
Y
Y
Y
n
TTheil
1
ln1_  (11) 
The Theil T index ranges from 0 (lowest inequality) to ln(N) (highest inequality). 
The impact of credit on the poverty indices of borrowers in period t is calculated as 
follows: 
),0(),0( )0( =>−>=Δ Dtttt YDPYDPP , (12) 
where the first term on the right-hand side of (12) is the poverty measure of the credit 
receiving households given their credit. This term is observed and can be computed directly 
from the sample data. However, the second term on the right-hand side of (12) is the 
counterfactual measure of poverty, i.e. poverty indexes of the borrower had they not 
borrowed. This term is not observed directly, and is estimated by using equation (1), and 
substituting these estimates of expenditure into Equation (7). 
We also measure the impact of credit on total poverty: 
)()( )0( =−=Δ Dtt YPYPP , (13) 
where P(Yt) is the observed poverty index of the entire population and )( )0( =DtYP  is the 
poverty index of the entire population if the borrower had not received the credit. The 
difference between Equations (13) and (12) is that the latter only looks at the effect on 
borrowers, while the former considers the effect on the entire population. Regarding 
inequality, we only measure the impact of credit on inequality of the entire population. The 
impact on the inequality index is given by: 
)()( )0( =−=Δ Dtt YIYII , (14) 
where )( tYI is observed inequality, which is calculated using the observed expenditure data. 
)( )0( =DtYI  is an inequality index in the absence of the credit, which is estimated using the 
predicted counterfactual expenditure without the credit, using equation (1). The standard 
errors of the estimates of impacts on poverty and inequality are estimated using the same 
bootstrap technique as for ATT. 
 
4.4 Credit impact 
 
4.4.1 VBSP credit 
 
To estimate the effects of VBSP and informal credit on per capita expenditure, we regress per 
capita expenditure on per capita VBSP credit and per capita informal credit and a set of 
control variables. Control variables include household composition, education of household 
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members, land, villages, urbanity, credit from other sources and regional variables. It should 
be noted that control variables should be exogenous to credit (Heckman et al., 1999; 
Ravallion, 2001). Thus, several asset variables such as living areas and housing types are not 
included as control variables since these variables can be affected by credit (Tables 4.3 and 
4.4 show that some households reported the use of credit for housing construction and 
purchase). We tested whether VBSP credit and informal credit had a different impact in rural 
and urban areas by including interaction terms for the two types of credit and a dummy for 
living in an urban area. These estimates indicate that the effects of credit do not differ 
between urban and rural areas. We, therefore, only present the estimates for the entire sample. 
The list of the variables and summary statistics for the borrowing and non-borrowing 
households are presented in Tables 4.7 and 4.8 in Appendix 4.1. In order to control for 
inflation, we have deflated all variables in terms of 2004 prices. Table 4.9 presents the 
regression results. We present both random effects and fixed effects estimates, without and 
with sampling weight and cluster correlation. Since the Hausman tests strongly favour the 
fixed effects estimates we focus the discussion on the fixed effects estimates with survey 
corrections. 
The estimates indicate that VBSP credit did not significantly affects borrowers’ 
expenditures, and therefore had no effect on poverty and inequality. This confirms the finding 
of Pham and Lensink (2008) that VBSP credit did not affect profits from self-employment in 
the period 2004-2006. Nguyen (2008), on the other hand, found a positive impact of VBSP 
credit on rural income, consumption and poverty using the VHLSS for 2002 and 2004. When 
we, however, repeated his estimates correcting for both household and year effects, the 
significance disappeared. A reason for the lack of impact of VBSP may be that people spend 
the subsidized money less productively than they claim. Alternatively, loans were used for 
longer term investments and impact can only be measured when considering a period longer 
than twelve months, but this is somewhat at odds with the short-term nature of the loans. 
 
4.4.2 Informal credit 
 
Contrary to VBSP credit, informal credit had a positive and statistically significant impact on 
household expenditure. An increase of 1 VND in per capita informal credit resulted in an 
increase of 0.05 VND in per capita expenditure, indicating an average rate of return of 5 
percent. This is somewhat surprising, as about two-thirds of the households borrowing in the 
informal sector said that they used the loan for consumption. However, rates of return to 
investment can be up to 100 percent or higher for relatively poor households, and it appears 
that at least part of the loans was (indirectly) used for production. 
At the household level, informal credit on average increased per capita expenditure by 3 
percent, or more precisely 112 and 118 thousand VND in 2004 and 2006, respectively, the 
difference being the result of a somewhat higher average loan size in the latter year (Table 
4.5). 
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Table 4.5. Impact of informal credit on expenditures per capita measured by ATT. 
 
Year Y1 Y0 ATT (Y1–Y0) 
2004 3,701.1*** 3,589.3*** 111.8** 
 [69.5] [83.8] [56.9] 
2006 4,279.8*** 4,161.6*** 118.2** 
 [100.3] [115.1] [59.3] 
** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Standard errors in brackets. Standard errors are corrected for sampling weights and estimated using bootstrap (non-parametric) 
with 500 replications. 
Source: Estimation from VHLSS 2004 and 2006. 
 
 
Table 4.6. Impact of informal credit on poverty and inequality. 
 
 2004   2006   
With credit Without credit Impact With credit Without credit Impact 
Poverty of borrowers     
P0 0.2532*** 0.2688*** -0.0156* 0.1972*** 0.2102*** -0.0138*
 [0.0127] [0.0154] [0.0092] [0.0121] [0.0151] [0.0083]
P1 0.0574*** 0.0651*** -0.0077 0.0468*** 0.0505*** -0.0037
 [0.0040] [0.0070] [0.0059] [0.0040] [0.0048] [0.0025]
P2 0.0204*** 0.0332*** -0.0129 0.0170*** 0.0186*** -0.0016
 [0.0020] [0.0429] [0.0430] [0.0018] [0.0025] [0.0017]
All poverty   
P0 0.1949*** 0.1981*** -0.0032* 0.1597*** 0.1619*** -0.0022
 [0.0053] [0.0056] [0.0019] [0.0051] [0.0053] [0.0015]
P1 0.0472*** 0.0488*** -0.0016 0.0383*** 0.0389*** -0.0006
 [0.0017] [0.0021] [0.0012] [0.0017] [0.0018] [0.0004]
P2 0.0170*** 0.0196*** -0.0026 0.0137*** 0.0140*** -0.0003
 [0.0009] [0.0087] [0.0087] [0.0009] [0.0009] [0.0003]
All inequality   
Gini 0.3698*** 0.3707*** -0.0008 0.3580*** 0.3584*** -0.0005
 [0.0040] [0.0041] [0.0007] [0.0040] [0.0040] [0.0004]
Theil L 0.2235*** 0.2243*** -0.0007 0.2117*** 0.2123*** -0.0006
 [0.0050] [0.0050] [0.0005] [0.0049] [0.0049] [0.0004]
Theil T 0.2407*** 0.2417*** -0.0010 0.2268*** 0.2274*** -0.0006
 [0.0065] [0.0066] [0.0009] [0.0071] [0.0071] [0.0005]
* significant at 10%; *** significant at 1%. 
Standard errors in brackets. Standard errors are corrected for sampling weights and estimated using bootstrap (non-parametric) 
with 500 replications. 
Source: Author’s estimation from VHLSS 2004 and 2006. 
 
 
As 21 percent of poor households obtained informal credit, at the national level this 
translated into a decrease in the head count index of poverty for borrowers by around 1.6 and 
1.4 percentage points in 2004 and 2006, respectively (Table 4.6). The effects on the other 
poverty indicators are all negative but very small and mostly not statistically significant. As 
the non-poor also used informal credit, it did not significantly affect inequality. 
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4.5 Conclusions 
 
The provision of subsidized loans without formal collateral requirement through the VBSP 
forms a cornerstone of Vietnam’s anti-poverty policy. Yet, little is known about the ultimate 
impact of these preferential loans on poverty and inequality, as most evaluation reports simply 
describe the implementation and outputs of the program. Even less information is available on 
the second important source of credit for the poor: informal loans from moneylenders, 
relatives and friends. While more expensive, these loans may be more easily accessible for the 
poor than subsidized loans, which could be siphoned off by wealthier households. Although it 
is possible to stimulate the availability of informal credit, the Vietnamese government has no 
policies to do so and its current cheap credit policy may even inhibit the functioning of the 
informal credit markets by taking its best clients. If indeed informal credit is an important 
means to increase expenditures for the poor, possibly even more important than subsidized 
credit, the government may want to reconsider its policy focus. 
We use fixed-effects regression to estimate the average effect of informal and VBSP 
credit on the expenditure of participating households, and subsequently assess their impact on 
poverty and inequality. In doing so, we intend to eliminate the potential bias caused by 
differences between participants and non-participants in credit markets. As with similar 
impact studies before us, the reliability of our estimates may still be disputed. Fixed-effects 
regression only eliminates endogeneity bias caused by unobserved variables that remained 
unchanged between survey rounds and that have an additive effect on the outcome. We feel 
that it is reasonable to assume that the relevant household-level variables, such as business 
and production skills or motivation for higher income, were time-invariant during the two 
periods covered in this study. Fixed-effects regressions will, however, fail to eliminate all 
endogeneity bias if the unobserved variables affect not only the level of the output but also its 
growth rate. Similarly, depending on unobserved characteristics, some households may be 
better able to benefit from new opportunities arising between survey rounds than other 
households are. We are however confident that the estimation bias resulting from these factors 
is small relative to the bias eliminated by using fixed-effects regression. 
We find that the impact of credit on poverty was limited, and the impact on inequality 
zero. Less than 30 percent of VBSP loans ended up in the hands of the poor. Seven percent of 
poor households obtained loans from the VBSP, compared to 15 percent that borrowed in the 
informal sector. Also average loan size was much higher in the informal sector. Not 
surprisingly, we therefore find that informal credit was most effective in decreasing poverty: 
it reduced the poverty incidence of borrowers by 1.6 and 1.4 percentage points (or equivalent 
to 5.9 and 6.6 percent) in 2004 and 2006, respectively, whereas we did not find evidence of an 
effect of VBSP credit on poverty. 
The complete absence of any effect of VBSP credit not only on poverty, but also on the 
expenditure of recipient households is somewhat surprising, especially since most households 
claim to use the money in productive activities. Yet these results are in accordance with the 
finding of Pham and Lensink (2008) that VBSP credit did not affect profits from self 
employment. Money is fungible, and it is possible that people did not use the loans as 
productively as they claimed. Alternatively, the effects of VBSP credit may only be 
measurable over a longer time period, despite the short-term nature of the loans. If the VBSP 
credit is used to buy production inputs, it is difficult to detect a significant impact on current 
income and expenditure in the short term. Even so, we would not expect a large negative 
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effect on poverty and inequality, as less than one third of the loans went to the poor and loan 
size was small compared to informal sources. 
Summarizing, we found limited evidence of a positive role of credit in achieving the 
government objectives of decreasing poverty and inequality. It seems that if credit is to play 
this role, informal credit is a more likely candidate than government subsidized credit: it 
already reaches more poor people, provides them with more money, and, contrary to VBSP 
credit, increases their expenditure. An alternative candidate would be microfinance from non-
governmental programs, a source that we have not considered in this chapter. Yet Pham and 
Lensink (2008) find that, just like VBSP credit, loans from other microfinance programs have 
no significant impact on self-employment profits. Based on existing studies, informal credit 
thus seems the best candidate to be a tool for poverty alleviation in Vietnam. It is not clear 
whether this is also the case for other countries: studies analyzing the effects of informal 
credit are extremely rare. The results we have obtained for Vietnam justify more research 
efforts in this direction. 
While not directly under public control, financial intermediation through informal 
lenders is not immune to public policies. Governments can facilitate intermediation through 
the provision of an important basic infrastructure, such as a system of laws and courts to 
support the creation and enforcement of property rights and contracts, credit bureaus to 
publicize information, and prudential regulation of financial institutions (Conning and Udry, 
2005). This is, however, not an easy task. Excessive regulation inhibits innovation and raises 
the costs of intermediation. Moreover, increased competition may undermine previously self-
enforcing financial arrangements, unless agents can enter into exclusive contracts (Conning 
and Udry, 2005). Put differently, new financial institutions or expansion of existing 
institutions potentially harms the informal sector. This study therefore provides a careful 
warning against an overenthusiastic adherence to the microfinance miracle. 
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Appendix 4.1 Descriptive statistics and regression results 
 
Table 4.7. Descriptive statistics of households with and without VBSP credit. 
 
Variables Type 2004 2006 
  Household 
with VBSP 
credit 
Household 
without 
VBSP 
credit 
Household 
with VBSP 
credit 
Household 
without 
VBSP 
credit 
Household variables      
Continuous 0.2978 0.2633 0.2928 0.2369 Ratio of members younger than 16 to total 
household members  [0.0082] [0.0027] [0.0092] [0.0027] 
Continuous 0.0593 0.0962 0.0592 0.0999 Ratio of members older than 60 to total 
household members  [0.0048] [0.0020] [0.0047] [0.0020] 
Discrete 5.2395 4.9945 5.0383 4.8531 Household size 
 [0.1117] [0.0271] [0.0687] [0.0304] 
Continuous 0.0463 0.0587 0.0528 0.0682 Ratio of members with technical degree to total 
household members  [0.0052] [0.0020] [0.0052] [0.0021] 
Continuous 0.0077 0.0343 0.0124 0.0360 Ratio of members with post secondary to total 
household members  [0.0018] [0.0018] [0.0021] [0.0017] 
Continuous 688.5 667.2 740.9 691.6 Area of annual crop land per capita (m2) 
 [36.4] [19.6] [44.2] [20.9] 
Continuous 144.6 206.4 183.1 242.7 Area of perennial crop land per capita (m2) 
 [38.4] [15.5] [26.9] [15.0] 
Continuous 432.7 175.8 375.7 200.9 Forestry land per capita (m2) 
 [113.3] [21.9] [68.3] [27.5] 
Continuous 25.6 62.2 36.6 63.8 Aquaculture water surface per capita (m2) 
 [7.4] [7.6] [13.6] [8.4] 
Continuous 116.4 903.3 293.1 1182.9 Other credit (thousand VND) 
 [22.2] [54.5] [43.1] [97.6] 
Commune variables      
Binary 0.6742 0.5971 0.7251 0.6281 Road to village (yes = 1) 
 [0.0223] [0.0099] [0.0209] [0.0098] 
Continuous 3.7390 2.0758 3.9762 2.2117 Distance to nearest daily market (km) 
 [0.4263] [0.0926] [0.4525] [0.1033] 
Regional variables      
Household in Red River Delta Binary 0.1721 0.2216 0.1152 0.2243 
  [0.0176] [0.0082] [0.0149] [0.0083] 
Household in North East Binary 0.2309 0.1048 0.1984 0.1082 
  [0.0197] [0.0052] [0.0186] [0.0054] 
Household in North West Binary 0.0651 0.0267 0.0692 0.0287 
  [0.0111] [0.0026] [0.0111] [0.0028] 
Household in North Central Coast Binary 0.1734 0.1253 0.2125 0.1252 
  [0.0197] [0.0070] [0.0212] [0.0071] 
Household in South Central Coast Binary 0.1197 0.0828 0.0793 0.0850 
  [0.0148] [0.0050] [0.0115] [0.0052] 
Household in Central Highlands Binary 0.0456 0.0574 0.0854 0.0581 
  [0.0087] [0.0044] [0.0139] [0.0045] 
Household in North East South Binary 0.0559 0.1672 0.0885 0.1652 
  [0.0104] [0.0085] [0.0162] [0.0084] 
Household in Mekong River Delta Binary 0.1373 0.2142 0.1516 0.2053 
  [0.0166] [0.0081] [0.0157] [0.0079] 
Household in Living in urban areas Binary 0.1309 0.2680 0.1738 0.2749 
  [0.0151] [0.0093] [0.0174] [0.0093] 
Observations  705 8,483 747 8,442 
Standard errors in brackets. 
Source: Author’s estimation from VHLSS 2004 and 2006. 
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Table 4.8. Descriptive statistics of households with and without informal credit. 
 
Variables Type 2004 2006 
  Household 
with 
informal 
credit 
Household 
without 
informal 
credit 
Household 
with 
informal 
credit 
Household 
without 
informal 
credit 
Household variables      
Continuous 0.2970 0.2579 0.2735 0.2347 Ratio of members younger than 16 to total 
household members  [0.0058] [0.0028] [0.0062] [0.0027] 
Continuous 0.0748 0.0983 0.0670 0.1027 Ratio of members older than 60 to total 
household members  [0.0035] [0.0021] [0.0037] [0.0021] 
Household size Discrete 5.0194 5.0105 4.8786 4.8650 
  [0.0593] [0.0294] [0.0551] [0.0321] 
Continuous 0.0568 0.0581 0.0636 0.0677 Ratio of members with technical degree to total 
household members  [0.0037] [0.0020] [0.0048] [0.0021] 
Continuous 0.0150 0.0368 0.0183 0.0374 Ratio of members with post secondary to total 
household members  [0.0020] [0.0019] [0.0024] [0.0018] 
Area of annual crop land per capita (m2) Continuous 573.9 692.9 627.6 708.9 
  [31.0] [20.7] [35.6] [21.8] 
Area of perennial crop land per capita (m2) Continuous 183.2 206.7 221.7 241.5 
  [27.8] [15.6] [24.2] [15.4] 
Forestry land per capita (m2) Continuous 170.4 200.6 175.9 221.8 
  [36.3] [25.6] [32.4] [30.5] 
Aquaculture water surface per capita (m2) Continuous 27.6 67.6 43.0 65.4 
  [5.2] [8.7] [13.9] [9.0] 
Other credit (thousand VND) Continuous 633.6 900.2 655.9 1207.0 
  [96.9] [57.6] [83.7] [106.7] 
Commune variables      
Road to village (yes = 1) Binary 0.6735 0.5846 0.7090 0.6208 
  [0.0151] [0.0103] [0.0157] [0.0101] 
Distance to nearest daily market (km) Continuous 2.3459 2.1588 2.7613 2.2634 
  [0.1534] [0.1049] [0.2761] [0.1091] 
Regional variables      
Household in Red River Delta Binary 0.2606 0.2071 0.2437 0.2105 
  [0.0138] [0.0082] [0.0145] [0.0082] 
Household in North East Binary 0.1172 0.1132 0.1340 0.1113 
  [0.0092] [0.0057] [0.0108] [0.0056] 
Household in North West Binary 0.0244 0.0308 0.0302 0.0321 
  [0.0040] [0.0030] [0.0056] [0.0031] 
Household in North Central Coast Binary 0.1536 0.1225 0.1513 0.1280 
  [0.0132] [0.0070] [0.0134] [0.0073] 
Household in South Central Coast Binary 0.0650 0.0907 0.0579 0.0899 
  [0.0073] [0.0056] [0.0075] [0.0055] 
Household in Central Highlands Binary 0.0772 0.0512 0.0885 0.0545 
  [0.0089] [0.0042] [0.0101] [0.0044] 
Household in North East South Binary 0.1400 0.1640 0.1370 0.1638 
  [0.0129] [0.0087] [0.0133] [0.0086] 
Household in Mekong River Delta Binary 0.1620 0.2205 0.1574 0.2099 
  [0.0111] [0.0084] [0.0117] [0.0081] 
Household in Living in urban areas Binary 0.2138 0.2693 0.1999 0.2806 
  [0.0137] [0.0096] [0.0139] [0.0095] 
Observations  1,791 7,397 1,473 7,716 
Standard errors in brackets. 
Source: Author’s estimation from VHLSS 2004 and 2006. 
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Table 4.9. Regressions of per capita expenditures. 
 
Explanatory variables Random 
effect (no 
sampling 
weight) 
Fixed-effect 
(no 
sampling 
weight) 
Fixed-effect 
with 
sampling 
weight and 
cluster 
correlation 
Random 
effect (no 
sampling 
weight) 
Fixed-effect 
(no 
sampling 
weight) 
Fixed-effect 
with 
sampling 
weight and 
cluster 
correlation 
VBSP credit (thousand VND) -0.045 0.159* 0.107 -0.046 0.086 0.036 
 [0.085] [0.093] [0.102] [0.080] [0.091] [0.095] 
Informal credit (thousand VND) 0.073*** 0.045*** 0.041 0.072*** 0.053*** 0.048** 
 [0.014] [0.015] [0.025] [0.013] [0.016] [0.024] 
   -1,649.79*** -537.467* -429.962 Ratio of members younger than 
16 to total household members    [178.755] [324.129] [350.014] 
   -828.979*** -848.395** -767.033 Ratio of members older than 60 
to total household members    [155.768] [352.431] [674.304] 
Household size    -632.301*** -984.302*** -
    [65.091] [108.114] [169.066] 
Household size squared    30.182*** 51.914*** 65.632*** 
    [5.788] [9.390] [15.154] 
   3,196.43*** 923.764*** 945.558** Ratio of members with technical 
degree to total household    [196.832] [279.558] [419.991] 
   8,390.74*** 1,550.06*** 1,568.71 Ratio of members with post 
secondary to total household    [292.248] [515.527] [1,059.221] 
   0.098*** 0.097*** 0.088*** Area of annual crop land per 
capita (m2)    [0.020] [0.033] [0.026] 
   0.142*** 0.109*** 0.112*** Area of perennial crop land per 
capita (m2)    [0.024] [0.034] [0.035] 
Forestry land per capita (m2)    -0.008 -0.027 -0.033*** 
    [0.013] [0.019] [0.010] 
   0.127*** 0.008 0.01 Area of aquaculture water 
surface per capita (m2)    [0.049] [0.065] [0.065] 
Other credit (thousand VND)    0.035*** 0.016** 0.016 
    [0.005] [0.006] [0.010] 
Road to village (yes = 1)    39.041 9.776 86.264 
    [87.570] [109.494] [131.785] 
   -11.164** -2.471 -3.638 Distance to nearest daily market 
(km)    [4.999] [6.086] [3.215] 
Red River Delta Base omitted     
       
North East    -693.759***   
    [128.506]   
North West    -1,184.547***   
    [199.361]   
North Central Coast    -678.43***   
    [135.917]   
South Central Coast    -126.727   
    [145.769]   
Central Highlands    -595.504***   
    [177.455]   
North East South    1,238.25***   
    [137.073]   
Mekong River Delta    123.716   
    [119.813]   
Urban    2,221.648***   
    [118.748]   
Time effect (2006 variable) 627.071*** 621.833*** 617.212*** 468.800*** 533.039*** 520.804*** 
 [40.779] [40.692] [52.756] [41.045] [41.333] [56.646] 
Constant 4,296.560*** 4,292.421*** 4,553.957*** 5,905.78*** 7,492.23*** 8,050.05*** 
 [54.577] [29.779] [28.586] [210.578] [315.777] [457.584] 
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Explanatory variables Random 
effect (no 
sampling 
weight) 
Fixed-effect 
(no 
sampling 
weight) 
Fixed-effect 
with 
sampling 
weight and 
cluster 
correlation 
Random 
effect (no 
sampling 
weight) 
Fixed-effect 
(no 
sampling 
weight) 
Fixed-effect 
with 
sampling 
weight and 
cluster 
correlation 
Observations 8,432 8,432 8,432 8,432 8,432 8,432 
Number of i 4,216 4,216 4,216 4,216 4,216 4,216 
R-squared 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.41 0.15 0.15 
Hausman test χ2 (Prob) 
(H0: Difference in coefficients 
in fixed and random effects 
regression not systematic)  
 43.7(0.000)   316.0(0.000)  
Robust standard errors in brackets. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Source: Author’s estimation from VHLSS 2004 and 2006. 
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Chapter 5 The impact of public and private transfers on poverty and 
inequality32 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Income transfers are potentially important means to alleviate poverty and reduce income 
inequality. A substantial share of poverty is so-called transient poverty, i.e. at any point in 
time a group of people is poor purely due to ‘bad luck’ combined with the inability to cope 
with this downward risk (Dercon and Krishnan, 2000; Dercon, 2003; Jalan and Ravallion, 
2000). Targeted transfers may help prevent this type of poverty (Alderman and Haque, 2006). 
In addition, cash transfers may have persistent effects on chronic poverty if they ease liquidity 
constraints that prevent the poor from investing in productive activities, generating multipliers 
on the cash received (Sadoulet et al., 2001; Farrington and Slater, 2006; Lloyd-Sherlock, 
2006). Similarly, through the provision of a safety net, transfers may decrease the need of 
poor households to diversify or skew towards low-risk low-return alternatives that avoid 
destitution but at the same time inhibit income growth and investment (Carter and Barrett, 
2006; Dercon, 2003; Ravallion, 1988). 
Income transfers are, however, by no means a panacea. Poor people may receive less 
from social security programs than people from middle and high income groups (e.g. 
Friedman and Friedman, 1979; Howe and Longman, 1992; Castles ad Mitchell, 1993). Public 
transfer programs are often contribution-based and exclude groups without substantial periods 
of formal sector employment, thus minimizing their coverage of poor and vulnerable social 
groups (Lloyd-Sherlock 2006). Even for social transfer programs targeted specifically at the 
poor, there can be a high leakage rate, i.e. the programs may cover a substantial share of 
ineligible people. Barrientos and DeJong (2006), for example, observed that 20-40 percent of 
beneficiaries in three different cash transfer programs to support poor households with 
children of school age were among the non-poor. Similarly, households receiving private 
income transfers are not necessarily poor: wealthier households may be better integrated in 
redistributing networks. 
Even if it is the poor who receive the transfers, the effect on poverty indicators may be 
limited. First, the transfers may simply be too small to lift people out of poverty. Second, the 
increase in income may be smaller than the amount of transfers received. Transfers potentially 
mitigate the incentive to work thus decreasing non-transfer income (Farrington and Slater, 
2006; Lloyd-Sherlock, 2006; Sahn and Alderman, 1996). Public transfers may be especially 
ineffective in increasing income, as an increase in public transfers may be (partly) cancelled 
out by an associated decrease in private transfers (Jensen, 2003; Maitra and Ray, 2003). This 
is particularly important as social transfers compete with other policies for government funds 
and may ultimately put upward pressure on taxation. Third, increased income may not 
completely translate into increased expenditure, which is usually used as an indicator in 
poverty analysis. The effect of different types of transfer and earned income on expenditures 
may diverge. Often, different income sources accrue to different persons. These persons may 
have different preferences and pooling may be imperfect (Maitra and Ray 2003). 
                                                 
32 This chapter is written based on the paper Nguyen, V.C. and Van den Berg M. (2009), ‘Measuring the Impact 
of Public and Private Transfers on Poverty and Inequality in Vietnam’, which is currently submitted to a journal 
for possible publication. 
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Despite these considerations, few studies systematically assess the combined impact of 
both private and public transfers on poverty while accounting for potential behavioral 
responses, and analyses of the relation between transfers and inequality are even more rare. 
This chapter focuses on the effects of income transfers in Vietnam. The main objective is to 
estimate and compare the impacts of public and private transfers on poverty and inequality in 
Vietnam. In addition, the chapter contributes to the existing literature through a stepwise 
analysis showing not only the ultimate impact of public and domestic private transfers on 
poverty and inequality in Vietnam but also some of the underlying mechanisms: the 
distribution of transfers among the poor and the non-poor, the potential effect of public on 
private transfers, the effect of transfers on work effort, and the different impact of transfers on 
income and expenditure. 
Vietnam has committed itself to a ‘growth with equity’ strategy of development. The 
country has achieved high economic growth, with annual GDP growth rates of around 6 
percent over the past 10 years. Poverty rates have declined remarkably from 58 to 16 percent 
between 1993 and 2006. The mass media claim that the extensive social security system 
maintained by the government has played a key role in this decline. Yet the few existing 
evaluation studies of the system do not support this claim. Van de Walle (2004) found that 
social insurance and subsidies were badly targeted at the poor, and that their impact on 
poverty was negligible during the 1990s. The relationship between transfers and poverty may, 
however, be different in the twenty-first century, as the pattern of poverty and transfers has 
changed significantly. As indicated above, poverty rates have declined dramatically, possibly 
leaving those households poor who are least connected to the outside world and are therefore 
least affected by any kind of transfers. At the same time several new transfer schemes were 
introduced, and the targeting of existing schemes may have improved. Evans et al. (2006) 
suggest that the overall effect of public transfers and poverty has improved slightly: they 
conclude that 2004 poverty rates would have been about 5 percent higher in the absence of 
social security payments. This estimate could, however, be biased as they use consumption 
minus transfers as counterfactual and do not account for behavioral responses. 
Much less is known about the effect of private transfers. De Brauw and Harigaya (2007) 
found that without seasonal migration, the estimated poverty rate would have been three 
percentage points higher than it was in 1998. This reduction in poverty was not associated 
with an increase in inequality, in part because households that increased participation in 
migration tended to be in the middle of the expenditure distribution. Seasonal migrants are, 
however, not the only source of private transfers. Other relatives or friends may also send 
money. 
Hence, while there are previous studies on the impact of transfers on poverty and 
inequality in Vietnam, sound scientific information is available only for the 1990s, and the 
rapid transformation of Vietnam since then may imply that this information is outdated. 
Perhaps more importantly, as for most other countries, these studies sketch only partial 
pictures. More particularly, they ignore potential interactions between public and private 
transfers and do not explicitly assess the behavioral responses to transfers. Also, existing 
information on the impact of private transfers is only indirect and incomplete –through an 
assessment of the impact of seasonal migration– and the impact of public transfers is only 
known for poverty and not for inequality. Our study intends to fill these gaps and present a 
relatively complete picture. 
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The structure of the chapter is as follows. The next section presents the theory and 
methodology used. We explain why public transfers may affect private transfers and how we 
test for this. Next, we explain the procedures for testing the impact of transfers on per capita 
income, expenditure and work efforts and some mechanisms behind the potential relations. 
We apply fixed-effects estimators and subsequently compute the expected impacts of transfers 
on recipients using a non-parametric bootstrap technique to determine their standard errors. 
Finally, we explain how we use our results to calculate Foster-Greer-Thorbecke poverty 
indexes and measures of inequality both with and without poverty. Section 3 presents the 
empirical analysis. We use data from the recent Vietnam Household Living Standard Surveys 
2004 and 2006. These surveys form a panel of more than 4200 households that allows us to 
estimate the impact of public and private transfers correcting for characteristics that are either 
observed or unobserved but stable between the two survey rounds. In this chapter, we focus 
on domestic private transfers as opposed to international remittances, as the latter involve an 
inflow of resources into the country and not a mere redistribution of income. Our empirical 
analysis consists of five parts. We start by describing the distribution of transfers over poor 
and non-poor households and then move on to analyzing whether the level of public transfers 
affect private transfers. As this is not the case, we can thereafter simply estimate the impact of 
public and private transfers. We first assess whether households adapt working hours to 
transfers, and secondly focus on the effects on income and expenditures. Finally, we estimate 
the ultimate effects of transfers on poverty and inequality. Section 4 gives policy implications 
and a conclusion. 
 
5.2 Theory and methodology 
 
5.2.1 Testing for interaction between public and private transfers 
 
Public transfers may have a limited impact on household income as they may simply replace 
private transfers. This crowding-out hypothesis is based on theories about altruism and 
insurance. Transfers of a well-behaved altruistic person to others will decrease if the pre-
transfer income of the recipients increases – through public transfers or otherwise (Becker, 
1974; Barro, 1974; Stack and Bloom, 1985; Stark, 1995; Lucas and Stark, 1985; Cox, 1987, 
1990). Alternatively, if migration is a strategy to cope with economic risks or shocks, 
migrants will remit more money when those staying behind experience a drop in income 
(Stark and Levhari, 1982; Stark and Bloom, 1985; Rosenzweig, 1988). Public transfers may 
make such transfers unnecessary. On the other hand, exchange theory argues that if people 
give transfers because they expect to get some benefits in return, higher recipient income – 
and thus higher public transfers – may result in higher private transfers (Cox, 1987, Bernheim 
et al., 1985; Hoddinott, 1994; De la Brière et al., 2002). Hence, not only the significance but 
also the direction of the effect of public transfers on private transfers is ultimately an 
empirical issue. 
While public transfers may thus affect private transfers, we do not expect similar effects 
the other way around. The government is not likely to know about the extent of private 
transfers and will therefore not be able to adapt its transfers accordingly. We therefore only 
test whether public transfers crowd in or crowd out private transfers. 
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In order to do so, we assume that private per capita transfers received by household i in 
region j at year t are a linear function of a year dummy G, household characteristics X, 
commune characteristics C and the per capita amount of public transfers received P: 
ijtjijjtijtijttijt vuCPXGT εβββαα +++++++= 43210 , (1) 
where uij and jν  are unobserved time-invariant household and commune characteristics, 
respectively, and εijt is an error term. If the coefficient for public transfers is statistically 
significant and negative, this is evidence of crowding out. Conversely, if the coefficient for 
public transfers is statistically significant and positive, this provides evidence of crowding in. 
Note that ‘per capita’ refers to the average per household at period t. Per capita transfers 
are thus calculated as total household transfers divided by the number of household members. 
The year dummy takes one for 2006 and controls for common macroeconomic changes. 
Household characteristics include household composition, education of household members, 
and natural capital. Commune characteristics include urbanity, location in one of the eight 
main zones of Vietnam, and two village level variables: distance to the nearest market, and a 
dummy variable indicating whether the village has a road. The VHLSS data sets only provide 
information on these variables for the rural area. For urban areas, we assume that all 
communes have a market and a road, which is a reasonable assumption. A description of the 
explanatory variables can be found in Tables A.1 and A.2. 
We use Tobit random effects to account for censoring of the dependent variable and at 
the same time control for unobserved time-invariant household characteristics. To give an 
indication of the robustness of the results, we also present standard random effects estimates 
and fixed effect estimates with sampling weights and cluster correlation. For completeness, 
we present the estimates of the complete function as well as regressions of per capita private 
transfers of per capita public transfers only. 
 
5.2.2 Impact of transfers on per capita income, per capita expenditure, labour supply, 
poverty and inequality 
 
Transfers increase income, but not necessarily by the amount of money transferred. Increased 
availability of non-labour income results in a rise in the shadow price of household labour. If 
labour supply is quite flexible, which is the case for self-employed households –an important 
group in developing countries like Vietnam– this will result in a decrease in labour supply 
that partly offsets the initial income increase. On the other hand, transfers can also provide 
working capital investment money for productive activities and therefore increase income by 
more than the amount transferred. Similarly, an increase in income does not necessarily result 
in the same increase in expenditure. Households may save part of the transfers, and the 
savings coefficient may be different from the coefficient for earned income. We therefore 
estimate not only the ultimate impact of transfers on expenditures, which –together with the 
distribution of transfers–determines their impact on poverty and inequality, but also the 
impact on income and labour supply. 
We assume a similar specification for estimating the effect of transfers on per capita 
income, per capita expenditure and labour supply: 
0 1 2 3 4ijt t ijt ijt jt ij j ijtY G X D C uβ β β β β ν ε= + + + + + + + , (2) 
where Y is a vector including income per capita, expenditure per capita, and different proxies 
for labour supply, D is a vector of per capita public and private transfers and the remainder 
variables are identical to Equation (1). Van de Walle (2004) uses a similar equation for her 
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estimates of the impact of public transfers on consumption. Please note that simultaneous 
inclusion of public and private transfers in a single equation is only possible when they are 
independent, that is if public transfers do not affect private transfers (Heckman et al., 1999). 
Otherwise, separate regressions are required for the two types of transfers. 
We use fixed and a random effects estimators. If the random effects estimator is 
used, 0β  is assumed to be the same for all households. In the fixed effects estimator, however, 
the constant is allowed to differ per household, i.e. 0 0ijβ β= . The time invariant household 
and commune characteristics are then perfectly correlated with the fixed effect and ij ju ν+  
will drop out of the model. The advantage of using panel data estimators is that they correct 
for time variant unobserved characteristics, such as diligence and social networks, which 
affect the choice variables. These characteristics are likely to be correlated with the 
independent variables in the regression, and if so, they will cause estimates to be biased unless 
fixed effects regression is used. Fixed effects regression was also used by Van de Walle 
(2004) in her study on the impact of public transfers on poverty. In addition, she used 1993 
transfers as instruments for 1998 transfers in an IV regression. However, as she herself 
admits, the validity of these results depends on the exogeneity of the instrument. This 
assumption cannot be tested as there are no other potential instruments. We are not convinced 
of the suitability of the instrument and therefore do not follow the IV approach and focus on 
the fixed effect regressions.33 
The marginal impact of transfers is measured by 3β . We will also measure the impact of 
transfers by calculating the Average Treatment Effect on the Treated (ATT) (Heckman et al., 
1999), i.e. the impact of transfers on the recipients (with D>0): 
( 0)( 0) ( 0)t ijt ijt ijt D ijtATT E Y D E Y D== > − > , (3) 
Where )0( )0( >= ijtDijt DYE  is the expected value of the outcome variable of the transfers 
recipients, i.e. income per capita, expenditure per capita, or work efforts, had they not 
received transfers. This is not observed and has to be estimated. 
Using Equation (2), we get: ( ) ( )( )( )
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.
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where nt is the number of the remittance recipients at time t. 
We compliment these point estimates of ATT with standard error estimates generated 
using a non-parametric bootstrap technique. This bootstrap is implemented by repeatedly 
drawing samples from the original data. Since the VHLSS sample selection follows stratified 
random cluster sampling, communes instead of households are bootstrapped in each stratum 
(Deaton, 1997). The number of replications is 500.34 
                                                 
33 Actually, we tried IV regressions, in which transfers in 2004 are used as instruments for transfers in 2006. 
However, the estimation results are not robust and reasonable in our data set. 
34 We also tried to bootstrap households instead of communes to examine the robustness to the standard error 
estimates to bootstrap ways. The results from the different bootstrap methods were very similar.  
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Finally, the impact of transfers on the poverty and inequality indices of transfer 
receivers in period t is estimated by the same method which is used to estimate the impact of 
credit on poverty and inequality in the previous chapter (section 4.3.2 of Chapter 4). 
 
5.3 Income transfers, poverty and inequality in Vietnam 
 
5.3.1 Who are the recipients of transfers? 
 
Vietnam’s social security net includes a large number of programs, including both 
contribution-based and non-contribution-based transfers. Contribution-based social insurance 
covers health benefits, which are outside the scope of this chapter, and social security 
schemes, which have been compulsory for employees in State organizations, State-owned 
enterprises, and private enterprises with ten employees or more since 1995 (Evans et al., 
2006). These schemes are mainly paid in cash and include maternity benefits, severance pay, 
sickness and occupational injury benefits, monthly pensions for the retired, and life insurance 
(Government of Vietnam, 1993a, 1993b, 1995, 1998, 2003 and 2006). The main non-
contributory schemes are the National Targeted Programs (NTP) and social allowances. The 
NTP provide very diverse support to the poor and are often in kind and difficult to convert to 
monetary values. In this chapter, we therefore focus on social allowances, which are usually 
disbursed in cash. These cover support to disadvantaged groups, such as war invalids and 
heroes, the elderly, children without guardians, disabled people, and households adversely 
affected by natural calamities (Government of Vietnam, 1993b, 2003). 
Table 5.1 presents the distribution of public transfers by the poor and non-poor in 2004 
and 2006. The coverage of public transfers remained almost unchanged during this period. 
About 18 percent of all households received public transfers in both years. In 2004 this was 
no different for the poor and the non-poor, but in 2006 the percentage of the poor receiving 
public transfers were decreased to 13.8 percent. In addition, the non-poor received much 
higher amounts of transfers per capita in both years. Moreover, since the non-poor account for 
a large proportion of the population, they received more than 95 percent of all public transfers 
in both years. Yet, the share of public transfers in income and expenditure for those poor 
receiving transfers is substantial: 24.0 and 38.1 percent of expenditures in 2004 and 2006, 
respectively, and 17.4 and 23.2 percent of income in 2004 and 2006, respectively. 
The large majority of households received domestic private transfers: between 84.0 and 
88.7 percent for the poor and the non-poor in 2004 and 2006 (Table 5.2). While the shares of 
households receiving private transfers did not differ much between the rich and the poor, the 
non-poor received much higher per capita amounts: their average value of per capita transfers 
was around 3.5 times more than that of the poor. As a result, the relative contribution of 
private transfers to total income and expenditures was similar for the rich and the poor. 
Summarizing, both the poor and the non-poor received public and private transfers, 
but a relatively large share of these transfers went to non-poor households. The share of both 
groups receiving either type of transfer is quite similar, but the average per capita amounts 
transferred were much larger for the non-poor. However, the analysis is ex post and does not 
take into account that the assignment of households to poverty group is done after accounting 
for public and private transfers. Transfers may have lifted people out of poverty. In order to 
test this hypothesis, we need to estimate household income in the absence of these transfers. 
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Table 5.1. Public transfers by poor and non-poor recipients. 
 
Indicators  2004   2006  
 Poor Non poor All Poor Non poor All 
18.0 18.3 18.3 13.8 18.8 18.1 % recipient households 
[1.1] [0.5] [0.5] [1.2] [0.5] [0.5] 
361.2 2,044.3 1,761.5 617.0 2,882.5 2,648.9 Per capita public transfers 
(thousand VND)* [31.3] [70.2] [62.4] [74.7] [96.1] [90.6] 
16.8 83.2 100 10.3 89.7 100 Distribution of recipient 
households  [1.0] [1.0]  [0.9] [0.9]  
4.2 95.8 100 3.1 96.9 100 Distribution of public transfers  
[0.4] [0.4]  [0.4] [0.4]  
24.0 34.3 33.8 38.1 41.7 41.6 % of public transfers in 
household expenditure [2.0] [1.1] [1.1] [4.4] [1.5] [1.5] 
17.4 26.7 26.2 23.2 31.0 30.8 % of public transfers in 
household income [1.4] [0.9] [0.8] [2.3] [1.0] [1.0] 
Number of observations 1,769  7,419 9,188 1,427 7,762 9,189 
Note: * in 2004 prices. 
Standard errors in brackets (corrected for sampling weight and cluster correlation). 
Source: Author’s estimation from VHLSS 2004 and 2006. 
 
 
Table 5.2. Domestic private transfers by poor and non-poor recipients. 
 
Indicators  2004   2006  
 Poor Non poor All Poor Non poor All 
84.0 86.8 86.3 87.5 88.7 88.5 % recipient households 
[1.1] [0.5] [0.5] [1.0] [0.5] [0.5] 
220.9 815.0 716.3 238.3 800.1 724.7 Per capita domestic transfers 
amount (thousand VND)* [12.4] [34.4] [29.1] [16.6] [27.3] [24.1] 
16.6 83.4 100 13.4 86.6 100 Distribution of receiving 
households  [0.5] [0.5]  [0.5] [0.5]  
5.8 94.2 100 5.1 94.9 100 Distribution of domestic 
transfers amount [0.4] [0.4]  [0.4] [0.4]  
13.7 15.2 15.1 13.9 13.5 13.5 % of domestic transfers over 
household expenditure [0.8] [0.6] [0.6] [1.0] [0.4] [0.4] 
9.9 11.7 11.6 9.1 10.1 10.0 % of domestic transfers over 
household income [0.5] [0.4] [0.4] [0.6] [0.3] [0.3] 
Number of observations 1,769 7,419 9,188 1,427 7,762 9,189 
Note: * in 2004 prices. 
Standard errors in brackets (corrected for sampling weight and cluster correlation). 
Source: Author’s estimation from VHLSS 2004 and 2006. 
 
 
This is what we will do in the remainder of this chapter. We will first consider 
possible relations between public and private transfers: does the amount of public transfers 
received affect private transfers. Subsequently, we will asset the impact of transfers on labour 
supply, as changes in household labour supply may modify the income effects of transfers. 
Finally, we determine the ultimate effects of transfers on income and expenditures. To get a 
general idea of the relation between these different variables, Table 5.3 presents a correlation 
matrix. As expected, the correlation between per capita income and expenditures is positive 
and high (0.7). Both per capita public and private expenditures are moderately positively 
correlated with per capita income and expenditures (0.2 to 0.3) and weakly positively with 
each other (0.1), confirming our tabular findings that at least ex post richer households receive 
higher transfers of both types. While working hours per productive member and working 
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hours per capita are weakly positively correlated with income and expenditures (0.1 to 0.2), 
the share of productive household members and income and expenditures are weakly 
negatively correlated (-0.1 to -0.2). Working hours per productive member, working hours per 
capita and the share of productive members are weakly negatively correlated with transfers (-
0.0 to -0.2). Whether this presents a causal link, and transfers induce people to consume more 
leisure is investigated in section 5.3.3. 
 
 
Table 5.3. Correlation matrix of income, expenditures, transfers, and labour supply in 2004 
and 2006. 
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2004        
Per capita income 1       
Per capita expenditure 0.7224* 1      
Per capita public transfers 0.2258* 0.2355* 1     
Per capita private transfers 0.3283* 0.3532* 0.1429* 1    
Members engaged in productive activities/total 
household members older than 14 (%) -0.1241* -0.2126* -0.1761* -0.1820* 1   
Annual working hours per household member 
engaged in productive activities 0.1854* 0.1650* -0.0335 -0.0564* 0.3563* 1  
Annual working hours per capita 0.1476* 0.1341* -0.1086* -0.1055* 0.0116* 0.6638* 1 
2006        
Per capita income 1       
Per capita expenditure 0.6577* 1      
Per capita public transfers 0.2122* 0.2192* 1     
Per capita private transfers 0.2267* 0.3292* 0.1041* 1    
Members engaged in productive activities/total 
household members older than 14 (%) -0.0556* -0.1579* -0.1793* -0.1555* 1   
Annual working hours per household member 
engaged in productive activities 0.1823* 0.1986* -0.0998* -0.0760* 0.4100* 1  
Annual working hours per capita 0.1439* 0.1559* -0.1671* -0.1578* 0.0743* 0.6822* 1 
* Statistically significant at 5%. 
Source: Author’s estimation from VHLSS 2004. 
 
 
5.3.2 Public and private transfers: crowding out or crowding in? 
 
To test for the relationship between public and private transfers net of household 
characteristics, we ran a regression of private transfers on public transfers and control 
variables as described above. While simple regressions of private transfers on public transfers 
point towards a significantly positive relationship, the significance disappears after the 
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introduction of household fixed effects or the introduction of household and community 
controls (Table 5.4 and Table 5.10 in Appendix 5.1). Put differently, the positive association 
between public and private transfers is the consequence of common association with other 
characteristics and not of a direct relationship: some households received both more public 
and more private transfers than others did, but this is due to other factors than the crowding-in 
of private transfers by public transfers. For example, households with more elderly received 
both more pensions and more transfers from friends and relatives but the latter sent these not 
considering the level of public transfers. This result is robust for the estimation method used. 
 
 
Table 5.4. Regression of per capita domestic transfer. 
 
Explanatory variables Random 
effects (no 
sampling 
weights) 
Tobit 
random 
effects (no 
sampling 
weights) 
Fixed 
effects (with 
sampling 
weights and 
cluster 
correlation) 
Random 
effects (no 
sampling 
weights) 
Tobit 
random 
effects (no 
sampling 
weights) 
Fixed 
effects (with 
sampling 
weights and 
cluster 
correlation) 
0.122*** 0.122*** -0.006 0.01 0.01 -0.05 Public transfers per capita 
(thousand VND) [0.013] [0.013] [0.056] [0.014] [0.014] [0.057] 
Household controls No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Community controls No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Dummy variable for 2006 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant Yes Yes yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 8,432 8,432 8,432 8,432 8,432 8,432 
Number of households 4,216 4,216 4,216 4,216 4,216 4,216 
R-squared 0.01  0.01 0.104  0.07 
Standard errors brackets. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Author’s estimation from VHLSS 2004 and 2006. 
 
 
5.3.3 Transfers and labour supply 
 
Public and private transfers potentially lower labour supply. To test this relationship, we ran 
regressions of several indicators of households labour supply on public and private transfers. 
The labour variables are the ratio of working members in households, the number of working 
household members, total annual working hours per capita, and total working hours per 
working household member. The regression results are reported in Tables 5.11 and 5.12 in 
Appendix 5.1. The results are mostly very similar across different estimation methods. As 
Hausman tests reject exogeneity of the household effects, we select the fixed effect estimates 
with survey corrections to estimate ATT. 
The ATT estimates are presented in Table 5.5 and show clearly that both public and 
private transfers decreased work efforts as expected. Receipt of private transfers reduced the 
ratio of members working in productive activities to total adult household members by nearly 
1 percentage point. The impacts of public transfers on the working to all adult ratio was of 
similar magnitude, but not statistically significant. Both public and private transfers reduced 
the working hours of the recipients. Public transfers on average reduced working hours per 
capita by 52 hours, or 5 percent in 2004. The reduction was substantially higher in 2006, 
when public transfers were higher: 89 hours, or 8 percent. The effect of domestic private 
transfers was quite small: the receipt of private transfers reduced the working hours per capita 
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by only 1 percent in both years. Not only were private transfers much lower than public 
transfers, their coefficient in the labour hours equations was also lower indicating that per 
VND transferred, the decrease in working hours was lowest for private transfers. Possible 
reasons could be that private transfers are better targeted at those who really need them or that 
people are afraid that their relatives or friends will not send money again if they notice that 
the recipients start working fewer hours. 
 
 
Table 5.5. Impact of public and private transfers on annual working hours (ATT). 
 
 2004   2006  
 Y1 Y0 
ATT 
(Y1 – Y0) 
Y1 Y0 
ATT 
(Y1 – Y0) 
Impact of public transfers on:       
69.6*** 70.3*** -0.8 66.5*** 67.8*** -1.3 Members engaged in productive 
activities/total household 
members older than 14 (%) [0.7] [1.0] [0.8] [0.8] [1.5] [1.3] 
1,688.7*** 1,766.5*** -77.8*** 1,732.9*** 1,863.2*** -130.3*** Annual working hours per 
household member engaged in 
productive activities [19.3] [27.1] [18.8] [23.2] [38.4] [31.7] 
948.3*** 999.8*** -51.5*** 961.4*** 1,050.0*** -88.6*** 
Annual working hours per capita 
[12.3] [17.9] [13.7] [15.6] [28.0] [23.7] 
Impact of private transfers on:       
76.6*** 77.3*** -0.7** 75.1*** 75.9*** -0.8*** Members engaged in productive 
activities/total household 
members older than 14 (%) [0.3] [0.4] [0.2] [0.3] [0.4] [0.2] 
1,776.1*** 1,784.7*** -8.6** 1,822.5*** 1,832.6*** -10.1** Annual working hours per 
household member engaged in 
productive activities [10.7] [11.3] [3.4] [10.2] [11.0] [4.0] 
1,001.9*** 1,013.5*** -11.5*** 1,040.6*** 1,054.0*** -13.4*** 
Annual working hours per capita 
[6.6] [7.6] [3.6] [7.1] [8.1] [4.2] 
Note: Members engaged in productive activities are those who are above 14 year olds and working for money, and working 
hours are those hours spent in productive activities. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Standard errors in brackets. Standard errors are corrected for sampling weights and estimated using bootstrap (non-
parametric) with 500 replications. 
Author’s estimation from VHLSS 2004 and 2006. 
 
 
5.3.4 The effect of transfers on household income and expenditure 
 
Tables 5.14 and 5.15 in Appendix 5.1 present the regressions of income and expenditure per 
capita on public and private transfers per capita and other control explanatory variables. As 
indicated before, we present both random effects and fixed effects estimates, with and without 
sampling weights and cluster correlation. The results are quite robust with respect to 
estimation method and inclusion or non-inclusion of control variables. Since the Hausman 
tests strongly favour the fixed-effects estimates, we focus the discussion on the survey-
corrected fixed-effects estimates. 
The estimates of marginal effect of public and private transfers on income are 0.75 and 
0.72 respectively, and not significantly different (Table 5.14 in the Appendix). This means 
that an extra VND transferred per capita leads to an increase of just over 0.7 VND in per 
capita income, irrespective of the source of the transfer. The estimates are statistically 
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significantly smaller than one, indicating that income increased by less than the amount of 
money transferred. These findings are consistent with the findings that transfers decrease 
work effort and do not confirm the existence of multiplier effects. 
As expected, the impact of public and private transfers on expenditure was lower than 
the impact on income (Table 5.15 in Appendix 5.1). An increase of 1 VND in per capita 
public and private transfers resulted in an increase of 0.12 and 0.41 VND in per capita 
expenditure. This suggests that households use public and private transfers not only for 
consumption but also for savings and investment. These results are of the same order of 
magnitude as the findings of Van de Walle (2004) who conclude that the propensity to 
consume out of public transfers (not including pensions) was 0.37 for Vietnam during the 
1990s. 
To see the total increase in per capita income and expenditure caused by transfers, we 
estimated ATT. Since ATT depends on the size of transfers, it may have differed between 
years and sources, and Table 5.6 presents the ATT estimates for public and private transfers 
for both years separately. It shows that public transfers increased per capita income of the 
recipient by around 20 and 24 percent in 2004 and 2006, respectively. The effect of public 
transfers on per capita expenditure was much lower. Public transfers increased per capita 
expenditure of the recipient households only by 3 and 4 percent for the years 2004 and 2006, 
respectively. Again, this finding suggests that most public transfers were saved. 
 
 
Table 5.6. Impact of transfers measured by ATT. 
 
 2004   2006   
Y1 Y0 ATT  
(Y1 – Y0) 
Y1 Y0 ATT  
(Y1 – Y0) 
Impact of public transfers on:       
Income per capita 6,279.3*** 5,238.0*** 1,041.3*** 7,962.2*** 6,416.5*** 1,545.7*** 
 [167.4] [194.3] [120.8] [192.1] [247.9] [183.4] 
Expenditure per capita 4,860.6*** 4,699.3*** 161.3** 5,938.3*** 5,698.9*** 239.4** 
 [117.1] [136.9] [76.8] [140.7] [174.9] [102.4] 
  880.1***   1,306.3*** Difference in ATT between 
income and expenditure   [109.5]   [167.6] 
Impact of private transfers on:       
Income per capita 5,801.7*** 5,412.6*** 389.1*** 6,809.5*** 6,420.6*** 388.9*** 
 [89.1] [88.4] [32.3] [99.3] [100.9] [31.9] 
Expenditure per capita 4,455.1*** 4,229.1*** 226.0*** 5,034.8*** 4,806.4*** 228.4*** 
 [64.9] [71.9] [35.9] [70.5] [76.7] [38.1] 
  163.1***   160.5*** Difference in ATT between 
income and expenditure   [37.8]   [37.7] 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Standard errors in brackets. Standard errors are corrected for sampling weights and estimated using bootstrap (non-
parametric) with 500 replications. 
Source: Author’s estimation from VHLSS 2004 and 2006. 
 
 
Private transfers had a much lower effect on per capita income than public transfers – a 
7 and 6 percent increase in 2004 and 2006, respectively – simply because private transfers 
were much smaller on average. The effect of both transfers on expenditures was, however, 
comparable: private transfers increased recipients per capita expenditure by around 5, public 
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transfers by 3-4 percent. Hence, whereas most public transfers were saved, a relatively large 
share of private transfers was used for current consumption. This suggests that people sent 
more transfers to relatives and friends who had a greater need for consumption, as theories of 
altruism and insurance imply. 
 
 
Table 5.7. Impact of transfers on poverty. 
 
 2004   2006   
With public 
transfers 
Without 
public 
transfers 
Impact With public 
transfers 
Without 
public 
transfers 
Impact 
Public transfers       
Transfer recipients 
P0 0.1991*** 0.2207*** -0.0216** 0.1353*** 0.1483*** -0.0130 
 [0.0129] [0.0163] [0.0108] [0.0122] [0.0148] [0.0092] 
P1 0.0565*** 0.0608*** -0.0044* 0.0388*** 0.0429*** -0.0041 
 [0.0050] [0.0058] [0.0026] [0.0055] [0.0060] [0.0025] 
P2 0.0235*** 0.0251*** -0.0015 0.0160*** 0.0178*** -0.0018 
 [0.0028] [0.0031] [0.0010] [0.0031] [0.0033] [0.0012] 
All       
P0 0.1949*** 0.1987*** -0.0038** 0.1597*** 0.1620*** -0.0023 
 [0.0053] [0.0056] [0.0019] [0.0051] [0.0052] [0.0016] 
P1 0.0472*** 0.0480*** -0.0008 0.0383*** 0.0390*** -0.0007 
 [0.0017] [0.0018] [0.0005] [0.0017] [0.0018] [0.0004] 
P2 0.0170*** 0.0173*** -0.0003 0.0137*** 0.0140*** -0.0003 
 [0.0009] [0.0009] [0.0002] [0.0009] [0.0009] [0.0002] 
Private transfers     
Transfer recipients     
P0 0.1884*** 0.2159*** -0.0275*** 0.1574*** 0.1780*** -0.0206*** 
 [0.0060] [0.0077] [0.0050] [0.0062] [0.0078] [0.0047] 
P1 0.0446*** 0.0569*** -0.0123*** 0.0366*** 0.0457*** -0.0092*** 
 [0.0019] [0.0037] [0.0031] [0.0019] [0.0031] [0.0024] 
P2 0.0157*** 0.0338*** -0.0181 0.0128*** 0.0205*** -0.0077** 
 [0.0009] [0.0125] [0.0124] [0.0009] [0.0038] [0.0036] 
All        
P0 0.1953*** 0.2189*** -0.0236*** 0.1601*** 0.1782*** -0.0182*** 
 [0.0058] [0.0071] [0.0043] [0.0059] [0.0074] [0.0041] 
P1 0.0473*** 0.0579*** -0.0106*** 0.0384*** 0.0464*** -0.0081*** 
 [0.0019] [0.0033] [0.0027] [0.0019] [0.0030] [0.0021] 
P2 0.0170*** 0.0325*** -0.0155 0.0137*** 0.0205*** -0.0068** 
 [0.0009] [0.0107] [0.0106] [0.0009] [0.0034] [0.0032] 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Standard errors in brackets. Standard errors are corrected for sampling weights and estimated using bootstrap (non-
parametric) with 500 replications. 
Source: Author’s estimation from VHLSS 2004 and 2006. 
 
 
5.3.5 Impact on poverty and inequality 
 
Since transfers had a significant impact on per capita expenditure, they are expected to have 
affected poverty and inequality. Public transfers indeed reduced the head count of poverty of 
recipients by around 2.2 and 1.3 percentage points in 2004 and 2006, respectively, although 
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the effect was not statistically significant for the latter year (Table 5.7). While the average 
transfer amounts were higher in 2006, their effect on poverty was higher in 2004, because in 
this year there were more poor and a larger share of the poor received public transfers. The 
effect of public transfers on the overall head count was negligible, as was their impact on the 
other poverty indices. This indicates that not much has changed since the 1990s, for which 
Van de Walle (2004) obtained a similar result. 
Domestic private transfers were slightly more successful in reducing poverty. Almost 
all impact estimates were negative and statistically significant (Table 5.6). Private transfers 
reduced the poverty incidence for the recipients by around 2.7 and 2.1 percentage points. 
Within the group of poor transfer recipients, the effects were greater: their poverty gap 
decreased by about 20 percent in both years, and the severity of their poverty even declined 
by 71 and 38 percent in 2004 and 2006, respectively. As more than 80 percent of the poor 
received domestic private transfers, their effects on total poverty were only slightly smaller 
than their effects on the poverty of recipients alone. 
Public transfers and private transfers had very little impact, if any, on inequality. 
Inequality of the total population increased by less than one percent due to public transfers, 
but decreased by around one percent due to private transfers (Table 5.8). Inequality between 
recipients did not change significantly due to either type of transfer and is therefore not 
presented in tabular form. The negligible impact of transfers on inequality does not come as a 
surprise. As we saw before, the relative contribution of transfers to total income and 
expenditure was similar for poor and non-poor recipients, and the shares of households 
receiving transfers were also similar across the two groups. 
 
 
Table 5.8. Impact of transfers on overall inequality. 
 
 2004   2006   
With 
transfers 
Without 
transfers 
Impact With 
transfers 
Without 
transfers 
Impact 
Public transfers       
Gini 0.3698*** 0.3697*** 0.0001 0.3580*** 0.3576*** 0.0004* 
 [0.0040] [0.0040] [0.0001] [0.0040] [0.0040] [0.0002] 
Theil L 0.2235*** 0.2234*** 0.0002 0.2117*** 0.2113*** 0.0005* 
 [0.0050] [0.0050] [0.0002] [0.0049] [0.0049] [0.0003] 
Theil T 0.2407*** 0.2408*** -0.0001 0.2268*** 0.2266*** 0.0001 
 [0.0065] [0.0066] [0.0003] [0.0071] [0.0072] [0.0003] 
Private transfers 
Gini 0.3697*** 0.3724*** -0.0027** 0.3579*** 0.3603*** -0.0024** 
 [0.0050] [0.0052] [0.0014] [0.0046] [0.0047] [0.0012] 
Theil L 0.2235*** 0.2238*** -0.0004 0.2118*** 0.2137*** -0.0019 
 [0.0062] [0.0064] [0.0014] [0.0056] [0.0056] [0.0013] 
Theil T 0.2405*** 0.2444*** -0.0040** 0.2267*** 0.2295*** -0.0028* 
 [0.0077] [0.0081] [0.0021] [0.0074] [0.0077] [0.0016] 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Standard errors in brackets. Standard errors are corrected for sampling weights and estimated using bootstrap (non-
parametric) with 500 replications. 
Source: Author’s estimation from VHLSS 2004 and 2006. 
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5.4 Conclusions 
 
In this study, we investigate how well public transfers and domestic private transfers reached 
the poor in Vietnam and to what extent these transfers affected poverty and inequality in the 
mid-2000s. We also show some of the other underlying mechanisms. We estimate the effect 
of the transfers on both per capita income and expenditure. Neither is straightforward. Cash 
transfers do not necessarily result in an increase in income with the same value as the transfer. 
On the one hand, cash transfers may have positive multiplier effects when (part of) the money 
is used productively. On the other hand, public transfers may crowd out private transfers and 
lead to a reduction in work effort. We therefore also estimate the effect of public transfers on 
domestic private transfers and the effect of both types of transfers on work effort. At the same 
time, the propensity to consume is not necessarily the same for transfers and earned income, 
as they may accrue to different persons with different preferences, and money may not be 
perfectly pooled. Last but not least, estimating the effect of transfers on income and 
expenditures will give biased estimates unless the endogeneity of transfer allocation is 
accounted for. We therefore use fixed-effects regression to account for time-invariant 
unobserved variables that are correlated with the independent variables. 
Vietnam’s extensive social security system is claimed to have played a key role in the 
extraordinary poverty decline over the past decades. This claim is, however, not substantiated 
by empirical evidence. Like Van de Walle (2004) has shown for the 1990s, we find that the 
impact of public transfers on poverty was negligible due to low coverage of poor and 
relatively low amounts transferred to the poor, but not due to crowding out of private 
transfers: contrary to studies for other countries, our estimates suggest that public transfers did 
not affect the level of private transfers. Still, the effect of transfers received on expenditure 
was small: transfer recipients decreased labour supply and in addition used only a limited 
amount of the extra income for current consumption. 
Domestic private transfers were somewhat more successful in reducing poverty – a 
decrease of about two percentage points of the head count and quite substantial decreases in 
the depth and severity of poverty – because a large proportion of the poor received private 
transfers and a relatively high share of private transfers was used for current consumption. 
Our results imply that simply increasing the government budget for transfers will not be 
very effective in decreasing poverty. A significant share of transfers can leak to the non-poor, 
even though social subsidies alone are targeting slightly better than the overall transfers we 
present in the chapter. Moreover, as indicated above, the impact of public transfers received 
on expenditures is low. The much larger effect of private transfers, however, indicates that 
better targeting could also improve the link between transfers and expenditures. 
Better targeting is however complicated and possibly costly. Decentralization, as 
suggested by Van de Walle (2004), may not be an easy solution. Public microfinance is 
allocated through commune authorities to supposedly poor households. But two thirds of the 
money lent still ends up with the non-poor (Nguyen et al., 2008). Our results suggest that 
facilitation of money transfers between relatives and friends could be a more efficient method 
of decreasing poverty. 
Despite the fact that most public and private transfer went to non-poor households, 
inequality was only marginally affected. The group of non-poor is much larger than the group 
of poor households, and even though the average transfer received is much higher for non-
poor recipients, the relative contribution of transfers to total income and expenditure was 
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similar for the poor and the non-poor recipients. Also, the shares of households receiving 
transfers were similar across the two groups for both public and private transfers. 
Finally, we must keep in mind that our poverty and inequality estimates do not cover all 
effects of transfers on welfare. A substantial share of especially public transfers seems to be 
saved or invested and may thus lead to future improvements in well-being, which was outside 
the scope of this study. Also, transfers resulted in a decrease in work effort and thus an 
increase in leisure, which – like consumption expenditure – adds to current welfare, but is not 
accounted for in our poverty calculations. 
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Appendix 5.1 Descriptive statistics and regression results 
 
Table 5.9. Variables of households with and without public transfers. 
 
2004 2006 Variables Type 
Household
s with 
public 
transfers 
Household
s without 
public 
transfers 
Household
s with 
public 
transfers 
Household
s without 
public 
transfers 
Household variables      
Continuous 0.2011 0.2809 0.1674 0.2527 Ratio of members younger than 16 to total 
household members  [0.0092] [0.0043] [0.0082] [0.0042] 
Continuous 0.1747 0.0771 0.1915 0.0793 Ratio of members who older than 60 to total 
household members  [0.0085] [0.0029] [0.0088] [0.0027] 
Household size Discrete 5.06 4.85 4.92 4.92 
  [0.10] [0.04] [0.12] [0.05] 
Household size squared Discrete 29.93 26.51 28.41 27.27 
  [1.34] [0.59] [1.67] [0.66] 
Continuous 0.1053 0.0492 0.1310 0.0526 Ratio of members with technical degree to total 
household members  [0.0079] [0.0028] [0.0080] [0.0026] 
Continuous 0.0601 0.0212 0.0770 0.0232 Ratio of members with post secondary degree 
to total household members  [0.0076] [0.0020] [0.0080] [0.0020] 
Area of annual crop land per capita (m2) Continuous 685.7 698.2 605.7 768.1 
  [57.0] [29.6] [59.0] [34.9] 
Area of perennial crop land per capita (m2) Continuous 206.0 215.6 174.0 251.6 
  [59.5] [19.5] [30.9] [20.7] 
Forestry land per capita (m2) Continuous 279.7 195.8 340.4 250.9 
  [82.2] [41.0] [113.2] [50.6] 
Aquaculture water surface per capita (m2) Continuous 43.0 57.8 32.9 73.3 
  [13.6] [10.0] [10.1] [14.1] 
Village variables      
Road to village (yes = 1) Continuous 0.5986 0.6157 0.5918 0.6661 
  [0.0251] [0.0145] [0.0250] [0.0140] 
Distance to nearest daily market (km) Continuous 2.5999 2.0652 2.2818 2.3390 
  [0.3348] [0.1318] [0.3275] [0.1625] 
Regional variables      
Red River Delta Binary 0.2614 0.1977 0.2950 0.1910 
  [0.0212] [0.0113] [0.0224] [0.0110] 
North East Binary 0.1518 0.1100 0.1504 0.1106 
  [0.0155] [0.0081] [0.0164] [0.0082] 
North West Binary 0.0336 0.0324 0.0246 0.0343 
  [0.0081] [0.0046] [0.0076] [0.0048] 
North Central Coast Binary 0.1977 0.1259 0.1992 0.1261 
  [0.0215] [0.0107] [0.0226] [0.0106] 
South Central Coast Binary 0.0669 0.0912 0.0637 0.0917 
  [0.0115] [0.0079] [0.0105] [0.0080] 
Central Highlands Binary 0.0939 0.0559 0.0532 0.0649 
  [0.0175] [0.0068] [0.0127] [0.0076] 
North East South Binary 0.0907 0.1631 0.1087 0.1587 
  [0.0160] [0.0125] [0.0172] [0.0123] 
Mekong River Delta Binary 0.1041 0.2238 0.1052 0.2227 
  [0.0144] [0.0122] [0.0142] [0.0121] 
Living in urban areas Binary 0.2870 0.2450 0.3329 0.2355 
  [0.0230] [0.0130] [0.0243] [0.0129] 
Observations  1,687  7,501 1,625  7,564 
Standard errors in brackets. 
Source: Author’s estimation from VHLSS 2004 and 2006. 
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Table 5.10. Variables of households with and without domestic private transfers. 
 
2004 2006 Variables Type 
Household
s with 
private 
transfers 
Household
s without 
private 
transfers 
Household
s with 
private 
transfers 
Household
s without 
private 
transfers 
Household variables      
Continuous 0.2634 0.2833 0.2370 0.2432 Ratio of members younger than 16 to total 
household members  [0.0043] [0.0096] [0.0040] [0.0111] 
Continuous 0.1005 0.0620 0.1016 0.0786 Ratio of members older than 60 to total 
household members  [0.0033] [0.0060] [0.0029] [0.0072] 
Household size Discrete 4.87 5.02 4.91 4.97 
  [0.04] [0.09] [0.05] [0.09] 
Household size squared Discrete 26.95 28.21 27.46 27.58 
  [0.60] [1.16] [0.67] [1.24] 
Continuous 0.0605 0.0534 0.0648 0.0806 Ratio of members with technical degree to total 
household members  [0.0031] [0.0057] [0.0029] [0.0088] 
Continuous 0.0285 0.0268 0.0318 0.0404 Ratio of hh. members with post secondary 
degree to total household members  [0.0025] [0.0042] [0.0026] [0.0056] 
Area of annual crop land per capita (m2) Continuous 676.5 809.9 732.8 794.7 
  [28.6] [68.4] [33.1] [92.7] 
Area of perennial crop land per capita (m2) Continuous 207.6 250.5 231.2 293.4 
  [21.0] [58.9] [18.1] [80.9] 
Forestry land per capita (m2) Continuous 187.3 351.3 254.2 370.7 
  [35.0] [126.7] [50.0] [152.1] 
Aquaculture water surface per capita (m2) Continuous 45.4 112.0 52.0 184.2 
  [7.8] [35.9] [10.2] [66.7] 
Village variables      
Road to village (yes = 1) Continuous 0.6214 0.5608 0.6537 0.6472 
  [0.0145] [0.0293] [0.0141] [0.0333] 
Distance to nearest daily market (km) Continuous 2.1091 2.4790 2.3392 2.2430 
  [0.1261] [0.3398] [0.1715] [0.3432] 
Regional variables      
Red River Delta Binary 0.2162 0.1693 0.2076 0.2243 
  [0.0119] [0.0226] [0.0115] [0.0319] 
North East Binary 0.1123 0.1491 0.1109 0.1734 
  [0.0084] [0.0187] [0.0082] [0.0238] 
North West Binary 0.0215 0.0976 0.0285 0.0668 
  [0.0034] [0.0159] [0.0041] [0.0153] 
North Central Coast Binary 0.1399 0.1335 0.1408 0.1237 
  [0.0113] [0.0206] [0.0112] [0.0235] 
South Central Coast Binary 0.0877 0.0812 0.0865 0.0883 
  [0.0078] [0.0164] [0.0077] [0.0177] 
Central Highlands Binary 0.0667 0.0402 0.0681 0.0192 
  [0.0078] [0.0115] [0.0078] [0.0069] 
North East South Binary 0.1506 0.1456 0.1494 0.1539 
  [0.0118] [0.0224] [0.0118] [0.0274] 
Mekong River Delta Binary 0.2051 0.1836 0.2082 0.1504 
  [0.0116] [0.0231] [0.0116] [0.0231] 
Living in urban areas Binary 0.2517 0.2582 0.2531 0.2485 
  [0.0132] [0.0256] [0.0130] [0.0393] 
Observations  7,825 1,363 8,032 1,157 
Standard errors in brackets. 
Source: Author’s estimation from VHLSS 2004 and 2006. 
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Table 5.11. Regression of per capita domestic transfers. 
 
Explanatory variables Random 
effects (no 
sampling 
weight) 
Tobit 
random 
effects (no 
sampling 
weight) 
Fixed 
effects with 
sampling 
weight and 
cluster 
correlation 
Random 
effects (no 
sampling 
weight) 
Tobit 
random 
effects (no 
sampling 
weight) 
Fixed 
effects with 
sampling 
weight and 
cluster 
correlation 
0.122*** 0.122*** -0.006 0.01 0.01 -0.05 Public transfers per capita 
(thousand VND) [0.013] [0.013] [0.056] [0.014] [0.014] [0.057] 
   -175.680* -176.004* 175.427 Ratio of members younger 
than 16 to total household 
members 
   [90.769] [90.521] [241.609] 
   587.087*** 587.388*** 347.955 Ratio of members older 
than 60 to total household 
members 
   [78.472] [78.241] [357.933] 
Household size    -452.273*** -451.976*** -728.132*** 
    [33.611] [33.537] [111.687] 
Household size squared    29.519*** 29.505*** 43.240*** 
    [2.999] [2.992] [8.919] 
   632.373*** 632.533*** 265.515 Ratio of household member 
with technical degree    [109.205] [108.979] [236.676] 
   358.895** 361.075** -1,156.429* Ratio of household member 
with post secondary degree    [152.531] [152.304] [615.681] 
   -0.023** -0.022** -0.054** Area of annual crop land 
per capita (m2)    [0.010] [0.010] [0.022] 
   -0.003 -0.003 -0.036* Area of perennial crop land 
per capita (m2)    [0.013] [0.013] [0.021] 
   0.002 0.002 -0.006 Forestry land per capita 
(m2)    [0.007] [0.007] [0.005] 
   -0.038 -0.038 -0.047 Area of aquaculture water 
surface per capita (m2)    [0.027] [0.027] [0.031] 
Road to village (yes = 1)    30.069 29.815 114.498 
    [49.419] [49.346] [76.938] 
   0.326 0.319 0.725 Distance to nearest daily 
market (km)    [2.857] [2.853] [2.519] 
Red River Delta Base-omitted     
North East    -184.348*** -184.409***  
    [60.207] [59.995]  
North West    -157.031* -157.042*  
    [93.983] [93.658]  
North Central Coast    -111.363* -111.382*  
    [63.447] [63.220]  
South Central Coast    -165.311** -165.301**  
    [68.170] [67.926]  
Central Highlands    -138.650* -138.705*  
    [83.616] [83.324]  
North East South    156.528** 156.510**  
    [64.277] [64.049]  
Mekong River Delta    96.697* 96.663*  
    [56.643] [56.447]  
Living in urban areas    -118.389* -118.010*  
    [60.634] [60.492]  
Dummy variable for 2006 60.852** 60.839** 97.859*** 39.405 39.399 69.686** 
 [27.533] [27.552] [32.321] [27.273] [27.295] [33.886] 
Constant 495.59*** 495.56*** 562.86*** 1,904.46*** 1,903.31*** 2,713.51*** 
 [23.248] [23.239] [27.718] [105.308] [105.085] [329.116] 
Observations 8,432 8,432 8,432 8,432 8,432 8,432 
Number of households 4,216 4,216 4,216 4,216 4,216 4,216 
R-squared 0.01  0.01 0.104  0.07 
Robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
Source: Author’s estimation from VHLSS 2004 and 2006. 
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Table 5.12. Regressions of the ratio and number of household working members. 
 
The ratio of working members in 
households 
The number of working members in 
households 
Explanatory variables 
Random 
effects (no 
sampling 
weight) 
Fixed 
effects (no 
sampling 
weight) 
Fixed 
effects with 
sampling 
weight and 
cluster 
correlation 
Fixed 
effects 
Poisson 
(no 
sampling 
weight) 
Random 
effects (no 
sampling 
weight) 
Fixed 
effects with 
sampling 
weight and 
cluster 
correlation 
-0.000016*** -0.000004 -0.000005 -0.000047*** -0.000018 -0.000018 Public transfers per capita 
(thousand VND) [0.000002] [0.000004] [0.000005] [0.000007] [0.000012] [0.000013] 
-0.000015*** -0.000009*** -0.000011*** -0.000029*** -0.000013** -0.000019** Domestic transfers per 
capita (thousand VND) [0.000002] [0.000002] [0.000003] [0.000005] [0.000007] [0.000008] 
0.382969*** 0.535524*** 0.557634*** -2.375293*** -1.719399*** -1.591811*** Ratio of members younger 
than 16 to total household 
members 
[0.014132] [0.027685] [0.032667] [0.047787] [0.093710] [0.110253] 
-0.232018*** -0.253573*** -0.260653*** -0.666633*** -0.562667*** -0.555223*** Ratio of members older than 
60 to total household 
members 
[0.012449] [0.030160] [0.047527] [0.042089] [0.102087] [0.108782] 
Household size -0.087057*** -0.103748*** -0.111368*** 0.522134*** 0.521758*** 0.458883*** 
 [0.005229] [0.009347] [0.012851] [0.017684] [0.031637] [0.064394] 
Household size squared 0.005259*** 0.006395*** 0.006913*** -0.000162 0.001809 0.007073 
 [0.000463] [0.000807] [0.001099] [0.001566] [0.002732] [0.006610] 
0.076530*** 0.099930*** 0.105840*** 0.228553*** 0.341362*** 0.358640*** Ratio of household member 
with technical degree [0.016207] [0.023968] [0.028146] [0.054835] [0.081130] [0.092228] 
0.049526** 0.247522*** 0.239809*** 0.200565** 0.833628*** 0.797131*** Ratio of household member 
with post secondary degree [0.023577] [0.044103] [0.055843] [0.079732] [0.149283] [0.175584] 
0.000007*** 0.000004 0.000005 0.000010* -0.000001 0.000002 Area of annual crop land per 
capita (m2) [0.000002] [0.000003] [0.000003] [0.000005] [0.000009] [0.000010] 
0.000003 0.000002 0.000004* 0.000004 0.000002 0.000008 Area of perennial crop land 
per capita (m2) [0.000002] [0.000003] [0.000003] [0.000007] [0.000010] [0.000008] 
Forestry land per capita (m2) 0.000001 0.000001 0.000001 0.000007* 0.000007 0.000007 
 [0.000001] [0.000002] [0.000001] [0.000004] [0.000005] [0.000007] 
0.000004 0.000007 0.000004 0.000009 0.000022 0.000012 Area of aquaculture water 
surface per capita (m2) [0.000004] [0.000006] [0.000008] [0.000013] [0.000019] [0.000026] 
Road to village (yes = 1) 0.000412 0.002517 0.002502 0.003726 -0.001028 0.01421 
 [0.007113] [0.009355] [0.010194] [0.024074] [0.031666] [0.034545] 
0.000132 -0.001125** -0.001323*** -0.00175 -0.005325*** -0.006523*** Distance to nearest daily 
market (km) [0.000407] [0.000520] [0.000424] [0.001378] [0.001760] [0.001900] 
Red River Delta Base-omitted     
North East 0.030974***   0.125874***   
 [0.009907]   [0.033478]   
North West 0.029552*   0.087585*   
 [0.015397]   [0.052031]   
North Central Coast -0.023184**   -0.123077***   
 [0.010475]   [0.035395]   
South Central Coast -0.011081   -0.05888   
 [0.011256]   [0.038034]   
Central Highlands 0.009184   -0.063221   
 [0.013717]   [0.046356]   
North East South -0.037660***   -0.146068***   
 [0.010590]   [0.035785]   
Mekong River Delta -0.016261*   -0.019884   
 [0.009279]   [0.031357]   
Urban -0.078730***   -0.256460***   
 [0.009370]   [0.031686]   
Time change (dummy 2006) -0.014336*** -0.013058*** -0.010233*** -0.039823*** -0.026673** -0.01988 
 [0.003451] [0.003557] [0.003933] [0.011692] [0.012039] [0.013132] 
Constant 1.033248*** 1.012347*** 1.022314*** 0.966159*** 0.642359*** 0.743344*** 
 [0.016954] [0.027480] [0.036347] [0.057338] [0.093016] [0.151506] 
Observations 8,432 8,432 8,432 7,998 8,432 8,432 
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The ratio of working members in 
households 
The number of working members in 
households 
Explanatory variables 
Random 
effects (no 
sampling 
weight) 
Fixed 
effects (no 
sampling 
weight) 
Fixed 
effects with 
sampling 
weight and 
cluster 
correlation 
Fixed 
effects 
Poisson 
(no 
sampling 
weight) 
Random 
effects (no 
sampling 
weight) 
Fixed 
effects with 
sampling 
weight and 
cluster 
correlation 
Number of i 4,216 4,216 4,216 3,999 4,216 4,216 
R-squared 0.24 0.13 0.17 0.62 0.40 0.39 
Test H0: Coefficients of per capita public and private transfers are equal:  
F-test 0.12 1.21 1.17 3.98 0.13 0.01 
P-value 0.73 0.27 0.28 0.05 0.72 0.92 
Note: Working people are those who are older than 14 and were working during the past 12 months. 
Robust standard errors in brackets. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Source: Author’s estimation from VHLSS 2004 and 2006. 
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Table 5.13. Regressions of annual working hours. 
 
Annual working hours per capita  Annual working hours per working 
members 
Explanatory variables 
Random 
effects (no 
sampling 
weight) 
Fixed 
effects (no 
sampling 
weight) 
Fixed 
effects with 
sampling 
weight and 
cluster 
correlation 
Fixed 
effects 
Poisson 
(no 
sampling 
weight) 
Random 
effects (no 
sampling 
weight) 
Fixed 
effects with 
sampling 
weight and 
cluster 
correlation 
-0.0522*** -0.0383*** -0.0373*** -0.0621*** -0.0592*** -0.0578*** Public transfers per capita 
(thousand VND) [0.0046] [0.0079] [0.0092] [0.0065] [0.0116] [0.0131] 
-0.0287*** -0.0146*** -0.0212*** -0.0286*** -0.0117* -0.0159** Domestic transfers per 
capita (thousand VND) [0.0034] [0.0042] [0.0066] [0.0048] [0.0062] [0.0067] 
-861.0810*** -642.9849*** -622.3706*** 109.2682*** 20.892 -9.0937 Ratio of members younger 
than 16 to total household 
members 
[30.5052] [60.6844] [62.0347] [42.2936] [88.7716] [92.6954] 
-622.6396*** -594.5159*** -622.3082*** -638.8280*** -560.9002*** -632.9537*** Ratio of members older than 
60 to total household 
members 
[26.8412] [66.1097] [117.3814] [37.0456] [96.7079] [149.1159] 
Household size -84.5288*** -92.4649*** -105.5759*** 111.9003*** 109.9197*** 120.5789*** 
 [11.2961] [20.4873] [28.0074] [15.7102] [29.9697] [33.6507] 
Household size squared 4.3051*** 4.9081*** 6.1223** -9.7184*** -8.8168*** -9.3359*** 
 [1.0004] [1.7691] [2.3851] [1.3924] [2.5880] [2.7553] 
204.6983*** 207.6632*** 219.1755*** 189.4508*** 110.9633 101.5769 Ratio of household member 
with technical degree [35.1042] [52.5378] [59.8074] [49.3263] [76.8545] [75.2016] 
254.9810*** 606.3869*** 567.0869*** 253.9589*** 365.4885*** 279.2423* Ratio of household member 
with post secondary degree [50.9199] [96.6728] [119.5864] [70.7382] [141.4170] [164.9665] 
-0.0047 -0.0023 -0.0015 -0.0160*** -0.0003 0.0011 Area of annual crop land per 
capita (m2) [0.0034] [0.0061] [0.0073] [0.0048] [0.0089] [0.0095] 
-0.0045 0.0029 0.0053 -0.0066 0.0052 0.0072 Area of perennial crop land 
per capita (m2) [0.0042] [0.0065] [0.0060] [0.0059] [0.0094] [0.0094] 
Forestry land per capita (m2) -0.0001 0.0025 0.0044 -0.0052 -0.0021 0.001 
 [0.0023] [0.0035] [0.0038] [0.0032] [0.0051] [0.0082] 
0.0026 0.0246** 0.0195 -0.0002 0.0457*** 0.0386* Area of aquaculture water 
surface per capita (m2) [0.0086] [0.0121] [0.0190] [0.0122] [0.0177] [0.0202] 
Road to village (yes = 1) 33.3237** 27.8409 31.555 64.2529*** 57.2822* 57.1035* 
 [15.4357] [20.5064] [21.1830] [21.8505] [29.9976] [31.5280] 
-0.9876 -1.255 -1.0599 -1.5618 1.1088 1.7374 Distance to nearest daily 
market (km) [0.8843] [1.1397] [1.4075] [1.2549] [1.6672] [1.9975] 
Red River Delta Base-omitted     
North East 70.3721***   46.6676   
 [21.2961]   [29.0598]   
North West -4.4096   -46.4395   
 [33.1057]   [45.2224]   
North Central Coast -35.6299   -2.1825   
 [22.5110]   [30.6886]   
South Central Coast -28.5502   -5.8663   
 [24.1898]   [32.9778]   
Central Highlands -18.8099   -34.9837   
 [29.4929]   [40.2753]   
North East South 58.3876**   171.9581***   
 [22.7620]   [31.0493]   
Mekong River Delta -89.0716***   -145.3682***   
 [19.9517]   [27.2551]   
Urban 128.9550***   424.9175***   
 [20.2261]   [28.0585]   
Time change (dummy 2006) 14.6515* 15.4553** 16.8698* 40.6626*** 33.9214*** 30.2728** 
 [7.5408] [7.7960] [9.4689] [10.9984] [11.4043] [13.9251] 
Constant 1,565.56*** 1,528.79*** 1,558.68*** 1,429.47*** 1,497.35*** 1,497.67*** 
 [36.6225] [60.2355] [81.8858] [50.9213] [88.1150] [99.4892] 
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Annual working hours per capita  Annual working hours per working 
members 
Explanatory variables 
Random 
effects (no 
sampling 
weight) 
Fixed 
effects (no 
sampling 
weight) 
Fixed 
effects with 
sampling 
weight and 
cluster 
correlation 
Fixed 
effects 
Poisson 
(no 
sampling 
weight) 
Random 
effects (no 
sampling 
weight) 
Fixed 
effects with 
sampling 
weight and 
cluster 
correlation 
Observations 8,432 8,432 8,432 7,998 8,432 8,432 
Number of i 4,216 4,216 4,216 3,999 4,216 4,216 
R-squared 0.23 0.19 0.08 0.21 0.03 0.10 
Test H0: Coefficients of per capita public and private transfers are equal:  
F-test 16.8 7.13 2.1 17.29 13.34 9.27 
P-value 0.00 0.01 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Note: Working people are those who are older than 14 and were working during the past 12 months. 
Robust standard errors in brackets. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Source: Author’s estimation from VHLSS 2004 and 2006. 
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Table 5.14. Regressions of per capita income. 
 
Explanatory variables Random 
effects (no 
sampling 
weight) 
Fixed 
effects (no 
sampling 
weight) 
Fixed 
effects with 
sampling 
weight and 
cluster 
correlation 
Random 
effects (no 
sampling 
weight) 
Fixed 
effects (no 
sampling 
weight) 
Fixed 
effects with 
sampling 
weight and 
cluster 
correlation 
0.846*** 0.764*** 0.807*** 0.574*** 0.718*** 0.754*** Public transfers per capita 
(thousand VND) [0.052] [0.086] [0.085] [0.052] [0.086] [0.086] 
0.874*** 0.756*** 0.734*** 0.809*** 0.733*** 0.717*** Domestic transfers per 
capita (thousand VND) [0.038] [0.046] [0.052] [0.037] [0.046] [0.053] 
   -1,209.630*** 41.244 794.221 Ratio of members younger 
than 16 to total household 
members 
   [340.601] [654.724] [1,115.817] 
   -2,897.496*** -1,852.319*** -1,744.062* Ratio of members older than 
60 to total household 
members 
   [300.478] [713.258] [1,039.516] 
Household size    -351.140*** -696.568*** -705.331* 
    [125.904] [221.038] [373.200] 
Household size squared    7.478 35.461* 38.979 
    [11.145] [19.087] [27.459] 
   4,369.924*** 2,070.701*** 2,469.826*** Ratio of household member 
with technical degree    [389.054] [566.831] [697.994] 
  10,634.727*** 4,308.865*** 4,787.906*** Ratio of household member 
with post secondary 
degree 
   [567.907] [1,043.004] [1,853.079] 
   0.588*** 0.617*** 0.661*** Area of annual crop land per 
capita (m2)    [0.038] [0.066] [0.144] 
   0.428*** -0.036 -0.091 Area of perennial crop land 
per capita (m2)    [0.047] [0.070] [0.199] 
   0.031 0.024 0.027 Forestry land per capita (m2) 
   [0.026] [0.038] [0.062] 
   0.664*** 0.359*** 0.345*** Area of aquaculture water 
surface per capita (m2)    [0.096] [0.130] [0.129] 
Road to village (yes = 1)    366.511** 404.257* 551.506** 
    366.511** 404.257* 551.506** 
   [170.391] [221.243] [226.240] Distance to nearest daily 
market (km)    -31.360*** -9.752 -9.493* 
Red River Delta Base-omitted   [9.749] [12.296] 
North East    -532.061**   
    [239.992]   
North West   -1,816.938***   
    [372.864]   
North Central Coast    -939.537***   
    [253.812]   
South Central Coast    -3.238   
    [272.737]   
Central Highlands    -760.104**   
    [332.220]   
North East South    1,733.176***   
    [256.558]   
Mekong River Delta    475.643**   
    [224.707]   
Living in urban areas    2,441.156***   
    [225.893]   
Dummy variable for 2006 1,135.392*** 1,156.466*** 1,089.688*** 1,000.029*** 1,057.636*** 1,003.889*** 
 [81.878] [82.434] [101.077] [81.995] [84.111] [113.807] 
Constant 4,980.469*** 5,067.907*** 5,366.408*** 5,220.098*** 6,617.513*** 6,546.798*** 
 [92.997] [67.703] [64.992] [408.333] [649.881] [1276.726] 
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Explanatory variables Random 
effects (no 
sampling 
weight) 
Fixed 
effects (no 
sampling 
weight) 
Fixed 
effects with 
sampling 
weight and 
cluster 
correlation 
Random 
effects (no 
sampling 
weight) 
Fixed 
effects (no 
sampling 
weight) 
Fixed 
effects with 
sampling 
weight and 
cluster 
correlation 
Observations 8,432 8,432 8,432 8,432 8,432 8,432 
Number of households 4,216 4,216 4,216 4,216 4,216 4,216 
R-squared 0.11 0.13 0.11 0.3 0.16 0.17 
Test H0: Coefficients of per capita public and private transfers are equal:    
F-test 0.18 0.01 0.6 13.6 0.03 0.16 
P-value 0.67 0.93 0.44 0.00 0.87 0.69 
Hausman test χ2 (prob) 
(H0: Difference in 
coefficients in fixed and 
random effects regression 
not systematic)   
84.34(0.000)   72.35(0.000)  
Robust standard errors in brackets. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Source: Author’s estimation from VHLSS 2004 and 2006. 
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Table 5.15. Regression of per capita expenditure. 
 
Explanatory variables Random 
effects (no 
sampling 
weight) 
Fixed 
effects (no 
sampling 
weight) 
Fixed 
effects with 
sampling 
weight and 
cluster 
correlation 
Random 
effects (no 
sampling 
weight) 
Fixed 
effects (no 
sampling 
weight) 
Fixed 
effects with 
sampling 
weight and 
cluster 
correlation 
0.379*** 0.136*** 0.162*** 0.142*** 0.100** 0.117** Public transfers per capita 
(thousand VND) [0.028] [0.041] [0.056] [0.026] [0.041] [0.056] 
0.569*** 0.452*** 0.447*** 0.516*** 0.421*** 0.412*** Domestic transfers per 
capita (thousand VND) [0.019] [0.022] [0.068] [0.018] [0.022] [0.069] 
  -1,562.752*** -630.642** -540.747 Ratio of members younger 
than 16 to total household 
members 
   [171.155] [310.855] [333.894] 
  -1,323.541*** -1,047.050*** -983.324 Ratio of members older than 
60 to total household 
members 
   [151.773] [338.646] [646.102] 
Household size    -359.691*** -705.201*** -824.491*** 
    [63.056] [104.946] [159.557] 
Household size squared    12.358** 35.173*** 46.497*** 
    [5.577] [9.062] [14.457] 
   2,709.662*** 711.208*** 786.982** Ratio of household member 
with technical degree    [192.811] [269.124] [389.883] 
   8,048.395*** 1,987.302*** 1,985.190** Ratio of household member 
with post secondary 
degree 
   [284.784] [495.205] [932.498] 
   0.118*** 0.119*** 0.117*** Area of annual crop land per 
capita (m2)    [0.019] [0.031] [0.024] 
   0.153*** 0.123*** 0.128*** Area of perennial crop land 
per capita (m2)    [0.023] [0.033] [0.036] 
   -0.01 -0.026 -0.032*** 
Forestry land per capita (m2) 
   [0.013] [0.018] [0.010] 
   0.153*** 0.034 0.032 Area of aquaculture water 
surface per capita (m2)    [0.047] [0.062] [0.067] 
Road to village (yes = 1)    9.82 -33.86 33.494 
    [83.834] [105.044] [124.570] 
   -11.984** -2.718 -3.923 Distance to nearest daily 
market (km)    [4.785] [5.838] [3.172] 
Red River Delta Base-omitted     
North East   -643.976***    
   [122.826]    
North West   -1,126.563***    
   [190.627]    
North Central Coast   -638.732***    
   [130.019]    
South Central Coast   -3.249    
   [139.710]    
Central Highlands   -516.445***    
   [169.883]    
North East South   1,171.448***    
   [131.345]    
Mekong River Delta   112.034    
   [114.875]    
Living in urban areas   2,153.831***    
   [113.708]    
Dummy variable for 2006 526.461*** 570.941*** 550.712*** 441.581*** 505.639*** 483.726*** 
 [39.294] [39.178] [50.505] [39.315] [39.935] [54.171] 
Constant 3,900.198*** 4,035.709*** 4,272.106*** 4,909.112*** 6,472.702*** 6,900.150*** 
 [51.859] [32.177] [55.191] [204.735] [308.556] [445.349] 
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Explanatory variables Random 
effects (no 
sampling 
weight) 
Fixed 
effects (no 
sampling 
weight) 
Fixed 
effects with 
sampling 
weight and 
cluster 
correlation 
Random 
effects (no 
sampling 
weight) 
Fixed 
effects (no 
sampling 
weight) 
Fixed 
effects with 
sampling 
weight and 
cluster 
correlation 
Observations 8,432 8,432 8,432 8,432 8,432 8,432 
Number of households 4,216 4,216 4,216 4,216 4,216 4,216 
R-squared 0.16 0.14 0.15 0.46 0.18 0.16 
Test H0: Coefficients of per capita public and private transfers are equal: 
F-test 29.98 46.68 15.11 141.03 49.68 16.8 
P-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Hausman test χ2 (prob) 
(H0: Difference in 
coefficients in fixed and 
random effects regression 
not systematic)   
132.9(0.000)  269.65(0.000)  
Robust standard errors in brackets. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Source: Author’s estimation from VHLSS 2004 and 2006. 
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Chapter 6 The impact of international remittances on poverty and 
inequality35 
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
During the last decade, the development impact of international remittance flows has 
increasingly become a subject of policy discussions, because these flows represent a 
substantial part of financial resources, especially from developed to developing countries 
(Chami et al., 2003). Foreign direct investment is still the largest flow of external funding for 
the entire group of developing countries, but international remittances represent the second 
most important external capital flow (Adams, 2006). The average inflow of remittances even 
surpasses official development flows in middle-income countries, and foreign direct 
investment in low-income countries. In 2005, the total flow of international remittances 
amounted to US$ 250 billion, and constituted 5-10 percent of total GDP in developing 
countries (World Bank, 2005a). The amount of international remittances to developing 
countries in 2005 was even 50 percent larger than the level of development aid (World Bank, 
2008a). The rising trend of international remittances is unlikely to reverse in the medium to 
long term. It is even expected that remittance flows will keep growing at a 7-8 percent annual 
rate (World Bank, 2005b). 
The significance of remittances for developing countries also becomes clear from the 
high proportion of households for which remittances are an important source of income. For 
instance, Rodriguez (1996) shows that 17 percent of Philippines’ poor households receive 
international remittances, Cox et al. (1998) estimate that about 25 percent of Peruvian 
households receive remittances, and Cox and Ureta (2003) find that about 14 percent of the 
households in El Salvador receive considerable amounts of international remittances. 
International remittances are also attracting increasing attention since they are supposed 
to play a crucial role in improving economic growth and reducing poverty in developing 
counties. It is even argued that facilitating international remittances may be very important in 
achieving the Millennium Development goals. Yet, the existing empirical evidence shows that 
many key questions regarding the impact of international remittances on developing countries 
remain unanswered. The literature points at beneficial but also detrimental effects of 
international remittances on the economy of the migrant-sending countries. Several studies 
conclude that on average remittances positively affect economic growth in developing 
countries (see e.g. the survey paper by Rapoport and Docquier, 2005, p. 75). The channel by 
which this occurs is still unclear, though. Some authors argue that remittance inflows directly 
augment income, and increase capital availability for consumption in receiving countries. 
Remittance inflows can also create multiplier effects in local economies on GDP, job creation, 
consumption, income and investment (Stahl and Arnold, 1986; De Vasconcelos, 2005; and 
Ratha and Shaw, 2007). Remittances may provide finance for investment, notably for small-
scale projects, and hence may stimulate production (Solimano, 2003). Some studies, however, 
argue that remittances are used unproductively and mostly spent on consumption (see 
Rapoport and Docquier, 2005). Other studies suggest that remittances are used productively. 
                                                 
35 This chapter is written based on the paper Nguyen, V.C., Van den Berg M. and Lensink R. (2009), ‘The 
Impact of International Remittances on Income, Work Efforts, Poverty and Inequality: New Evidence for 
Vietnam’, which is currently submitted to a journal for possible publication. 
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Estimates show that around 10 percent of remittance receipts are being saved, invested, and 
used for entrepreneurial activity (Orozco and Fedewa, 2005). Similarly, based on a survey of 
the literature, Adams (2006) concludes that international remittances have a more substantial 
effect on households investments, like education and housing, than on consumption. A large 
inflow of international remittances can also lower the chance of a financial crisis since it helps 
to reduce current account reversals (Bugamelli and Paternò, 2005). However, a large inflow 
of remittances may also have negative effects on growth, since it may reduce export 
competitiveness in the remittance-receiving country on account of a sharp currency 
appreciation (World Bank, 2005b; and Cordova and Olmedo, 2006). Moreover, remittances 
may promote idleness on the part of the recipients, and consequently may have a negative 
effect on the work efforts of recipients (Chami et al., 2005). 
One of the most contentious issues regarding the impact of remittances concerns their 
effect on poverty reduction and income inequality. Indeed, the impact on poverty reduction 
and inequality is central in any attempt to examine the overall effect of international 
remittances in developing countries. It is argued that international remittances may help to 
reduce poverty in the developing world without increasing debt or administrative burden since 
remittances are a person-to-person flow of money without government intervention. Yet, it is 
still far from clear whether and how international remittances reduce poverty and income 
inequality. Several authors find evidence that the inflow of international remittances reduce 
poverty. For instance, Anyanwu and Erhijakpor (2008) in a cross-country study for 33 
African countries show that international remittances have a significant poverty-reducing 
effect. In addition, Adams (2006) finds that international remittances reduce poverty in 
Guatemala and Mexico, e.g. since in these countries international migrants come from the 
poorest group of households, and remittances are sent to relatively poor households. 
Moreover, Adams et al. (2008) show that international remittances have a poverty-reducing 
effect in Ghana. In contrast, Cattaneo (2005), in a cross-country study, does not find any 
effect of international remittances on poverty. Stahl (1982) even argues that international 
remittances may eventually even lead to an increase in poverty since poor households would 
not benefit from the inflow of international remittances. The empirical evidence on the impact 
of international remittances on income inequality even seems to be more pessimistic. Acosta 
(2007) suggests that the effect of remittances on inequality is mixed. He finds that for some 
countries remittances increase inequality, whereas for other countries inequality reduces. 
However, Adams et al. (2008) find that international remittances in Ghana increase income 
inequality. A similar outcome is found by Azam and Gubert (2006). Based on surveys 
performed in Mali and Senegal, they argue that migrants mainly come from rich families, and 
that especially the rich families receive most remittances. Hence, the existing studies show a 
wide diversity of empirical results, which calls for more empirical studies to better understand 
the economic effects of international remittances. 
The aim of this study is to provide new empirical evidence on the impact of 
international remittances. This study has several special features. First, we concentrate on one 
country, Vietnam. For several reasons, Vietnam is an interesting case to look at. International 
remittances to Vietnam are increasing in size and importance. However, there are no recent 
empirical analyses on the impact of international remittances on welfare in Vietnam available. 
Niimi et al. (2008) investigate the determinants of remittances in Vietnam, but they 
concentrate on internal remittances. Since, as is e.g. argued by Adams at al. (2008), it is 
highly likely that international and internal remittances will have differing effects on poverty 
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and inequality, the study by Niimi et al. (2008) cannot provide any evidence on the impact of 
international remittances. Nguyen et al. (2008) study the effects of migration. They also deal 
with remittances, but only indirectly. Vietnam is also interesting to look at since over the past 
decade Vietnam has achieved a remarkable result in the fight against poverty. The incidence 
of poverty, according to the international poverty line, declined from 58 percent to 20 percent 
between 1993 and 2004 (Vietnamese Academy of Social Science, 2007). The impact of 
international remittances on household welfare in Vietnam remains an open question, though. 
Our study aims to provide new evidence on this important issue. Second, this study is the first 
study that uses data from the two most recent Vietnam Household and Living Standard 
Surveys (VHLSS) of 2004 and 2006 to estimate the impact of remittances. The use of two 
years of data allows us to use panel techniques. This dramatically improves the estimation 
strategy since by using panel data biases that arise due to omitted variables, endogeneity and 
selection can be addressed. Third, we estimate the impact of international remittances on a 
series of indicators, so that our study provides new evidence for the most important direct 
effects of remittances. More specifically, we focus on the effect of remittances on per capita 
income, per capita expenditure (consumption), work efforts, poverty and inequality. We will 
show that a rise in international remittances increases household income and expenditure. 
However, we will also show that international remittances decrease work efforts, have no 
impact on poverty reduction, and lead to a minor increase in inequality. Although the 
empirical analysis deals with Vietnam, we expect our results to be important for a wider 
group of emerging and developing economies. At the very least, our study shows that 
international remittances are not a panacea for poverty reduction, which may have important 
policy implications. 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. The second section presents data 
on international remittances and poverty in Vietnam. The third section presents impact 
estimation results and the fourth section draws conclusions. 
 
6.2 Poverty and remittances in Vietnam 
 
Recently, international remittances have become an increasing source of external funding for 
Vietnam. Figure 6.1 shows that international remittances increased from 26.5 to 57.9 
thousand billion VND, in prices of 2001, during the period 2001-2007. Table 6.1 presents the 
distribution of international remittances over the poor and non-poor in 2004 and 2006. It 
shows that international remittances are not pro-poor. In 2004 and 2006, the percentage of the 
poor receiving remittances was only 1.3 and 1.8 percent, respectively. Moreover, the bulk of 
international remittances went to the non-poor. Some 97 percent of the remittances receiving 
households are non-poor. In terms of amount, even more than 99 percent of the international 
remittances inflow is distributed to non-poor households. The average value of remittances of 
the non-poor is even more than 5 times higher than the average value of remittances to the 
poor. Also in terms of percentages of household income and expenditure, remittances to the 
non-poor are much higher than remittances to the poor. 
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Figure 6.1. International remittances in Vietnam over time (in 2001 prices).36 Source: 
Vietnam Economy Newspapers (www.vneconomy.com.vn). 
 
 
Table 6.1. International remittances among the poor and non-poor. 
 
 2004   2006  
Indicators 
Poor Non poor All Poor Non poor All 
1.3 8.3 7.1 1.8 7.7 6.9 % of households receiving 
remittances [0.3] [0.4] [0.3] [0.4] [0.4] [0.3] 
851.8 4,744.1 4,626.6 912.0 4,919.2 4,781.3 Remittances per capita 
(thousand VND)* [299.1] [390.1] [379.9] [228.5] [482.8] [467.7] 
3.0 97.0 100 3.4 96.6 100 Distribution of receiving 
households  [0.7] [0.7]  [0.8] [0.8]  
0.9 99.1 100 0.9 99.1 100 Distribution of remittance 
amount [0.4] [0.4]  [0.3] [0.3]  
50.5 52.9 52.8 54.7 60.6 60.6 % of remittances in 
household expenditure [17.5] [4.0] [4.0] [13.8] [5.9] [5.9] 
27.6 38.2 38.1 24.8 39.8 39.6 % of remittances in 
household income [7.8] [2.1] [2.1] [5.9] [2.7] [2.7] 
Number of observations 1,769 7,419 9,188 1,427 7,762 9,189 
Note: * in 2004.prices. 
Standard errors in brackets (corrected for sampling weights and cluster correlation). 
Source: Author’s estimation from VHLSS 2004 and 2006. 
 
 
Table 6.2 shows that urban households are more likely to receive remittances than rural 
households. In 2006, the proportion of households receiving remittances was 11.6 percent and 
5.1 percent in the urban and rural areas, respectively. The average size of international 
remittance inflows was also larger in urban areas. 
                                                 
36 Note: 1 USD = 15084 VND in 2001 
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Table 6.2. International remittances received by urban and rural households. 
 
 2004   2006  
Indicators 
Urban Rural All Urban Rural All 
13.8 4.7 7.1 11.6 5.1 6.9 % of households receiving 
remittances [0.9] [0.3] [0.3] [0.9] [0.3] [0.3] 
5,352.5 3,861.9 4,626.6 5,320.4 4,319.0 4,781.3 Remittances per capita 
(thousand VND)* [633.1] [392.5] [379.9] [828.9] [497.5] [467.7] 
51.3 48.7 100 46.2 53.8 100 Distribution of receiving 
households  [2.7] [2.7]  [2.7] [2.7]  
56.7 43.3 100 50.0 50.0 100 Distribution of remittance 
amount [4.6] [4.6]  [5.8] [5.8]  
44.9 71.2 52.8 51.3 74.8 60.6 % of remittances in 
household expenditure [4.8] [6.9] [4.0] [7.8] [8.5] [5.9] 
35.2 43.5 38.1 37.9 41.7 39.6 % of remittances in 
household income [2.9] [2.8] [2.1] [4.2] [3.0] [2.7] 
Number of observations 2,250 6,938 9,188 2,307 6,882 9,189 
Note: * in 2004 prices. 
Standard errors in brackets (corrected for sampling weight and cluster correlation). 
Source: Author’s estimation from VHLSS 2004 and 2006. 
 
 
Table 6.3 presents changes in welfare and poverty for different household groups over 
the 2004-2006 period. It appears that households receiving international remittances in both 
years have higher income and expenditure per capita, and lower poverty than households 
never receiving remittances. The impact of changes in remittance status is, however, unclear. 
On the one hand, the strongest decline in the poverty rate is experienced by households 
receiving remittances neither in 2004, nor in 2006. On the other hand, it appears that 
households who do receive remittances in 2004, but not in 2006, experience an increase in 
poverty, whereas the opposite is true for households who receive remittances in 2006, but not 
in 2004. 
If anything, this section suggests that an increase in international remittances will 
increase income. However, it also suggests that the effects on poverty reduction are probably 
minor since international remittances primarily go to the non-poor. It may even be the case 
that an increase in international remittances increases inequality. The remainder of this 
chapter analyses these issues in detail. 
 
6.3 Impact estimation results 
 
This section presents the estimation results regarding the effects of international remittances 
on per capita income, per capita expenditure, work efforts, and on aggregate poverty and 
inequality. We applied the same method of impact measurement which is used to measure the 
impact of credit in Chapter 4 (presented in section 4.3 of Chapter 4). We use panel data from 
VHLSS 2004-2006 to regress income per capita, expenditure per capita, and different proxies 
for work effort, on remittances per capita and other control variables. We use fixed and 
random effects regression. The advantage of these techniques is that they control for time 
invariant unobserved variables which are correlated with both income (expenditure) and 
remittances. 
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Control variables include household composition, education of household members, 
land and housing, villages, urbanity, and regional variables. It should be noted that we use 
two village level variables, distance to the nearest market, and a dummy variable indicating 
whether the village has a road. The VHLSS data sets only provide information on these 
variables for the rural area. Since our sample includes the urban and rural area, we had to 
come up with estimates for the urban areas. We assumed that for urban areas, the variables 
‘distance to market’ and ‘have a road’ are equal to 0 and 1, respectively. This is a reasonable 
assumption given the fact that in all cities there is a market and at least one road.37 
The complete list of the variables and summary statistics are presented in Table 6.7 in 
Appendix 6.1. In order to control for inflation, we have deflated all variables in terms of 2004 
prices. 
 
6.3.1 Impact on household income and expenditure 
 
Tables 6.8 and 6.9 in Appendix 6.1 present the regression results with respect to the impact of 
remittances on per capita income and per capita expenditure, respectively. We present both 
random effects and fixed effects estimates, without and with sampling weight and cluster 
correlation. Since the Hausman tests strongly favour the fixed effects estimates we focus the 
discussion on the fixed effects estimates. 
International remittances had a significant positive effect on per capita income and per 
capita expenditure. For all regressions presented, the coefficient for international remittances 
is highly significant. An increase in remittances had, however, a much smaller impact on 
consumption than on income. An increase of 1 VND in per capita remittances resulted in an 
increase of 0.85 VND in per capita income and of only 0.08 VND in per capita expenditure. 
This suggests that households made only limited use of remittances for daily consumption. 
Improvement and construction of houses appear to be an important alternative use: these 
expenses, which are not included in the total expenditure measure used in the remainder in the 
chapter, increased by 0.3 for each VND of remittances. This accounts for about 40 percent of 
the difference between income and expenditures. We did not find a significant direct effect of 
remittances on the purchase of physical assets (tools, implements, etc), but these may require 
more long-term saving.38 
Table 6.4 presents the ATT for the effect of remittances on per capita income and per 
capita expenditure. The advantage of ATT over the regression coefficient is that it gives a 
better estimate of the total increase in per capita income and expenditure caused by 
remittances. Since ATT depends on the size of remittances, it differs for 2004 and 2006. The 
table shows that remittances on average increase per capita income of recipients by 3148 and 
3602 thousand VND in 2004 and 2006, respectively. In other words, remittances help increase 
per capita income of the recipient by around 40 and 47 percent in 2004 and 2006, 
respectively. The effect of international remittances on per capita expenditure, however, is 
much smaller: only 285 and 326 thousand VND in 2004 and 2006, respectively. 
                                                 
37 We tested whether international remittances have a different impact in rural and urban areas by including 
interaction terms for international remittances and a dummy for living in an urban area. These estimates indicate 
that the effects of remittances do not differ between urban and rural areas. We, therefore, only present the 
estimates for the entire sample. 
38 Estimates available from the authors on request. 
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Table 6.4. Impact of international remittances measured by ATT. 
 
 2004   2006  
 Y1 Y0 
ATT 
(Y1 – Y0) 
Y1 Y0 
ATT 
(Y1 – Y0) 
Income per capita 11,052.6*** 7,905.0*** 3,147.5*** 11,281.8*** 7,679.9*** 3,601.9*** 
 [500.1] [432.5] [317.8] [507.9] [364.8] [432.1] 
Expenditure per capita 7,984.8*** 7,700.2*** 284.7** 7,445.4*** 7,119.7*** 325.8** 
 [331.2] [349.7] [132.3] [289.4] [314.3] [158.9] 
  2,862.9***   3,276.1*** Difference in ATT between 
income and expenditure   [309.7]   [413.9] 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Standard errors in brackets. Standard errors are corrected for sampling weights and estimated using bootstrap (non-
parametric) with 500 replications. 
Source: Author’s estimation from VHLSS 2004 and 2006. 
 
 
6.3.2 Impact on work efforts 
 
Table 6.8 in Appendix 6.1 indicates that some crowding out of remittances takes place since 
there is not a one to one increase in income if remittances increase. This may be caused by a 
decrease in work efforts. We try to present some evidence for this by presenting regression 
results on the impact of remittances on different proxies for working time. More specifically, 
we estimate the effect of remittances on the percentage of household members that work (for 
persons older than 14), the number of working household members, the total annual working 
hours per capita, and total working hours per working household member. These regression 
results are reported in Tables 6.10 and 6.11 in the Appendix. The tables show that remittances 
lead to a significant reduction in the percentage of household members that work, and in per 
capita annual working hours. 
In order to better understand the effect of remittances on working time, we also 
calculate the ATT for these variables.39 The results are presented in Table 6.5. The table 
shows that remittances reduce the ratio of working people above 14 year olds by around 3 
percentage points. As a result, working hours per capita of the receiving households are 
reduced by 45 and 59 hours in 2004 and 2006, respectively. However, the effect of 
remittances on the number of annual working hours per working person is small and not 
statistically significant. 
 
6.3.3 Impact on poverty and inequality 
 
Table 6.6 presents the impact of international remittances on poverty and inequality. The table 
suggests that an increase in international remittances does not reduce poverty: not one of the 
three poverty indices is significantly reduced. The table also shows that international 
remittances have a significant but very small effect on inequality: inequality increased slightly 
due to an increase in remittances. Both effects do not come as a surprise given that most 
remittances go to the non-poor and that, although remittances substantially increase income, 
they have a limited effect on expenditures (see section 3). 
                                                 
39 We used Hausman specification tests to test the differences in coefficients between the random and fixed-
effects regressions. The test statistics strongly reject the null hypothesis that the differences in coefficients 
between two regressions are not systematic. Thus we use the fixed-effects regressions.  
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Table 6.5. Impact of remittances on annual working hours (ATT). 
 
 2004   2006  
 Y1 Y0 
ATT 
(Y1 – Y0) 
Y1 Y0 
ATT 
(Y1 – Y0) 
65.2*** 68.0*** -2.7*** 65.4*** 68.8*** -3.4*** Ratio of members engaged in 
productive activities to the total 
household members older than 14 [1.3] [1.4] [0.8] [1.2] [1.5] [0.9] 
1,985.7*** 1,998.2*** -12.5 1,978.1*** 1,994.6*** -16.5 Annual working hours per working 
household member [47.6] [52.7] [25.4] [43.6] [55.4] [33.6] 
993.0*** 1,038.2*** -45.2** 1,014.6*** 1,074.0*** -59.4** 
Annual working hours per capita 
[30.1] [34.9] [19.5] [31.2] [40.7] [25.0] 
Note: working people are those who are above 14 year olds and working, and working hours are calculated for working 
people. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Standard errors in brackets. Standard errors are corrected for sampling weights and estimated using bootstrap (non-
parametric) with 500 replications. 
Source: Author’s estimation from VHLSS 2004 and 2006. 
 
 
 
Table 6.6. Impact of international remittances on poverty and inequality. 
 
 2004   2006   
With 
remittances 
Without 
remittances 
Impact With 
remittances 
Without 
remittances 
Impact 
Poverty of remittance recipients     
P0 0.0412*** 0.0591*** -0.0179 0.0406*** 0.0593*** -0.0188 
 [0.0098] [0.0162] [0.0129] [0.0098] [0.0153] [0.0122] 
P1 0.0081*** 0.0111*** -0.0029 0.0105*** 0.0193*** -0.0088 
 [0.0026] [0.0054] [0.0048] [0.0033] [0.0137] [0.0135] 
P2 0.0027*** 0.0035*** -0.0008 0.0038*** 0.0097*** -0.0059 
 [0.0010] [0.0068] [0.0068] [0.0015] [0.0473] [0.0474] 
All poverty       
P0 0.1949*** 0.1962*** -0.0013 0.1597*** 0.1610*** -0.0013 
 [0.0058] [0.0058] [0.0009] [0.0059] [0.0060] [0.0009] 
P1 0.0472*** 0.0474*** -0.0002 0.0383*** 0.0389*** -0.0006 
 [0.0019] [0.0019] [0.0003] [0.0019] [0.0021] [0.0009] 
P2 0.0170*** 0.0170*** -0.0001 0.0137*** 0.0141*** -0.0004 
 [0.0009] [0.0011] [0.0005] [0.0009] [0.0035] [0.0034] 
All inequality       
Gini 0.3698*** 0.3687*** 0.0012*** 0.3580*** 0.3577*** 0.0003 
 [0.0050] [0.0050] [0.0004] [0.0046] [0.0046] [0.0005] 
Theil L 0.2235*** 0.2221*** 0.0014** 0.2117*** 0.2110*** 0.0008 
 [0.0062] [0.0062] [0.0006] [0.0056] [0.0055] [0.0006] 
Theil T 0.2407*** 0.2389*** 0.0018** 0.2268*** 0.2265*** 0.0003 
 [0.0077] [0.0077] [0.0007] [0.0074] [0.0074] [0.0007] 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Standard errors in brackets. Standard errors are corrected for sampling weights and estimated using bootstrap (non-
parametric) with 500 replications. 
Source: Author’s estimation from VHLSS 2004 and 2006. 
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6.4 Conclusions 
 
This chapter estimates the impact of international remittances on per capita income, per capita 
expenditure (consumption), work efforts, and poverty and inequality in Vietnam, using the 
two most recent Vietnam Household Living Standard Surveys for 2004 and 2006. We show 
that an increase in international remittances leads to a significant increase in income. Yet, we 
do not find evidence that international remittances reduce poverty. Our analysis even suggests 
that in the short run international remittances may increase inequality. These effects on 
poverty and inequality seem unfortunate. However, they are not unexpected given the fact that 
in Vietnam mainly the non-poor are remittances receivers. Moreover, it appears that the direct 
impact of international remittances on per capita consumption is small since a substantial part 
of international remittances is being saved and invested. 
It should be noted that our estimates only show direct effects. The estimates do not 
allow for spill-over effects. Especially if international remittances are used productively, 
indirect effects on the poor may be substantial. On the other hand, we do not control for home 
earnings had the migrant stayed at home, which may imply that our estimates are too positive. 
Estimating the indirect effects of international remittances, allowing for spill-over effects, and 
controlling for home earnings had the migrant stayed at home is beyond the scope of the 
chapter, but certainly important for future research. 
Overall, our analysis suggests that international remittances neither play an important 
role in reducing poverty, nor in improving equality. International remittances may play an 
important role in enhancing production and investment, and hence in reducing poverty in the 
long run. However, to reduce poverty and inequality in the short run, the government of 
Vietnam would probably be better to rely on income distribution and poverty reduction 
programs which are targeted at the poor more directly. Also for other developing countries the 
role that international remittances may play in terms of poverty reduction should not be 
exaggerated. Especially for some Asian developing countries, such as the Philippines, 
Indonesia, Lao, and Cambodia, with a similar economic structure to Vietnam there is no 
reason to expect that international remittances will have a profound poverty-reducing effect. 
Our study clearly casts doubts on the hypothesis of many academics and politicians who 
argue that international remittances may play a crucial role in reducing poverty in developing 
countries. International remittances may have positive economic effects, especially in the 
longer run, but are certainly not a panacea for poverty reduction in the short term. 
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Appendix 6.1 Descriptive statistics and regression results 
 
Table 6.7. Descriptive statistics for households with and without international remittances. 
 
2004 2006 Variables Type 
Households 
with 
remittances 
Households 
without 
remittances 
Households 
with 
remittances 
Households 
without 
remittances 
Household variables      
Continuous 0.2390 0.2683 0.1969 0.2409 Ratio of members younger than 16 to 
total household members  [0.0136] [0.0041] [0.0121] [0.0039] 
Continuous 0.1107 0.0937 0.1223 0.0973 Ratio of members older than 60 to total 
household members  [0.0109] [0.0030] [0.0110] [0.0028] 
Household size Discrete 5.0762 4.8768 4.8805 4.9183 
  [0.1659] [0.0406] [0.1142] [0.0466] 
Household size squared Discrete 29.7 26.9 26.5 27.6 
  [2.2] [0.6] [1.3] [0.7] 
Continuous 0.0885 0.0573 0.0838 0.0651 Ratio of members with technical degree 
to total household members  [0.0112] [0.0029] [0.0118 [0.0028 
Continuous 0.0624 0.0258 0.0546 0.0310 Ratio of members with post secondary 
degree to total household members  [0.0103] [0.0022] [0.0101 [0.0024] 
Continuous 510.8 709.6 437.4 763.6 Area of annual crop land per capita (m2) 
 [72.2] [28.1] [58.6] [33.2] 
Continuous 290.1 208.2 169.7 243.4 Area of perennial crop land per capita 
(m2)  [141.5] [17.9] [35.8] [19.7] 
Forestry land per capita (m2) Continuous 37.6 224.0 108.9 279.3 
  [26.2] [39.9] [45.1] [51.0] 
Aquaculture water surface per capita 
(m2) 
Continuous 32.7 56.8 75.4 65.4 
  [15.9] [9.3] [39.5] [12.2] 
Commune variables      
Road to village (yes = 1) Continuous 0.9456 0.8509 0.9131 0.9049 
  [0.0145] [0.0099] [0.0211] [0.0079] 
Distance to nearest daily market (km) Continuous 0.9565 2.2521 1.0502 2.4313 
  [0.1818] [0.1380] [0.1773] [0.1723] 
Regional variables      
Household in Red River Delta Binary 0.1786 0.2116 0.1405 0.2149 
  [0.0281] [0.0114] [0.0244] [0.0115] 
Household in North East Binary 0.0323 0.1239 0.0862 0.1201 
  [0.0102] [0.0085] [0.0177] [0.0084] 
Household in North West Binary 0.0063 0.0345 0.0091 0.0345 
  [0.0045] [0.0046] [0.0057] [0.0046] 
Household in North Central Coast Binary 0.1479 0.1383 0.1310 0.1397 
  [0.0280] [0.0108] [0.0257] [0.0110] 
Household in South Central Coast Binary 0.0701 0.0880 0.1034 0.0854 
  [0.0164] [0.0075] [0.0226] [0.0074] 
Household in Central Highlands Binary 0.0408 0.0645 0.0293 0.0656 
  [0.0162] [0.0072] [0.0120] [0.0074] 
Household in North East South Binary 0.3192 0.1374 0.2658 0.1406 
  [0.0415] [0.0108] [0.0395] [0.0111] 
Household in Mekong River Delta Binary 0.2048 0.2017 0.2347 0.1993 
  [0.0302] [0.0110] [0.0289] [0.0109] 
Household in Living in urban areas Binary 0.4646 0.2370 0.4171 0.2395 
  [0.0403] [0.0121] [0.0378] [0.0124] 
Observations  563 8,625 584 8,605 
Standard errors in brackets. 
Source: Author’s estimation from VHLSS 2004 and 2006. 
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Table 6.8. Impact of remittances on per capita income. 
 
Explanatory variables Random 
effect (no 
sampling 
weights) 
Fixed-effect 
(no 
sampling 
weights) 
Fixed-effect 
(sampling 
weights and 
cluster 
correlation) 
Random 
effect (no 
sampling 
weights) 
Fixed-effect 
(no 
sampling 
weights) 
Fixed-effect 
(sampling 
weights and 
cluster 
correlation) 
0.917*** 0.853*** 0.849*** 0.896*** 0.848*** 0.848*** International remittances 
(thousand VND) [0.021] [0.024] [0.041] [0.019] [0.023] [0.043] 
   -1,849.669*** -744.764 -448.3 Members younger than 16 / 
total household members    [317.177] [592.755] [712.882] 
   -2,020.407*** -1,446.877** -1,604.552* Members older than 60 / total 
household members    [275.009] [644.009] [927.439] 
Household size    -687.284*** -1,140.166*** -1,312.333*** 
    [115.694] [197.594] [220.586] 
Household size squared    30.233*** 64.304*** 79.102*** 
    [10.292] [17.162] [18.724] 
   5,398.712*** 2,377.630*** 2,749.986*** Members with technical 
degree/ total members    [351.413] [510.939] [740.022] 
   11,452.856*** 2,970.618*** 3,091.188* Members with post secondary 
degree/ total members    [518.597] [942.386] [1,655.836] 
   0.579*** 0.589*** 0.622*** Area of annual crop land per 
capita (m2)    [0.035] [0.059] [0.144] 
   0.420*** -0.069 -0.131 Area of perennial crop land 
per capita (m2)    [0.043] [0.063] [0.192] 
Forestry land per capita (m2)    0.036 0.033 0.033 
    [0.024] [0.034] [0.062] 
   0.639*** 0.320*** 0.310** Area of aquaculture water 
surface per capita (m2)    [0.088] [0.118] [0.126] 
Road to village (yes = 1)    357.211** 393.357** 552.909** 
    [157.162] [200.113] [234.068] 
   -29.269*** -7.937 -8.394 Distance to nearest daily 
market (km)    [8.982] [11.123] [5.629] 
Red River Delta Base-omitted      
       
North East    -554.983**   
    [225.195]   
North West    -1,817.819***   
    [349.823]   
North Central Coast    -987.195***   
    [238.329]   
South Central Coast    -284.653   
    [255.609]   
Central Highlands    -821.533***   
    [311.587]   
North East South    1,373.413***   
    [240.520]   
Mekong River Delta    294.476   
    [210.262]   
Urban    2,401.531***   
    [210.365]   
Time effect (2006 variable) 1,272.601*** 1,276.351*** 1,240.674*** 1,041.546*** 1,127.202*** 1,086.619*** 
 [74.338] [74.227] [84.223] [74.567] [75.390] [81.476] 
Constant 5,469.512*** 5,485.500*** 5,756.272*** 6,670.533*** 8,511.186*** 9,023.166*** 
 [86.716] [52.821] [44.378] [373.428] [576.197] [651.007] 
Observations 8,432 8,432 8,432 8,432 8,432 8,432 
Number of i 4,216 4,216 4,216 4,216 4,216 4,216 
R-squared 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.39 0.25 0.24 
Hausman test χ2 (prob) 30.0 (0.000)  194.5(0.00)  
Robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Source: Author’s estimation from VHLSS 2004 and 2006. 
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Table 6.9. Impact of remittances on per capita expenditure. 
 
Explanatory variables Random 
effect (no 
sampling 
weight) 
Fixed-effect 
(no 
sampling 
weight) 
Fixed-effect 
with 
sampling 
weight and 
cluster 
correlation 
Random 
effect (no 
sampling 
weight) 
Fixed-effect 
(no 
sampling 
weight) 
Fixed-effect 
with 
sampling 
weight and 
cluster 
correlation 
0.161*** 0.084*** 0.077** 0.166*** 0.080*** 0.077***International remittances 
(thousand VND) [0.012] [0.013] [0.031] [0.011] [0.013] [0.029]
 -1,751.376*** -653.115** -587.531*Members younger than 16/ 
total household members  [176.039] [323.282] [346.572]
 -917.851*** -892.519** -832.818Members older than 60 / total 
household members  [152.759] [351.235] [651.192]
Household size  -596.769*** -973.662*** -1139.451***
  [64.184] [107.765] [167.845]
Household size squared  27.810*** 51.371*** 65.656***
  [5.709] [9.360] [15.224]
 3234.433*** 903.029*** 923.699**Members with technical 
degree / total members  [194.720] [278.660] [420.860]
 8,450.103*** 1,480.861*** 1,447.67Members with post secondary 
degree/ total members  [287.800] [513.966] [1,054.883]
 0.107*** 0.102*** 0.094***Area of annual crop land per 
capita (m2)  [0.020] [0.032] [0.025]
 0.151*** 0.110*** 0.112***Area of perennial crop land 
per capita (m2)  [0.024] [0.034] [0.035]
Forestry land per capita (m2)  -0.008 -0.026 -0.033***
  [0.013] [0.019] [0.010]
 0.139*** 0.011 0.013Area of aquaculture water 
surface per capita (m2)  [0.049] [0.064] [0.065]
Road to village (yes = 1)  25.578 -3.501 73.475
  [86.985] [109.139] [132.414]
 -11.793** -2.211 -3.582Distance to nearest daily 
market (km)  [4.970] [6.066] [3.269]
Red River Delta Base-omitted  
North East  -710.320***  
  [125.288]  
North West  -1,176.680***  
  [194.597]  
North Central Coast  -683.058***  
  [132.610]  
South Central Coast  -124.728  
  [142.225]  
Central Highlands  -580.157***  
  [173.332]  
North East South  1,154.754***  
  [133.819]  
Mekong River Delta  107.106  
  [116.963]  
Urban  2,193.406***  
  [116.780]  
Time effect (2006 variable) 616.732*** 621.270*** 615.082*** 467.003*** 533.584*** 519.708***
 [40.860] [40.475] [53.511] [41.131] [41.117] [57.590]
Constant 4,276.946*** 4,296.294*** 4,548.855*** 5,860.681*** 7,511.981*** 8,091.677***
 [53.202] [28.803] [24.810] [207.203] [314.251] [450.432]
Observations 8,432 8,432 8,432 8,432 8,432 8,432
Number of i 4,216 4,216 4,216 4,216 4,216 4,216
R-squared 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.43 0.16 0.15
Hausman test χ2 (prob)  159.9 (0.000) 443.4 (0.000) 
Robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Source: Author’s estimation from VHLSS 2004 and 2006. 
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Table 6.10. Regressions of the ratio of working members and the number of working members. 
 
Working members / total members Working members  Explanatory variables 
Random 
effect (no 
sampling 
weight) 
Fixed-effect 
(no 
sampling 
weight) 
Fixed-effect 
with 
sampling 
weight and 
cluster 
correlation 
Fixed-effect 
Poisson (no 
sampling 
weight) 
Random 
effect (no 
sampling 
weight) 
Fixed-effect 
with 
sampling 
weight and 
cluster 
correlation 
-0.000006*** -0.000006*** -0.000007*** -0.000014*** -0.000013*** -0.000017*** International remittances 
(thousand VND) [0.000001] [0.000001] [0.000002] [0.000003] [0.000004] [0.000005] 
0.392005*** 0.540145*** 0.567058*** -2.353461*** -1.708024*** -1.567524*** Members younger than 16 / 
total household members [0.014255] [0.027693] [0.032548] [0.048023] [0.093696] [0.110482] 
-0.255982*** -0.257242*** -0.262890*** -0.730356*** -0.572812*** -0.560986*** Members older than 60 / 
total household members [0.012320] [0.030087] [0.047100] [0.041473] [0.101798] [0.108241] 
Household size -0.078676*** -0.098372*** -0.102891*** 0.541307*** 0.531192*** 0.475342*** 
 [0.005209] [0.009231] [0.012423] [0.017555] [0.031233] [0.063409] 
Household size squared 0.004704*** 0.006061*** 0.006380*** -0.001434 0.001198 0.006005 
 [0.000464] [0.000802] [0.001073] [0.001563] [0.002713] [0.006576] 
0.044635*** 0.096389*** 0.102978*** 0.140401*** 0.332328*** 0.350237*** Members with technical 
degree / total members [0.015900] [0.023870] [0.027643] [0.053645] [0.080763] [0.091373] 
0.017463 0.260835*** 0.260499*** 0.103101 0.854753*** 0.836195*** Members with post 
secondary / total members [0.023317] [0.044027] [0.053764] [0.078559] [0.148962] [0.170325] 
0.000007*** 0.000004 0.000006* 0.000010* 0.00000 0.000003 Area of annual crop land 
per capita (m2) [0.000002] [0.000003] [0.000003] [0.000005] [0.000009] [0.000010] 
0.000003 0.000003 0.000005* 0.000004 0.000003 0.000009 Area of perennial crop land 
per capita (m2) [0.000002] [0.000003] [0.000003] [0.000007] [0.000010] [0.000008] 
0.000001 0.000001 0.000001 0.000007* 0.000007 0.000007 Forestry land per capita 
(m2) [0.000001] [0.000002] [0.000001] [0.000004] [0.000005] [0.000007] 
0.000004 0.000008 0.000005 0.00001 0.000022 0.000013 Area of aquaculture water 
surface per capita (m2) [0.000004] [0.000006] [0.000008] [0.000014] [0.000019] [0.000026] 
Road to village (yes = 1) 0.000026 0.002227 0.001892 0.002863 -0.001004 0.013625 
 [0.007144] [0.009349] [0.010078] [0.024130] [0.031632] [0.034266] 
0.000098 -0.001141** -0.001336*** -0.001812 -0.005351*** -0.006548*** Distance to nearest daily 
market (km) [0.000409] [0.000520] [0.000423] [0.001381] [0.001758] [0.001896] 
North East 0.032107***   0.126874***   
 [0.010025]   [0.033700]   
North West 0.031512**   0.091586*   
 [0.015582]   [0.052389]   
North Central Coast -0.022212**   -0.121797***   
 [0.010604]   [0.035645]   
South Central Coast -0.003892   -0.039766   
 [0.011373]   [0.038228]   
Central Highlands 0.01318   -0.052701   
 [0.013877]   [0.046656]   
North East South -0.033159***   -0.132133***   
 [0.010705]   [0.035987]   
Mekong River Delta -0.012134   -0.006609   
 [0.009366]   [0.031489]   
Urban -0.081426***   -0.263615***   
 [0.009449]   [0.031831]   
Time effect (2006 dummy) -0.016156*** -0.013672*** -0.011090*** -0.044927*** -0.028738** -0.022221* 
 [0.003439] [0.003522] [0.003882] [0.011654] [0.011917] [0.012944] 
Constant 0.999363*** 0.990560*** 0.988902*** 0.889214*** 0.603264*** 0.677731*** 
 [0.016803] [0.026919] [0.033991] [0.056623] [0.091079] [0.145530] 
Observations 8,432 8,432 8,432 7,998 8,432 8,432 
Number of i 4,216 4,216 4,216 3,999 4,216 4,216 
R-squared 0.22 0.13 0.14 0.62 0.57 0.39 
Hausman test χ2 (prob) 72.7 (0.000)  272.8 (0.000)  
Robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Source: Author’s estimation from VHLSS 2004 and 2006. 
The impact of international remittances on poverty and inequality 
Essays on impact evaluation: new empirical evidence from Vietnam 139
Table 6.11. Regressions of annual working hours. 
 
 Annual working hours per working 
member 
Annual working hours per capita 
Explanatory variables Random 
effect (no 
sampling 
weights) 
Fixed-effect 
(no 
sampling 
weights) 
Fixed-effect 
(sampling 
weights 
and cluster 
correlation) 
Random 
effect (no 
sampling 
weight) 
Fixed-effect 
(no 
sampling 
weights) 
Fixed-effect 
(sampling 
weights and 
cluster 
correlation) 
-0.0115*** -0.0109*** -0.0110** -0.0068** -0.0055 -0.0023 International remittances 
(thousand VND) [0.0019] [0.0024] [0.0045] [0.0027] [0.0035] [0.0065] 
-840.5761*** -637.4136*** -612.3838*** 126.7249*** 17.7247 -16.5051 Members younger than 16 / 
total household members [30.9290] [60.8238] [62.2531] [42.7032] [89.1169] [92.7447] 
-692.9007*** -615.2529*** -643.0128*** -722.4424*** -591.9096*** -668.4195*** Members older than 60 / 
total household members [26.6990] [66.0831] [115.9812] [36.6304] [96.8226] [148.3619] 
Household size -64.3343*** -77.4442*** -82.7503*** 134.2960*** 128.6281*** 145.3145*** 
 [11.3086] [20.2755] [27.8351] [15.6676] [29.7070] [33.4032] 
Household size squared 2.9546*** 3.9353** 4.6391** -11.2184*** -10.0354*** -10.9687*** 
 [1.0067] [1.7610] [2.3511] [1.3961] [2.5802] [2.7208] 
106.1335*** 186.4422*** 195.8052*** 68.2896 77.6263 63.1636 Members with technical 
degree / total members [34.5807] [52.4285] [58.8290] [48.3976] [76.8164] [74.3786] 
144.966*** 621.331*** 587.845*** 111.616 366.885*** 269.328 Members with post 
secondary / total members [50.5980] [96.7001] [118.6326] [69.9148] [141.6816] [166.6653] 
-0.0037 -0.0013 0.0001 -0.0148*** 0.0009 0.003 Area of annual crop land 
per capita (m2) [0.0035] [0.0061] [0.0074] [0.0048] [0.0089] [0.0096] 
-0.0041 0.0041 0.0068 -0.0062 0.0067 0.0088 Area of perennial crop land 
per capita (m2) [0.0043] [0.0065] [0.0061] [0.0060] [0.0095] [0.0094] 
-0.0006 0.0019 0.004 -0.0058* -0.003 0.0003 Forestry land per capita 
(m2) [0.0023] [0.0035] [0.0040] [0.0033] [0.0051] [0.0084] 
0.0037 0.0256** 0.0207 0.0008 0.0468*** 0.0397** Area of aquaculture water 
surface per capita (m2) [0.0087] [0.0121] [0.0187] [0.0123] [0.0177] [0.0199] 
Road to village (yes = 1) 32.2659** 27.4813 30.0836 63.0966*** 56.6440* 55.3039* 
 [15.5647] [20.5340] [21.2196] [21.9999] [30.0857] [31.6430] 
-1.0156 -1.2624 -1.0739 -1.554 1.1297 1.7424 Distance to nearest daily 
market (km) [0.8911] [1.1414] [1.4364] [1.2630] [1.6723] [2.0353] 
North East 71.1442***   47.1721   
 [21.6774]   [29.3908]   
North West 0.0205   -41.2948   
 [33.7013]   [45.7492]   
North Central Coast -34.4369   -1.3202   
 [22.9265]   [31.0523]   
South Central Coast -7.6895   18.1579   
 [24.5881]   [33.3017]   
Central Highlands -6.9438   -20.608   
 [30.0125]   [40.7286]   
North East South 72.9059***   187.3539***   
 [23.1476]   [31.3731]   
Mekong River Delta -74.4765***   -128.4896***   
 [20.2564]   [27.4979]   
Urban 120.5362***   414.8475***   
 [20.4997]   [28.3175]   
Time effect (2006 variable) 8.8296 10.4994 11.2493 33.5535*** 25.9731** 21.4611 
 [7.5328] [7.7359] [9.3207] [11.0055] [11.3344] [13.7098] 
Constant 1,485.59*** 1,469.28*** 1,472.23*** 1,343.03*** 1,425.39*** 1,407.75*** 
 [36.4743] [59.1247] [81.8643] [50.5076] [86.6274] [98.4460] 
Observations 8,432 8,432 8,432 8,432 8,432 8,432 
Number of i 4,216 4,216 4,216 4,216 4,216 4,216 
R-squared 0.21 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.08 0.08 
Hausman test χ2 (prob) 48.8(0.000)  89.3 (0.000)  
Robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Source: Author’s estimation from VHLSS 2004 and 2006. 
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Chapter 7 The impact of work migration and non-work migration on 
poverty and inequality40 
 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
Migration is potentially an important strategy for fighting poverty and decreasing inequality. 
Remittances sent by migrants are remarkable capital flows. Nowadays, the amount of 
international remittances to developing countries is much higher than foreign assistance 
(DeWind and Holdaway, 2005). In 2005, the total flow of international remittances amounted 
to US$ 250 billion, and constituted 5-10% of total GDP in developing countries (World Bank, 
2005a). It is even expected that remittance flows will keep growing at a 7-8 percent annual 
rate (World Bank 2005b). International and internal remittances can help households increase 
income and consumption. Remittances can also help increase investment and production. The 
theory on exchange motives (Cox, 1987) argues that people give transfers to others because 
they want to get some return benefits. This implies that remittances can be invested in 
physical and social assets for the benefit of the migrant and the remittance recipients. In 
addition, productivity will increase if remittances help relax liquidity constraints and allow 
households to invest in high-return capital intensive activities (Stark, 1991; Taylor and 
Martin, 2001; Taylor and Lopez-Feldma, 2007). Through remittances, migration can thus 
directly and indirectly increase income and consumption in the home area and, if the poor 
receive at least some remittances, decrease poverty in the home area. If the poor even receive 
most remittances, not only poverty but also inequality will decrease. 
Yet, migration does not necessarily lead to a significant increase in income or reduction 
in poverty and inequality in home areas. Remittances may not be sufficient to compensate for 
the loss of local income previously earned by the migrant. In extreme cases, they could even 
lower the earned income of the recipients if they provide disincentives to work effort 
(Farrington and Slater, 2006; Lloyd-Sherlock 2006; Sahn and Alderman, 1996). Migration 
could also result in labour shortages for migrant-sending households, and thus prevent these 
households from engaging in high-return but labour-intensive activities (Taylor and Lopez-
Feldma, 2007). Regarding inequality, migration can even harm inequality of the departure 
areas if remittances are mostly sent to the non-poor households. 
Empirical findings do not settle the theoretical ambiguity of the impact of migration on 
home country welfare. For example, Acosta (2007) finds that for some countries remittances 
increase inequality, whereas the opposite happens in other countries. Adams (2006) suggests 
that international remittances reduce poverty in Guatemala and Mexico, since in these 
countries international migrants come from the poorest group of households, and remittances 
are sent to relatively poor households. However, Azam and Gubert (2006) find that in Mali 
and Senegal migrants mainly come from rich families, and that especially the rich families 
receive most remittances. Yang (2004) finds that migration reduced labour hours and income 
in the Philippines. Hence, the effect of out-migration on poverty and inequality remains an 
empirical question the answer to which depends on the specific nature of migration in an area. 
                                                 
40 This chapter is written based on the paper Nguyen, V.C., Van den Berg M. and Lensink R. (2009), ‘The 
Impact of Work Migration and Non-Work Migration on Household Welfare, Poverty and Inequality: Evidence 
from Vietnam’, which is currently submitted to a journal for possible publication. 
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Also the effect of migration on vulnerability is indefinite. According to insurance 
theory, migration is a strategy to cope with economic risks or shocks in the absence of 
complete risk and financial markets (Stark and Levhari, 1982, Stark and Bloom, 1985, 
Rosenzweig, 1988, Stark, 1991). Migrants will then remit more money when their family 
members who stayed behind experience a decrease in income. On the other hand, recipients 
may become dependent on remittances, and fall into poverty when the migrant stops sending 
money. 
In Vietnam, both internal and international migration has increased rapidly over the past 
decades. According to the 1999 Population and Housing Census, around 6.5 percent of the 
population over 5 years old changed their place of residence during 1994-1999 (Dang et al., 
2003). Between 1998 and 2006, the share of the population living in urban areas increased 
from 22 to 27% (1998 and 2006 Vietnam Household Living Standard Surveys). The annual 
number of international work migrants increased by 136 percent from 36 to 85 thousand 
during the period 2001-2007 (Labor Newspaper, 2008). In addition, an increasing number of 
women married foreigners. Until 2007, 177 thousand women left the country for marriage 
(Police Newspaper, 2008). 
Most studies argue that the main reasons for economic migration in Vietnam are to find 
better employment and higher wages (e.g. Dang et al., 2003; Cu, 2005; Brauw and Harigaya, 
2007). Industrialization and high economic growth in urban areas increasingly attract rural 
labour (Dang et al., 1997; Dang, 2001; Cu, 2005). Large flows of foreign direct investment 
move into industrial zones and companies that create employment for rural people. In 
addition, there are more landless or near landless households (Ravallion and van de Walle, 
2006). The increased shortage of land could push farmers to go for non-farm employment in 
other areas (Cu, 2005). 
There are many studies on migration in Vietnam. However, most of them focus on the 
pattern and determinants of migration (e.g. Guest 1998; Djamba, 1999; Dang et al., 1997; 
Dang, 2001; Dang et al., 2003; GSO and UNFPA, 2005; Cu, 2005; Dang and Nguyen, 2006). 
Only two existing studies have assessed the quantitative impact of migration. The first study 
is Brauw and Harigaya (2007), who find that seasonal migration increases household 
expenditure using the Vietnam Living Standard Surveys (VLSS) 1993 and 1998. The second 
and closest to this paper is Nguyen et al. (2008), who evaluate the impact of long-term 
migration on household expenditure and inequality using the Vietnam Household Living 
Standard Surveys (VHLSS) from 2002 and 2004. They find that migration increases 
expenditures but also inequality. 
The main objective of this chapter is to estimate the impact of long-term migration for 
both work and non-work reasons on several welfare indicators at household and country level 
in Vietnam. Compared to Nguyen et al. (2008), we provide not only information on the 
impact of migration on expenditures and inequality, but also on remittances, work effort, 
income, and poverty. This results in a deeper understanding of the process in which migration 
affects expenditures. Also, we consider the relationship between migration and vulnerability 
through the level of income diversification. Finally, we consider additional economy-wide 
welfare indicators besides inequality: we assess the impact of migration on three different 
poverty indicators. We do all this using the two most recent Living Standard Surveys: the 
VHLSS 2004 and 2006. 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the definition 
of migration. Section 3 discusses patterns of migration and household welfare in Vietnam. 
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Next, the methodology employed is discussed in Section 4. Sections 5 and 6 present the 
estimation results. Finally, we draw conclusions in Section 7. 
 
7.2 Definition of migration 
 
Like other empirical chapters, this chapter relies on data from VHLSS in 2004 and 2006. An 
important issue when analyzing migration is how to define migration. Although the surveys 
did not have explicit questions on migration, we could use special features of the panel of 
4,216 households to define migration. 1,395 individuals who were part of these households in 
2004 were not covered in the 2006 survey (these people do not include dead people). These 
people are considered migrants. Since a household’s members in VHLSS are defined as those 
who lived with the households for more than 5 months during the past year, the duration of 
the defined migration was at least 7 months. The 2006 VHLSS includes a question on the 
reasons why these people left the households: work, marriage/separate stay, and 
education/other reasons. The questionnaire did not distinguish between internal and 
international migration. Based on these data, we defined two types of migration: work 
migration and non-work migration. Households with work migration had someone leaving for 
work during the period 2004-2006. Households with so-called non-work migration had 
someone leaving for marriage, separate stay, education or other reasons. The number of 
households who sent out work migrants and non-work migrants are 295 and 608, respectively. 
Around 1 percent of households had both types of migration at the same time. 
This definition of migration has both disadvantages and advantages. The main 
disadvantage is that it can underestimate the total migration. Households who did not have 
migration between 2004 and 2006 can have migration from before 2004. However, other 
studies which define households with migration as those having someone currently leaving 
for work can also underestimate the impacts of migration. This is because other households 
without current migrating members can have migrating members in the past. The chapter’s 
definition of migration has an important advantage. The defined migration clearly refers to the 
period 2004-2006. Thus, in this chapter, impact estimates will be attached to the impacts of 
the migration between 2004 and 2006. In many studies, households with migration are those 
currently with migrating members.41 As a result, migration can take place in any time before 
the survey, and it is not clear about how long the migration lasts. As the impact of migration 
on household welfare may change over time, merging migration over too long a time period 
may obscure the results of an impact study. 
 
7.3 Migration and household welfare in Vietnam 
 
Figure 7.1 presents the distribution of migrants over different groups of households. The 
percentage of households with work and non-work migration was 7.1 percent and 14.3 
percent, respectively, with very similar shares for poor and non-poor households. As 
expected, rural areas had a higher proportion of households with work migration, 8.3 percent 
compared to 3.8 percent, since people tend to move from rural to urban areas for higher 
income employment. However, the share of households with non-work migration was 
somewhat higher in urban areas. 
                                                 
41 For example, in Hoddinott (1994), Barham and Boucher (1995), Niimi and Ozden (2006), and Mora and 
Taylor (2006).  
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Figure 7.1. Distribution of migrants (% of all households). Source: Authors’ calculations 
using VHLSS 2004 and 2006. 
 
 
Households with people migrating between 2004 and 2006 could be expected to have 
experienced an increase in welfare over that period, especially when the migrants left for 
work. Table 7.1 shows averages of a number of welfare indicators for households with and 
without work-migration. The indicators include labour efforts, remittances, income, income 
diversification, consumption expenditure, and poverty indexes. 
To examine how the labour efforts of household members change with migration, the 
labour variables of migration households in 2004 are constructed for only non-migrating 
members. As can be seen, the ratio of working members in households was quite similar 
between households with and without work migration. However, annual working hours per 
labourer for households with migration were slightly lower for households without migration. 
Households with work migration experienced a large increase in both internal and 
international remittances. Internal and international remittances per capita increased by 
around 78 percent and 561 percent, respectively. Remittances of households without work 
migration increased only slightly. 
The growth rate of income of households with work migration was higher than that of 
households without migration: 50 percent compared to 20 percent. Migration household 
income excluding remittances also increased at a higher rate than that of households without 
migration. 
Migration could imply increased income diversification and thus a reduction of risk. To 
measure income diversification, we use the Simpson index (SI). A larger SI means more 
income diversification: SI ranges between 0 if there is only one source of income and (1 – 1/k) 
if a household earns income equally from all k possible income sources (see Appendix 7.2). 
We define seven mutually exclusive income sources: crops, livestock, fishery/forestry/other 
agricultural activities, non-farm self employment, wages, remittances, transfers, and other 
income. Since migration can lead to increased remittances, we estimate the SI for total income 
and income without remittances. 
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Table 7.1. Household welfares of household with and without work migrants during 2004-
2006. 
 
Households with work 
migrants 
Households without work 
migrants 
Welfare indicators 
2004 2006 2004 2006 
81.7 79.9 81.3 78.6 Ratio of members engaged in productive activities 
to the total household members older than 14 
years old (%)  [1.4] [1.5] [0.5] [0.4] 
1,023.7 1073.7 1,026.9 1,060.7 Annual working hours per capita  
[29.6] [29.2] [10.7] [10.6] 
1,592.1 1,693.1 1,828.1 1,868.6 Annual working hours per working member 
[39.4] [39.2] [16.1] [14.6] 
472.0 851.0 423.1 435.8 Per capita internal remittances 
[76.9] [69.2] [19.1] [20.8] 
123.3 911.9 251.9 302.1 Per capita international remittances 
[71.5] [388.3] [46.7] [64.5] 
595.3 1,762.9 675.0 737.9 Per capita remittances (both international and 
internal)  [103.8] [398.7] [51.4] [68.1] 
4,733.4 7,088.5 5,790.0 6,902.0 Per capita income (household income divided by 
household size) [194.5] [455.7] [129.0] [146.2] 
8,111.2 13,100.0 11,215.1 13,188.0 Household income divided by the number of 
working members (above 14 years old)  [364.8] [1,414.3] [310.7] [372.9] 
7,028.9 8,917.7 9,773.2 11,540.5 Household income excluding remittances divided 
by the number of working members (above 14 
years old) 
[283.2] [404.3] [233.2] [261.9] 
58.1 61.2 64.0 66.7 Ratio of non-farm income to total income (%) 
[1.7] [1.8] [0.8] [0.8] 
53.2 49.8 60.1 63.1 Ratio of non-farm income (excluding remittances) 
to total income (%) [1.9] [2.3] [0.8] [0.8] 
0.5630 0.5561 0.4852 0.4719 Simpson index 1 (all income sources) 
[0.0090] [0.0100] [0.0042] [0.0042] 
0.5120 0.4670 0.4230 0.4108 Simpson index 2 (income sources excluding 
remittances) [0.0110] [0.0122] [0.0048] [0.0048] 
3,608.9 4,612.5 4,329.1 4,848.0 Per capita consumption expenditure 
[129.8] [148.4] [87.8] [90.5] 
0.1727 0.1080 0.2062 0.1625 P0 
[0.0259] [0.0229] [0.0096] [0.0091] 
0.0463 0.0222 0.0522 0.0405 P1 
[0.0100] [0.0084] [0.0033] [0.0030] 
0.0181 0.0097 0.0195 0.0147 P2 
[0.0055] [0.0053] [0.0016] [0.0015] 
Number of observations 295 295 3,921 3,921 
Standard errors in brackets (corrected for sampling weight and cluster correlation). 
Source: Author’s estimation from VHLSS 2004 and 2006. 
 
 
Households with work migrants had a higher average SI than other households, even 
before migration. This could be because a large share of these households came from rural 
areas. The SI was slightly reduced over time for both groups of households. Moreover, the SI 
for income without remittances decreased remarkably from 0.512 to 0.467 for the households 
with migration. 
Per capita expenditure increased by around 28 percent and 12 percent for households 
with and without migration during the period 2004-2006, respectively. Poverty, which is 
measured by three Foster-Greer-Thorbecke poverty indexes, reduced for groups of households 
(the formulas of these poverty indexes are presented in section 4.2). Migration households 
experienced a larger decrease in poverty than other households. 
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Similarly, Table 7.2 presents the welfare indicators of households with and without 
non-work migration. In general, households with non-work migration experienced a higher 
increase in per capita remittances and income than those without non-work migration. Per 
capita expenditure also increased at a higher rate for the migrant-sending households: 26 
percent compared to 11 percent for the period 2004-2006. As a result, poverty of the non-
work migration households decreased more quickly than poverty of the households without 
non-work migration. 
 
 
Table 7.2. Household welfares of household with and without non-work migrants during 
2004-2006. 
 
Households with non-work 
migrants 
Households without non-
work migrants 
Welfare indicators 
2004 2006 2004 2006 
77.6 79.0 82.0 78.7 Ratio of members engaged in productive activities to the 
total household members older than 14 years old (%)  [1.2] [0.9] [0.5] [0.4] 
1,066.1 1,152.3 1,021.1 1,047.1 Annual working hours per capita  
[29.3] [22.4] [10.4] [10.8] 
1,726.3 1,873.1 1,829.2 1,855.6 Annual working hours per working member 
[34.7] [30.3] [16.1] [14.7] 
396.1 802.8 428.9 405.4 Per capita internal remittances 
[40.4] [76.0] [19.9] [18.9] 
217.2 219.2 249.6 358.2 Per capita international remittances 
[49.1] [53.8] [50.5] [74.8] 
613.3 1,021.9 678.5 763.6 Per capita remittances (both international and internal)  
[67.2] [89.4] [55.2] [77.4] 
5,520.7 7,093.7 5,754.2 6,884.3 Per capita income (household income divided by 
household size) [208.8] [266.7] [132.5] [152.2] 
10,000.0 12,500.0 11,138.9 13,292.1 Household income divided by the number of working 
members (above 14 years old)  [533.1] [617.9] [315.2] [403.0] 
8,924.2 10,700.0 9,703.9 11,497.4 Household income excluding remittances divided by the 
number of working members (above 14 years old) [468.3] [568.9] [232.1] [268.0] 
65.8 66.8 63.2 66.1 Ratio of non-farm income to total income (%) 
[1.3] [1.4] [0.8] [0.7] 
62.3 61.7 59.1 62.2 Ratio of non-farm income (excluding remittances) to total 
income (%) [1.4] [1.5] [0.8] [0.8] 
0.5020 0.4975 0.4889 0.4749 Simpson index 1 (all income sources) 
[0.0080] [0.0079] [0.0043] [0.0043] 
0.4450 0.4206 0.4268 0.4147 Simpson index 2 (income sources excluding remittances) 
[0.0090] [0.0091] [0.0049] [0.0049] 
4,260.8 5,387.5 4,284.2 4,746.2 Per capita consumption expenditure 
[163.4] [170.1] [86.3] [88.6] 
0.2073 0.1293 0.2037 0.1640 P0 
[0.0202] [0.0173] [0.0097] [0.0093] 
0.0550 0.0293 0.0514 0.0409 P1 
[0.0071] [0.0045] [0.0033] [0.0031] 
0.0220 0.0100 0.0190 0.0151 P2 
[0.0036] [0.0019] [0.0016] [0.0016] 
Number of observations 608 608 3,608 3,608 
Standard errors in brackets (corrected for sampling weight and cluster correlation). 
Source: Author’s estimation from VHLSS 2004 and 2006. 
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7.4 Methodology of impact evaluation 
 
It is not possible to ascribe the differences between migrant-sending households and other 
households to the migration, as the two groups are likely to differ in other respects. To 
address the causal effects of migration on household welfare, poverty and inequality, we used 
the methodology of difference-in-differences with propensity score matching. In the following 
section, we discuss this method and the indicators used. 
 
7.4.1 Impact of migration on household welfare indicators 
 
Let D be a binary variable indicating whether a household has migrants: D=1 if a household 
has migrants, D=0 otherwise. In addition, denote Y as the variable of interest, with 1i iY Y=  if 
household i has migrants and 0i iY Y=  if the same household i had not had migrants. The 
impact of migration on household i is then measured by: 
01 iii YY −=Δ  (1) 
Following the evaluation literature, the average impact of migration on households with 
migrants is defined by 
)1()1()1( 0101 =−===−= DYEDYEDYYEATT  (2) 
where ATT denotes the Average Treatment Effect on the Treated, or in this case the average 
effect of migration on households with migrants (Heckman et al., 1999). 
Estimation of ATT is not straightforward, since )1|( 0 =DYE  is unobservable. 
)1|( 0 =DYE  is the counterfactual which would give the expected outcome of households with 
migration if nobody had migrated. A possible solution would be to estimate )1|( 0 =DYE  by 
the expected value of the variable of interest for those households that do not have migrants, 
0( | 0)E Y D = , which is observable. Obviously, this approach is only valid if households with 
and without migrants are similar in all respects but migration, or in other words, if the 
decision to migrate is not correlated with other variables that are not controlled for in analysis. 
In practice, this requires selection of a valid control group (the counterfactual). 
We use a matching methodology to derive such a control group, which comes down to 
pairing households with and without migrants on the basis of some observable variables such 
that both groups become comparable. Such matching is preferable to randomly choosing a 
control group, since it suffers less from selection bias. The main advantage of matching 
compared to regression-based methods is that it is a non-parametric method, which avoids 
specifying the relationship between characteristics and outcome. A second advantage is that 
matching methods emphasize the common support problem, which implies that they only 
compare household performance between households with and without migrants when the 
two groups of households have otherwise similar characteristics. 
We use the method of propensity score matching (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). We 
start by estimating the probability of being a household with migrants at time t by using a 
logit or probit model, 1( 1) ( )it itP D F X −= = , where X is a vector of observed variables before 
migration. Let’s divide the sample into two groups: a group of households with migrants (say 
group M) and a group of households without migrants (say group C). The matching 
methodology pairs each family with migrants to some group of ‘comparable’ households 
without migrants and then associates to the outcomes of the treated families the (weighted) 
outcomes of their neighbours in the comparison group. The matching estimator is defined by 
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( )∑ ∑
∈ ∈
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −=
Mi Cj
jjii yppgy ,μ ,  
where p is the probability of having migrants and g(.) gives the weights on control family j in 
forming a comparison with migrant family i. The function g(.) differs for the different 
matching estimators proposed in the literature. 
Since we have longitudinal data on the migration and non-migration households, we can 
estimate the impact of migration by using the method of difference-in-differences with 
matching. The main advantage of the difference-in-differences method compared to the 
standard matching estimator in levels is that the former eliminates differences in the variable 
of interest due to unobserved time-invariant effects. This implies that the difference-in-
differences method controls for selection on both observables and time-invariant 
unobservables, while the standard matching method controls for selection on observables 
only. Let yΔ be the differences between the variable of interest before and after migration. 
Then the difference-in-differences estimator is given by: 
( )∑ ∑
∈ ∈
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ Δ−Δ=
Mi Cj
jjii yppgy ,δ .  (3) 
Different matching estimators can be used. In this chapter, we use nearest-neighbours, kernel 
matching, and local linear regression matching to examine the sensitivity of the impact 
estimates. We calculate standard errors using bootstrap techniques. This is common practice 
in empirical studies, although Abadie and Imbens (2006) show that bootstrap can give invalid 
standard errors for the nearest neighbour matching estimator, and there is no evidence on the 
validity of bootstrap standard errors for other matching estimators. We implement the 
bootstrap by repeatedly drawing samples from the original sample of the VHLSS panel data. 
Since the VHLSS sample selection follows stratified random cluster sampling, communes 
instead of households are bootstrapped in each stratum (Deaton, 1997). In other words, the 
bootstrap is made of communes (i.e. clusters) within strata. The number of replications is 500. 
We also tried to bootstrap households instead of communes, and the results of both 
possibilities are very similar. 
It should be noted that we are able to construct so-called baseline data before migration 
since the migration is defined for the period 2004-2006. It is possible that before 2004 both 
migration and non-migration households already had migrating members. However, through 
controlling for a large number of household and village variables including receipt of internal 
and international remittances in 2004, we expect to be able to construct a control group with 
observed characteristics similar to the migrant group. The main difference between the 
migrant and control group is that the migrant group had migrating members between 2004 
and 2006, while the control group did not. We therefore interpret the estimated differences as 
the impact of migration during the period 2004-2006. 
 
7.4.2 Impact of migration on poverty and inequality 
 
In this chapter, expenditure poverty is measured by the three Foster-Greer-Thorbecke poverty 
indexes, and expenditure inequality is measured by the Gini coefficient, Theil’s L index, and 
Theil’s T index. The formulas of these indexes are presented in section 4.3 of Chapter 4. 
The impact of migration on the poverty indexes of migrant households is calculated as 
follows: 
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)1|()1|( 01 =−==Δ DYPDYPP AA ααα ,  (4) 
where the first term on the right-hand side is the poverty measure of households with 
migration given this migration. This term is observed and can be computed directly from the 
sample data. The second term on the right-hand side is the counterfactual measure of poverty, 
i.e. poverty indexes of the migration households had they not had migration. This term is not 
observed directly. To estimate this term, we estimate AY0  for each household as follows: 
i
A
i
A
i YY Δ−= ˆˆ 10 , (5) 
where AiY1 is observed per capita expenditure of migration household i. iΔˆ  is the impact 
estimate of migration on household i estimated using the difference-in-differences with 
matching method described in the previous section. It should be noted that we measure the 
impact of migration in 2006, i.e. after households sent migrants (and the superscript ‘A’ 
means ‘after’ migration). 
We also measure the impact of migration on total poverty: 
)()( 0
AA YPYPP ααα −=Δ , (6) 
where )( AYPα  is the observed poverty index of the entire population and )( 0AYPα  is the 
poverty index of the entire population if there had been no migration at all. 
For inequality, we only measure the impact of migration on the entire population: 
)()( 0
AA YIYII −=Δ , (7) 
where )( AYI is the index for observed inequality and )( 0AYI  the inequality index in the 
absence of migration, which is estimated using the predicted counterfactual expenditure. The 
standard errors of the estimates of impacts on poverty and inequality are estimated using the 
bootstrap technique described in the previous section. 
 
7.5 Determinants of migration and propensity score estimation 
 
The first step in measuring impact is to predict the propensity score, which is the probability 
that a household had at least one migrating member during 2004-2006. Since the dependent 
variable is binary, we used logit regression. The main problem we faced was how to select the 
set of explanatory variables. Two requirements need to be taken into account. First, the 
explanatory variables should be exogenous to migration (Heckman et al., 1999; Ravallion, 
2001). Therefore, we use variables before migration during the 2004-2006 period, i.e. 
variables in the 2004 VHLSS. Second, the explanatory variables should affect both the 
outcome variable we are interested in and migration (Ravallion, 2001). Variables which affect 
the outcome variable but not migration should not be included in the logit regressions. 
Similarly, variables affecting migration but not the outcome variables should be ignored. 
Economic theories of migration suggest that people primarily migrate in order to 
improve income, or to reduce risk (Harris and Todaro, 1970; Stark, 1980; Katz and Stark, 
1986; Stark and Taylor, 1991; Stark, 1991). The new economics of labour migration assumes 
that migration decisions are determined both by individual and household characteristics, 
including human and physical assets of the households (Stark, 1991; Mora and Taylor, 2006). 
In line with the recent literature on determinants of migration (e.g. Hoddinott, 1994; Morra 
and Taylor, 2006; Sienaert, 2007), our set of explanatory variables includes household 
income, receipt of remittances, education of household head and head’s spouse, age, sex and 
marriage of the head, household composition, household education, housing and land, village 
characteristics, regions and urbanity. Several control variables such as household income and 
remittances are also outcome variables. However, these variables were measured in 2004, i.e. 
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before migration during the 2004-2006 period, and pre-treatment outcome can be used as a 
control in the regression of the propensity score (Dehejia and Wahba, 1998; Smith and Todd, 
2005). 
It should be noted that households with and without migration during the 2004-2006 
period may have had migrating members before 2004. Moreover, households who had 
migrating members before 2004 may be less likely to have had members migrating between 
2004 and 2006. Therefore, migration before 2004 should be controlled for. Since the VHLSS 
do not present information on migration before 2004, we use receipts of remittances in 2004 
as a proxy for pre-2004 migration. 
Table 7.8 in Appendix 7.1 presents the entire set of explanatory variables, and their 
means and standard errors of the means. Table 7.9 in the Appendix presents the logit 
regressions regarding the determinants of work and non-work migration. We start (models 1a 
and 1b) by including all explanatory variables that are expected to affect migration. Next, we 
re-estimate the model by only including variables that are statistically significant at the 10% 
level (models 2a and 2b). We use models 2a and 2b to estimate the propensity scores for work 
and non-work migration, respectively. 
To examine the common support, we present Figures 7.2 and 7.3 of the propensity 
scores. The bars above the horizontal line represent the density distribution of the propensity 
score of the migration households, while the bars below the horizontal line represent the 
density distribution of the propensity score of the non-migration households. The figures 
show that the common support is large. This means that for each migration household we will 
be able to find non-migration households with similar propensity scores. 
According to Model 2a, households with non-work migrants were less likely to have 
work migrants. As expected, households with lower per capita income tended to send out 
work migrants. Households with international remittances in 2004 were less likely to send 
work migrants during the period 2004-2006, since international remittances in 2004 imply 
that these households had already sent migrants before 2004. On the contrary, households 
with internal remittances were more likely to have work migrants. It should be noted that 
internal remittances as defined in the VHLSS include all internal private transfers received by 
households. These can be given to households not only by relatives but also by friends, 
neighbours, etc. Thus, the receipt of internal remittances of a household can be an indicator 
not only for migrants but also for relationship with other households. Households with a 
larger network could have a higher probability of migration. Ethnic minorities were less likely 
to send out migrating members compared to Kinh/Chinese households. Large living areas and 
annual crop lands were associated with a small probability of work migration. 
Non-work migration was not significantly correlated with economic factors such as 
income and land. Households with a large number of members and higher ratio of members 
between 15 and 60 years olds were more likely have non-work migration. Smaller living areas 
tended to increase the probability of non-work migration. 
It should be noted that the main aim of the predicted propensity score is to overcome the 
multidimensionality problem of matching by covariates. The quality of a constructed 
comparison group should be assessed by testing whether the distribution of the covariates is 
similar between the comparison and treatment groups given the predicted propensity score. 
We test the equality of means of covariates between migrant and non-migrant households 
using t-tests. To examine the sensitivity of the impact estimates to different matching 
schemes, we will use four matching estimators including 1 nearest neighbour, 5 nearest 
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neighbours, kernel matching with bandwidth of 0.05, and local linear regression matching 
with bandwidth of 0.05. The results of the balancing test for these estimators are presented in 
Tables 7.10 to 7.17 in Appendix 7.1. It can be seen that we cannot reject equality of the means 
of the covariates between migrant and non-migrant households for any of the matching 
estimators.42 All estimators achieve similar bias reduction percentages of X. Yet, the matched 
group from kernel matching is most similar to the migrant group. So we will use the results 
from the kernel matching scheme in the remainder of this chapter the interpretation. Results 
from other matching estimators are very similar and presented in Appendix 7.1. 
 
7.6 Impact of migration 
 
Below, we will analyze the impacts of migration on welfare at the household and country 
level. At household level, we assess the ultimate effects on income and expenditures and the 
underlying factors work efforts of non-migrating members, remittances, and income 
diversification. At the national level, we consider poverty of both migrant households and the 
overall population and total inequality. 
 
7.6.1 Impact of migration on household income and expenditure 
 
Work migration had a significant impact on per capita income, household income per working 
household member, as well as per capita consumption expenditures (Table 7.3). Migration for 
work purposes resulted in an average increase in per capita income by 897 thousand VND 
between 2004 and 2006: an increase of 19 percent. Income per working member even 
increased by one third. This was solely due to an increase in remittances: non-remittances 
income did not significantly change due to migration. Per capita consumption increased by 8 
percent only, suggesting a high propensity to save out of remittances. 
Migration for non-work purposes only significantly affected average per capita 
consumption expenditures and not income (Table 7.3). The latter is not surprising given our 
previous finding that work migration affects per capita income through remittances alone. 
Between 2004 and 2006, per capita consumption increased by 525 thousand VND, or 12 
percent, due to migration. Perhaps surprisingly, this indicates that the consumption effect of 
non-work migrants was higher than the consumption effect on work migrants, even though it 
did not lead to a significant increase in per capita income. There might be two possible 
explanations for this. The first explanation is that non-work migration did help migrant-
sending households increase their income, but we are not able to detect statistically significant 
impacts using this data set and this impact measurement method. The second explanation is 
that households with non-work migrants had on average higher per capita expenditures than 
households with work migrants. Richer households may experience more household 
economies of scale and thus decrease total consumption less as a result of a reduction in 
household size (Deaton and Paxson, 1998). 
 
                                                 
42 We relied on the STATA command called ‘psmatch2’ to perform the matching estimators. However, we do 
not use the original command for the estimation, since the command does not allow sampling weights. We 
revised the command to allow for sampling weights. We also tried to estimate the migration impacts without 
sampling weights. The results are very similar to those using the sampling weights.  
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Table 7.3. Impact of migration on income and expenditure in 2006 (kernel matching with 
bandwidth of 0.05). 
 
 2004   2006  
Welfare indicators (outcome) Treatment Matched 
control 
Difference Treatment Matched 
control 
Difference Diff-in-diff
Impact of work migration 
4,733.4*** 4,941.9*** -208.5** 7,088.5*** 6,399.7*** 688.9* 897.4**Per capita income (Household 
income divided by household 
size) [194.5] [185.0] [86.6] [455.7] [169.5] [445.4] [424.6]
8,111.2*** 8,208.0*** -96.9 13,100.0*** 10,500.0*** 2,614.2* 2,711.0**Household income divided by 
the number of working 
members (above 14 years 
old)  
[364.8] [302.2] [249.1] [1,414.3] [284.5] [1,406.9] [1,398.2]
7,028.9*** 7,466.4*** -437.5* 8,917.7*** 9,527.0*** -609.3* -171.8Household income excluding 
remittances divided by the 
number of working members 
(above 14 years old) 
[283.2] [264.7] [236.3] [404.3] [263.3] [379.3] [347.2]
3,608.9*** 3,786.5*** -177.5* 4,612.5*** 4,487.5*** 125.0 302.6***Per capita consumption 
expenditure [129.8] [108.6] [96.8] [148.4] [106.6] [119.7] [117.0]
Impact of non-work migration 
5,520.7*** 5,433.8*** 87.0 7,093.7*** 6,748.0*** 345.7*** 258.8Per capita income (Household 
income divided by household 
size) 
[208.8] [158.3] [234.0] [266.7] [189.5] [311.7] [240.1]
10,000*** 10,100*** 141.8 12,500.0*** 12,000.0*** 492.6 350.8Household income divided by 
the number of working 
members (above 14 years 
old)  
[533.1] [344.2] [597.9] [617.9] [332.1] [679.2] [554.0]
8,924.2*** 8,857.7*** 66.5 10,700.0*** 10,700.0*** -79.1 -145.7Household income excluding 
remittances divided by the 
number of working members 
(above 14 years old) 
[468.3] [249.0] [503.1] [568.9] [287.3] [621.7] [474.9]
4,260.8*** 4,153.2*** 107.6 5,387.5*** 47,54.5*** 633.0*** 525.4***Per capita consumption 
expenditure [163.4] [121.0] [188.1] [170.1] [112.9] [193.0] [144.0]
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Standard errors in brackets. Standard errors are corrected for sampling weights and estimated using bootstrap (non-
parametric) with 500 replications. 
Source: Author’s estimation from VHLSS 2004 and 2006. 
 
 
7.6.2 Impact of migration on work efforts 
 
Table 7.4 presents the impact of migration on work efforts of non-migrating members in 
migrant-sending households. The table suggests that work migration did not have a 
statistically significant impact on the labour efforts of the non-migrating members. Non-work 
migration, on the other hand, resulted in an increase in annual working hours per working 
member (older than 14) by around 7 percent. This suggests that there was a need to 
compensate for a loss in income due to non-work migration by means of an increase in 
working hours of the remaining household members. The results of the previous section 
suggest that this increase was sufficient to compensate for the per capita income loss. 
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Table 7.4. Impact of work and non-work migration on household work efforts in 2006 (kernel 
matching with bandwidth of 0.05). 
 
 2004   2006  
Indicators (outcome) Treatment Matched 
control 
Difference Treatment Matched 
control 
Difference Diff-in-diff
Impact of work migration 
81.7*** 79.5*** 2.2* 79.9*** 78.1*** 1.8 -0.5Ratio of members engaged in 
productive activities to the 
total household members 
older than 14 years old (%)  
[1.4] [0.7] [1.5] [1.5] [0.7] [1.5] [1.6]
1,023.7*** 1,091.2*** -67.5** 1,073.7*** 1,144.2*** -70.5** -2.9Annual working hours per 
capita  [29.6] [18.3] [28.1] [29.2] [17.7] [29.0] [31.2]
1,592.1*** 1,693.4*** -1,01.3*** 1,693.1*** 1,765.6*** -72.5* 28.8Annual working hours per 
working member [39.4] [21.4] [39.7] [39.2] [19.2] [40.9] [48.9]
Impact of non-work migration 
77.6*** 75.6*** 2.0 79.0*** 75.1*** 3.8*** 1.8Ratio of members engaged in 
productive activities to the 
total household members 
older than 14 years old (%)  
[1.2] [0.7] [1.3] [0.9] [0.6] [1.1] [1.4]
1,066.1*** 1,087.5*** -21.5 1,152.3*** 1,113.5*** 38.8 60.3**Annual working hours per 
capita  [29.3] [17.3] [31.0] [22.4] [19.5] [26.7] [29.5]
1,726.3*** 1,812.5*** -86.2** 1,873.1*** 1,835.0*** 38.1 124.3***Annual working hours per 
working member [34.7] [21.0] [40.3] [30.3] [21.9] [35.8] [40.8]
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Standard errors in brackets. Standard errors are corrected for sampling weights and estimated using bootstrap (non-
parametric) with 500 replications. 
Source: Author’s estimation from VHLSS 2004 and 2006. 
 
 
Table 7.5. Impact of migration on remittances in 2006 (kernel matching with bandwidth of 
0.05). 
 
 2004   2006  Welfare indicators (outcome) 
Treatment Matched 
control 
Difference Treatment Matched 
control 
Difference Diff-in-diff
Impact of work migration 
472.0*** 377.4*** 94.6 851.0*** 417.4*** 433.6*** 339.0***Per capita internal remittances 
[76.9] [26.3] [72.0] [69.2] [31.4] [74.6] [95.1]
123.3*** 63.6*** 59.8 911.9*** 166.3*** 745.6* 685.8*Per capita International 
remittances [71.5] [18.0] [62.9] [388.3] [33.4] [389.0] [379.6]
595.3*** 441.0*** 154.3 1,762.9*** 583.7*** 1,179.2** 1,024.9***Per capita remittances (both 
international and internal)  [103.8] [34.6] [90.5] [398.7] [45.3] [400.1] [401.6]
Impact of non-work migration 
396.1*** 368.2*** 27.9 802.8*** 391.9*** 410.9*** 383.0***Per capita internal remittances 
[40.4] [24.3] [45.3] [76.0] [27.6] [81.6] [85.2]
217.2*** 223.4*** -6.2 219.2*** 255.9*** -36.7 -30.5Per capita international 
remittances [49.1] [71.2] [84.4] [53.8] [49.7] [73.1] [96.2]
613.3*** 591.6*** 21.7 1,021.9*** 647.7*** 374.2*** 352.5***Per capita remittances (both 
international and internal)  [67.2] [77.0] [98.6] [89.4] [55.3] [107.8] [124.5]
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
Standard errors in brackets. Standard errors are corrected for sampling weights and estimated using bootstrap (non-
parametric) with 500 replications. 
Source: Author’s estimation from VHLSS 2004 and 2006. 
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7.6.3 Impact of migration on remittances 
 
Table 7.5 shows that both work and non-work migration lead to an increase in remittances. 
However, remittances from non-work migrants were relatively low. This could explain why in 
case of non-work migration there was a higher need to compensate for possible income losses 
by increasing working hours (see above). The table also shows that non-work migration 
increased internal remittances but not international remittances. This is in accordance with the 
observation that most non-work migrants left for marriage or separate stay, which mainly 
involve internal migration. 
 
7.6.4 Impact of migration of income diversification 
 
Migration did not increase the overall Simpson index of income diversification. However, 
work migration resulted in a decrease of 3 percentage points in the Simpson diversification 
index of non-remittances income (Table 7.6). This suggests that some work migrants were 
already involved in different activities than their household members, so that when they left 
local income became less diversified. This could increase their vulnerability to shocks if the 
migrant stops sending remittances. We do not find this effect for non-work migrants. 
 
 
Table 7.6. Impacts of migration on income diversification in 2006 (kernel matching with 
bandwidth of 0.05). 
 
 2004   2006  Welfare indicators 
(outcome) Treatment Matched 
control 
Difference Treatment Matched 
control 
Difference Diff-in-diff
Impact of work migration 
0.5630*** 0.5280*** 0.0354*** 0.5561*** 0.5080*** 0.0481*** 0.0128Simpson index 1 (all income 
sources) [0.0090] [0.0064] [0.0098] [0.0100] [0.0061] [0.0108] [0.0113]
0.5120*** 0.4804*** 0.0313*** 0.4670*** 0.4640*** 0.0029** -0.0284***Simpson index 2 (income 
sources excluding 
remittances) 
[0.0110] [0.0066] [0.0106] [0.0122] [0.0066] [0.0124] [0.0122]
Impact of non-work migration 
0.5020*** 0.5051*** -0.0031 0.4975*** 0.4922*** 0.0053 0.0084Simpson index 1 (all income 
sources) [0.0080] [0.0054] [0.0095] [0.0079] [0.0050] [0.0092] [0.0093]
0.4450*** 0.4522*** -0.0073 0.4206*** 0.4422*** -0.0216** -0.0143
[0.0090] [0.0060] [0.0104] [0.0091] [0.0053] [0.0101] [0.0100]
Simpson index 2 (income 
sources excluding 
remittances) [163.4] [121.0] [188.1] [170.1] [112.9] [193.0] [144.0]
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Standard errors in brackets. Standard errors are corrected for sampling weights and estimated using bootstrap (non-
parametric) with 500 replications. 
Source: Author’s estimation from VHLSS 2004 and 2006. 
 
 
7.6.5 Impact of migration on poverty and inequality 
 
Table 7.7 presents the impact of work and non-work migration on expenditure poverty and 
inequality. Although work migration did not have statistically significant effects on the 
incidence of poverty, it did significantly change the poverty gap and severity for the work 
migration households. Hence, work migration did not lift people out of poverty but it did 
make their poverty less harsh. 
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Table 7.7. Impacts of work and non-work migration on poverty and inequality in 2006 (kernel 
matching with bandwidth of 0.05). 
 
Households with ‘work’ migration Households with ‘non-work’ migration  
With 
migration 
Without 
migration 
Impact With 
migration 
Without 
migration 
Impact 
Poverty of households with migration     
P0 0.1074*** 0.1346*** -0.0272 0.1277*** 0.2166*** -0.0889*** 
 [0.0219] [0.0310] [0.0249] [0.0159] [0.0319] [0.0308] 
P1 0.0222** 0.0384*** -0.0162** 0.0293*** 0.0701*** -0.0407** 
 [0.0084] [0.0120] [0.0074] [0.0045] [0.0151] [0.0141] 
P2 0.0097** 0.0179** -0.0082** 0.0100*** 0.0327*** -0.0228** 
 [0.0053] [0.0081] [0.0044] [0.0019] [0.0096] [0.0091] 
All poverty       
P0 0.1587*** 0.1603*** -0.0017 0.1587*** 0.1709*** -0.0122*** 
 [0.0073] [0.0074] [0.0015] [0.0073] [0.0087] [0.0043] 
P1 0.0392*** 0.0402*** -0.0010** 0.0392*** 0.0448*** -0.0056*** 
 [0.0025] [0.0026] [0.0004] [0.0025] [0.0033] [0.0019] 
P2 0.0144*** 0.0149*** -0.0005 0.0144*** 0.0175*** -0.0031*** 
 [0.0012] [0.0013] [0.0003] [0.0012] [0.0019] [0.0013] 
All inequality       
Gini 0.3464*** 0.3477*** -0.0013** 0.3464*** 0.3510*** -0.0046*** 
 [0.0050] [0.0051] [0.0005] [0.0050] [0.0053] [0.0015] 
Theil L 0.1984*** 0.2002*** -0.0019** 0.1984*** 0.2055*** -0.0071*** 
 [0.0058] [0.0060] [0.0009] [0.0058] [0.0065] [0.0026] 
Theil T 0.2080*** 0.2096*** -0.0016*** 0.2080*** 0.2135*** -0.0056*** 
 [0.0073] [0.0074] [0.0006] [0.0073] [0.0077] [0.0018] 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Standard errors in brackets. Standard errors are corrected for sampling weights and estimated using bootstrap (non-
parametric) with 500 replications. 
Source: Author’s estimation from VHLSS 2004 and 2006. 
 
 
The effects of non-work migration on expenditure poverty were greater, which could be 
expected given that non-work migration was more widespread and on average resulted in a 
larger increase in per capita expenditures (although not per capita income). Non-work 
migration helped reduce the poverty incidence of migration households by around 9 
percentage points and in addition reduced their poverty gap and severity indexes by 57 
percent and 67 percent, respectively. These numbers translate into a reduction of the overall 
poverty incidence by 1.2 percentage points and a reduction of the overall poverty gap and 
severity indexes by 12 percent and 17 percent. 
Nguyen et al. (2008) found that total migration between 2002 and 2004 resulted in an 
increase in inequality in 2004: the actual Gini coefficient was 0.42, compared to the 
counterfactual (no migration) of 0.38. On the contrary, we find that both work and non-work 
migration slightly decreased expenditure inequality in 2006. The effects we find are, however, 
extremely small compared to the 0.04 points observed by Nguyen et al. The difference could 
lie in the slightly different time period covered in the two studies or in methodological 
differences. Nguyen et al. use least-squares regression to determine the impact of migration 
on expenditures to compute inequality, whereas we use difference-in-differences with 
propensity score matching, which has the advantages that it controls for time-invariant 
unobservable differences between households with and without migrants in addition to 
observable differences, and that it does not impose a functional form on the relationship 
between migration, the covariates, and expenditures. 
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7.7 Conclusions 
 
While migration is an increasingly important phenomenon in Vietnam, there are surprisingly 
few studies analyzing its effects quantitatively. In this study, we therefore estimate the impact 
of long-term migration on welfare at household and country level in Vietnam using the 
VHLSS of 2004 and 2006. Compared to Nguyen et al.(2008), the only other existing study on 
the impact of long-term migration in Vietnam, we provide not only information on 
expenditures and inequality, but also on remittances, work effort, income and poverty. Also, 
we look at income diversification as an indicator of vulnerability. 
Work migration resulted in an increase of income per capita by 19 percent and of 
income per working member by one third. This was purely due to an increase in remittances: 
migration did not significantly affect non-remittances income per working member, nor did it 
change the work efforts of the remaining household members. Per capita consumption 
increased by 8 percent, less than half of the percentage increase in per capita income, 
suggesting a high propensity to save out of remittances. 
Migration for non-work purposes did not significantly affect per capita and per worker 
income. Remittances were low and per capita working hours increased. This suggests that 
there was a need to compensate for a loss in per capita income due to the departure of a 
productive household member. Surprisingly, we found this effect for non-work migrants only. 
Despite the absence of an effect of non-work migration on per capita income, per capita 
consumption increased by 12 percent, i.e. more than for work migration, which did 
significantly increase income. Possibly, households with non-work migrants, which had on 
average higher per capita expenditures than households with work migrants, experienced 
more household economies of scale and thus decreased total consumption less as a result of a 
reduction in household size. It can also be possible that non-work migration did help migrant-
sending households increase their income, but we are not able to detect statistically significant 
impacts using this data set and this impact measurement method. 
Migration potentially affects the vulnerability of households to shocks. While neither 
work nor non-work migration affected overall income diversification as measured by the 
Simpson index, we could postulate that the covariance between local income sources is higher 
than the covariance between local income and remittances. Remittances could even be 
negatively correlated with earned income if migrants remit more when needs are higher. If so, 
especially work migration, which resulted in most remittances, would have decreased 
vulnerability. 
On the other hand, work migration resulted in a decrease in diversification of non-
remittances income. Apparently, before migration some migrants engaged in different 
activities than their household members, so that when they left local income became less 
diversified. This could increase the vulnerability of these households to shocks if the migrant 
stopped sending remittances in the future. This prospect might affect the limited increase in 
per capita consumption compared to per capita income. We did not find these effects for non-
work migration, which was associated with low levels of remittances and did not affect non-
remittance income diversification levels. 
The household-level effects translated into changes in poverty and inequality at the 
country level. Due to its even distribution over poor and non-poor households and its 
relatively large effect on expenditure, non-work migration significantly decreased the 
incidence, depth and severity of national poverty. The effects of work migration on poverty 
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were much smaller, mainly due to the lower expenditure effects. Still, while work migration 
did not lift people out of poverty, it did make their poverty less severe. 
In addition, we found that migration decreased inequality, although only very slightly. 
This conflicts with the results of Nguyen et al. (2008) who found that total migration resulted 
in a substantial increase in inequality. Both the two-year difference between the data used for 
the two studies and methodological differences could explain these results. While we used 
difference-in-differences with propensity score matching, Nguyen et al. applied least-squares 
regression to determine the impact of migration on expenditures. Our method has the 
advantages that it controls for time-invariant unobservable differences between households 
with and without migrants in addition to observable differences, and that it does not impose a 
functional form on the relationship between migration, the covariates, and expenditures. Yet 
more research is needed to test the robustness of these contradictory results. 
Overall, our analysis suggests that work migration and non-work migration are an 
important tool to increase household consumption expenditure and to reduce poverty and 
inequality in Vietnam. Also for other developing countries, especially for some Asian 
developing countries, such as the Philippines, Indonesia, Lao, and Cambodia, with a similar 
economic structure as Vietnam, migration may play an important role in terms of poverty and 
inequality reduction. There are several measures and policies to increase migration. 
Improvement of transportation and road can promote not only the local market but also the 
probability of migration from rural to urban areas. Vocational training programs can provide 
rural people with production and business skills, and rural people are more likely to find 
employment in urban areas. The government can support migrants with social security 
programs and protective policies. 
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Appendix 7.1 Descriptive statistics and regression results 
 
Table 7.8. Descriptive information on the 2004 variables for households with and without 
migration. 
 
Variable Description Type Household 
with work 
migrants 
Household 
without 
work 
migrants 
Household 
with non-
work 
migrants 
Household 
without 
non-work 
migrants 
migration1 Binary 1 0 0.0773 0.0687
 
Households with work migration (yes 
= 1)  [0] [0] [0.0108] [0.0042
migration2 Binary 0.1593 0.1431 1 0
 
Households with non-work migration 
(yes = 1)   [0.0213] [0.0056] [0] [0]
incomepc04 Per capita income (million VND) Continuous 4.9542 5.8202 5.4337 5.8145
   [0.1898] [0.0880] [0.1624] [0.0930]
dforemit04 Receipt of international remittances  Binary 0.0271 0.0607 0.0691 0.0565
   [0.0095] [0.0038] [0.0103] [0.0038]
ddoremit04 Receipt of internal remittances  Binary 0.8983 0.8452 0.8257 0.8528
   [0.0176] [0.0058] [0.0154] [0.0059]
dagri04 Binary 0.8780 0.7819 0.7895 0.7885
 
Household involved in agricultural 
activities (yes = 1)  [0.0191] [0.0066] [0.0165] [0.0068]
ragri_oc04 Continuous 0.3839 0.3357 0.3516 0.3370
 
Ratio of members involved in 
agricultural production to total 
household members  [0.0157] [0.0048] [0.0119] [0.0050]
runsk_oc04 Continuous 0.1313 0.1194 0.1220 0.1199
 
Ratio of unskilled workers to total 
household members  [0.0119] [0.0032] [0.0081] [0.0034]
ethnic04 Ethnic minorities (yes = 1)  Binary 0.0983 0.1597 0.1760 0.1519
   [0.0174] [0.0059] [0.0155] [0.0060]
hhsize04 Household size Discrete 4.9797 4.3532 5.5197 4.2079
   [0.0917] [0.0274] [0.0821] [0.0263]
pchild04 Continuous 0.1577 0.2518 0.1803 0.2561
 
Ratio of members younger than 16 
to total household members  [0.0103] [0.0035] [0.0070] [0.0037]
pelderly04 Continuous 0.0709 0.1247 0.0990 0.1247
 
Ratio of members older than 60 to 
total household members  [0.0082] [0.0040] [0.0068] [0.0043]
pfemale04 Continuous 0.4582 0.5158 0.5291 0.5088
 
Ratio of female members to total 
household members  [0.0106] [0.0031] [0.0070] [0.0033]
agehead04 Age of household head Discrete 51.7 48.8 53.0 48.4
   [0.6157] [0.2252] [0.4936] [0.2342]
sexhead04 Binary 0.7898 0.7554 0.7368 0.7614
 
Gender of household head (male = 
1, female = 0)  [0.0238] [0.0069] [0.0179] [0.0071]
married04 Head lives with spouse (yes = 1) Binary 0.8305 0.8113 0.7829 0.8176
   [0.0219] [0.0062] [0.0167] [0.0064]
hhedu04 Binary 0.1051 0.1421 0.1250 0.1419
 
Head completed technical degree or 
post-secondary degrees   [0.0179] [0.0056] [0.0134] [0.0058]
hsedu04 Binary 0.1017 0.0808 0.0691 0.0845
 
Head’s spouse completed technical 
degrees or post-secondary 
degrees 
 [0.0176] [0.0044] [0.0103] [0.0046]
rtechnical04 Continuous 0.0630 0.0645 0.0625 0.0648
 
Ratio of members with technical 
degrees to total household 
members 
 [0.0083] [0.0025] [0.0055] [0.0027]
rposecond04 Continuous 0.0244 0.0283 0.0321 0.0274
 
Ratio of members with post-
secondary degrees to total 
household members 
 [0.0053] [0.0018] [0.0045] [0.0018]
livingarea04 House area per capita (m2) Continuous 13.18 15.80 13.05 16.05
   [0.39] [0.19] [0.33] [0.20]
housetype1 Binary 0.1593 0.1900 0.1743 0.1901
 
House made of permanent materials
 [0.0213] [0.0063] [0.0154] [0.0065]
housetype2 Binary 0.6169 0.5800 0.6217 0.5759
 
House made of semi-permanent 
materials  [0.0284] [0.0079] [0.0197] [0.0082]
housetype3 House of temporary materials Binary 0.2237 0.2300 0.2039 0.2339
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Variable Description Type Household 
with work 
migrants 
Household 
without 
work 
migrants 
Household 
with non-
work 
migrants 
Household 
without 
non-work 
migrants 
  [0.0243] [0.0067] [0.0164] [0.0070]
    
anualand04 Continuous 0.5906 0.7631 0.7796 0.7462
 
Area of annual crop land per capita 
(thousand m2) [0.0444] [0.0243] [0.0568] [0.0249]
pereland04 Continuous 0.1899 0.2469 0.2675 0.2388
 
Area of perennial crop land per 
capita (thousand m2) [0.0405] [0.0211] [0.0462] [0.0218]
forland04 Continuous 0.3691 0.2323 0.3799 0.2186
 
Forestry land per capita (thousand 
m2) [0.1261] [0.0326] [0.1246] [0.0303]
aqualand04 Continuous 0.0309 0.0613 0.0727 0.0568
 
Aquaculture water surface per capita 
(thousand m2) [0.0138] [0.0079] [0.0241] [0.0077]
roadv04 Road to village (yes = 1) Binary 0.8780 0.9095 0.8980 0.9088
  [0.0191] [0.0046] [0.0123] [0.0048]
dmarket104 Continuous 2.2102 2.3387 2.1995 2.3517
 
Distance from village to nearest 
market (km) [0.2385] [0.0884] [0.2010] [0.0920]
region1 Household in Red River Delta Binary 0.2203 0.2056 0.1891 0.2095
  [0.0242] [0.0065] [0.0159] [0.0068]
region2 Household in North East Binary 0.1559 0.1469 0.1414 0.1486
  [0.0212] [0.0057] [0.0141] [0.0059]
region3 Household in North West Binary 0.0034 0.0487 0.0493 0.0449
  [0.0034] [0.0034] [0.0088] [0.0034]
region4 Household in North Central Coast Binary 0.2000 0.1109 0.0905 0.1217
  [0.0233] [0.0050] [0.0116 [0.0054]
region5 Household in South Central Coast Binary 0.0983 0.0951 0.0872 0.0967
  [0.0174] [0.0047] [0.0114] [0.0049]
region6 Household in Central Highlands Binary 0.0305 0.0640 0.0576 0.0624
  [0.0100] [0.0039] [0.0095] [0.0040]
region7 Household in North East South Binary 0.0508 0.1270 0.1645 0.1145
  [0.0128] [0.0053] [0.0150] [0.0053]
region8 Household in Mekong River Delta Binary 0.2407 0.2017 0.2204 0.2018
  [0.0249] [0.0064] [0.0168] [0.0067]
Urban04 Household in urban areas (yes = 1) Binary 0.1492 0.2400 0.2467 0.2314
  [0.0208] [0.0068] [0.0175] [0.0070]
 Number of observations 295 3921 608 3,608
Standard errors in brackets. Standard errors are corrected for sampling weights and cluster correlation. 
Source: Author’s estimation from VHLSS 2004 and 2006. 
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Table 7.9. Logit regressions of migration probability. 
 
Households with work 
migration (yes = 1) 
Households with non-work 
migration (yes = 1) 
Explanatory variables 
Model 1a Model 2a Model 1b Model 2b 
Households with work migration (yes = 1)   -0.4371** -0.4582** 
   [0.1980] [0.1960] 
Households with non-work migration (yes = 1) -0.5537*** -0.5435***   
 [0.2011] [0.2022]   
Per capita income (million VND) -0.0288 -0.0406* -0.0103  
 [0.0252] [0.0243] [0.0142]  
Receipt of international remittances  -0.6058* -0.6020* 0.1462  
 [0.3633] [0.3626] [0.2321]  
Receipt of internal remittances  0.4124* 0.4179* -0.23  
 [0.2177] [0.2152] [0.1441]  
0.6223** 0.5335** 0.0268  Household involved in agricultural activities (yes = 1) 
[0.2534] [0.2485] [0.1739]  
-0.0525  0.022  Ratio of members involved in agricultural production to 
total household members [0.3012]  [0.2706]  
0.126  -0.0184  Ratio of unskilled workers to total household members 
[0.3676]  [0.2977]  
Ethnic minorities (yes = 1)  -0.7113*** -0.6177*** -0.1073  
 [0.2749] [0.2336] [0.2000]  
Household size 0.3200*** 0.3053*** 0.5408*** 0.5376*** 
 [0.0457] [0.0431] [0.0442] [0.0414] 
-3.7832*** -3.7498*** -3.8269*** -3.8170*** Ratio of members younger than 16 to total household 
members [0.4598] [0.4328] [0.3466] [0.3241] 
-2.8967*** -2.9113*** -0.9504*** -0.9939*** Ratio of members older than 60 to total household 
members [0.5389] [0.5168] [0.3570] [0.3523] 
-1.3120*** -1.2700*** 1.1137*** 1.1032*** Ratio of female members to total household members 
[0.4052] [0.3927] [0.3004] [0.2907] 
Age of household head 0.0245*** 0.0257*** 0.0118* 0.0121** 
 [0.0073] [0.0066] [0.0063] [0.0060] 
-0.0664  -0.004  Gender of household head (male = 1, female = 0) 
[0.1951]  [0.1941]  
Head lives with spouse (yes = 1) -0.0746  -0.4128* -0.4218*** 
 [0.2450]  [0.2262] [0.1627] 
-0.3968 -0.5539** -0.1683  Head completed technical degree or post-secondary 
degrees  [0.2883] [0.2360] [0.2253]  
0.8121** 0.6959*** 0.0582  Head’s spouse completed technical degrees or post-
secondary degrees [0.3195] [0.2512] [0.2595]  
-0.5179  0.1513  Ratio of members with technical degrees to total 
household members [0.6802]  [0.5436]  
-0.4071  0.5876  Ratio of members with post-secondary degrees to 
total household members [0.8533]  [0.6973]  
House area per capita (m2) -0.0167* -0.0154* -0.0151** -0.0147** 
 [0.0096] [0.0092] [0.0072] [0.0067] 
House made of permanent materials Omitted    
     
House made of semi-permanent materials 0.0307  0.1172  
 [0.1905]  [0.1595]  
House of temporary materials 0.0578  0.068  
 [0.2559]  [0.1999]  
-0.2037** -0.1918** 0.0527  Area of annual crop land per capita (thousand m2) 
[0.0841] [0.0796] [0.0338]  
0.0095  0.0299  Area of perennial crop land per capita (thousand m2) 
[0.0429]  [0.0322]  
0.0583*** 0.0600*** 0.0328  Forestry land per capita (thousand m2) 
[0.0216] [0.0209] [0.0201]  
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Households with work 
migration (yes = 1) 
Households with non-work 
migration (yes = 1) 
Explanatory variables 
Model 1a Model 2a Model 1b Model 2b 
-0.4079  0.0675  Aquaculture water surface per capita (thousand m2) 
[0.2870]  [0.0992]  
Road to village (yes = 1) -0.0824  0.1445  
 [0.2416]  [0.1814]  
Distance from village to nearest market (km) 0.0138  -0.0091  
 [0.0193]  [0.0117]  
Household in Red River Delta Omitted    
     
Household in North East 0.2446  -0.0669  
 [0.2473]  [0.1892]  
Household in North West -2.7590* -2.7510** -0.2998  
 [1.4406] [1.3894] [0.2985]  
Household in North Central Coast 0.6327*** 0.5626*** -0.3865** -0.2929* 
 [0.2289] [0.1820] [0.1903] [0.1660] 
Household in South Central Coast 0.1375  -0.1572  
 [0.2562]  [0.1914]  
Household in Central Highlands -0.6128  -0.5495** -0.4662* 
 [0.4879]  [0.2720] [0.2457] 
Household in North East South -0.8441** -0.8861*** 0.0813  
 [0.3307] [0.3003] [0.1929]  
Household in Mekong River Delta 0.1286  -0.1342  
 [0.2384]  [0.1755]  
Household in urban areas -0.6107*** -0.6583*** -0.0583  
 [0.2254] [0.2184] [0.1482]  
Constant -3.6128*** -3.6164*** -3.9384*** -3.9728*** 
 [0.6452] [0.5062] [0.5325] [0.4179] 
Observations 4,216 4,216 4,216 4,216 
R-squared 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Robust standard errors in brackets. Standard errors are corrected for sampling weights and cluster correlation. 
Source: Author’s estimation from VHLSS 2004 and 2006. 
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Figure 7.2. Predicted propensity score of households with and without work migration 
(Model 2a). Source: Author’s estimation from VHLSS 2004 and 2006. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.3. Predicted propensity score of households with and without non-work migration 
(Model 2b). Source: Author’s estimation from VHLSS 2004 and 2006. 
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Table 7.10. Testing balance of the conditioning variables for households with work migrants: 
1 nearest neighbour matching (Model 2a). 
 
Variable Sample Treated Control % bias % bias 
reduction 
T-statistic P-value 
migration2 Unmatched 0.1593 0.1431 4.5  0.77 0.444 
 Matched 0.1593 0.1525 1.9 58.3 0.23 0.821 
dforemit04 Unmatched 0.0271 0.0607 -16.4  -2.37 0.018 
 Matched 0.0271 0.0271 0.0 100.0 0.00 1.000 
ddoremit04 Unmatched 0.8983 0.8452 15.9  2.46 0.014 
 Matched 0.8983 0.9288 -9.1 42.6 -1.32 0.188 
incomepc04 Unmatched 4,954.2 5,820.2 -19.1  -2.67 0.008 
 Matched 4,954.2 4,917.0 0.8 95.7 0.14 0.892 
living04 Unmatched 13.2 15.8 -27.0  -3.74 0.000 
 Matched 13.2 12.6 5.5 79.7 0.88 0.381 
dagri04 Unmatched 0.8780 0.7819 25.8  3.90 0.000 
 Matched 0.8780 0.9017 -6.4 75.3 -0.92 0.358 
ethnic04 Unmatched 0.0983 0.1597 -18.4  -2.81 0.005 
 Matched 0.0983 0.1017 -1.0 94.5 -0.14 0.891 
hhsize04 Unmatched 4.9797 4.3532 38.0  6.07 0.000 
 Matched 4.9797 5.0271 -2.9 92.4 -0.30 0.761 
pchild04 Unmatched 0.1577 0.2518 -47.6  -7.29 0.000 
 Matched 0.1577 0.1630 -2.7 94.3 -0.36 0.717 
pelderly04 Unmatched 0.0709 0.1247 -26.4  -3.63 0.000 
 Matched 0.0709 0.0831 -6.0 77.4 -0.92 0.356 
pfemale04 Unmatched 0.4582 0.5158 -30.5  -4.90 0.000 
 Matched 0.4582 0.4710 -6.8 77.7 -0.90 0.370 
agehead04 Unmatched 51.7 48.8 23.3  3.46 0.001 
 Matched 51.7 51.9 -1.6 93.2 -0.21 0.832 
hhedu04 Unmatched 0.1051 0.1421 -11.2  -1.77 0.077 
 Matched 0.1051 0.0780 8.2 26.6 1.14 0.254 
hsedu04 Unmatched 0.1017 0.0809 7.2  1.26 0.209 
 Matched 0.1017 0.0780 8.2 -13.8 1.01 0.314 
anualand04 Unmatched 0.5906 0.7631 -14.3  -1.93 0.054 
 Matched 0.5906 0.5036 7.2 49.6 1.55 0.122 
forland04 Unmatched 0.3691 0.2323 6.5  1.10 0.269 
 Matched 0.3691 0.2339 6.4 1.2 0.84 0.403 
region3 Unmatched 0.0034 0.0487 -28.7  -3.61 0.000 
 Matched 0.0034 0.0102 -4.3 85.0 -1.00 0.316 
region4 Unmatched 0.2000 0.1109 24.7  4.60 0.000 
 Matched 0.2000 0.2068 -1.9 92.4 -0.20 0.838 
region7 Unmatched 0.0509 0.1270 -27.0  -3.86 0.000 
 Matched 0.0509 0.0441 2.4 91.1 0.39 0.699 
urban0404 Unmatched 0.1492 0.2400 -23.1  -3.56 0.000 
 Matched 0.1492 0.1220 6.9 70.1 0.96 0.337 
Source: Author’s estimation from VHLSS 2004 and 2006. 
Chapter 7 
 Essays on impact evaluation: new empirical evidence from Vietnam 164 
Table 7.11. Testing balance of the conditioning variables for households with work migrants: 
5 nearest neighbours matching (Model 2a). 
 
Variable Sample Treated Control % bias % bias 
reduction 
T-statistic P-value 
migration2 Unmatched 0.1593 0.1431 4.5  0.77 0.444 
 Matched 0.1593 0.1742 -4.2 8.2 -0.48 0.628 
dforemit04 Unmatched 0.0271 0.0607 -16.4  -2.37 0.018 
 Matched 0.0271 0.0285 -0.7 96.0 -0.10 0.920 
ddoremit04 Unmatched 0.8983 0.8452 15.9  2.46 0.014 
 Matched 0.8983 0.9085 -3.0 80.9 -0.42 0.677 
incomepc04 Unmatched 4,954.2 5,820.2 -19.1  -2.67 0.008 
 Matched 4,954.2 4,993.5 -0.9 95.5 -0.14 0.885 
living04 Unmatched 13.2 15.8 -27.0  -3.74 0.000 
 Matched 13.2 12.8 4.0 85.3 0.66 0.510 
dagri04 Unmatched 0.8780 0.7819 25.8  3.90 0.000 
 Matched 0.8780 0.8922 -3.8 85.2 -0.54 0.589 
ethnic04 Unmatched 0.0983 0.1597 -18.4  -2.81 0.005 
 Matched 0.0983 0.1146 -4.9 73.5 -0.64 0.523 
hhsize04 Unmatched 4.9797 4.3532 38.0  6.07 0.000 
 Matched 4.9797 5.0102 -1.9 95.1 -0.21 0.837 
pchild04 Unmatched 0.1577 0.2518 -47.6  -7.29 0.000 
 Matched 0.1577 0.1545 1.6 96.7 0.21 0.830 
pelderly04 Unmatched 0.0709 0.1247 -26.4  -3.63 0.000 
 Matched 0.0709 0.0746 -1.8 93.1 -0.30 0.765 
pfemale04 Unmatched 0.4582 0.5158 -30.5  -4.90 0.000 
 Matched 0.4582 0.4559 1.2 96.0 0.16 0.873 
agehead04 Unmatched 51.7 48.8 23.3  3.46 0.001 
 Matched 51.7 51.9 -1.0 95.7 -0.14 0.888 
hhedu04 Unmatched 0.1051 0.1421 -11.2  -1.77 0.077 
 Matched 0.1051 0.0936 3.5 68.8 0.47 0.641 
hsedu04 Unmatched 0.1017 0.0809 7.2  1.26 0.209 
 Matched 0.1017 0.0983 1.2 83.7 0.14 0.891 
anualand04 Unmatched 0.5906 0.7631 -14.3  -1.93 0.054 
 Matched 0.5906 0.5890 0.1 99.1 0.02 0.981 
forland04 Unmatched 0.3691 0.2323 6.5  1.10 0.269 
 Matched 0.3691 0.4877 -5.6 13.2 -0.45 0.652 
region3 Unmatched 0.0034 0.0487 -28.7  -3.61 0.000 
 Matched 0.0034 0.0088 -3.4 88.0 -0.84 0.399 
region4 Unmatched 0.2000 0.1109 24.7  4.60 0.000 
 Matched 0.2000 0.1803 5.5 77.9 0.61 0.544 
region7 Unmatched 0.0509 0.1270 -27.0  -3.86 0.000 
 Matched 0.0509 0.0549 -1.4 94.7 -0.22 0.826 
urban0404 Unmatched 0.1492 0.2400 -23.1  -3.56 0.000 
 Matched 0.1492 0.1451 1.0 95.5 0.14 0.889 
Source: Author’s estimation from VHLSS 2004 and 2006. 
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Table 7.12. Testing balance of the conditioning variables for households with work migrants: 
kernel matching with bandwidth of 0.05 (Model 2a). 
 
Variable Sample Treated Control % bias % bias 
reduction 
T-statistic P-value 
migration2 Unmatched 0.1593 0.1431 4.5  0.77 0.444 
 Matched 0.1593 0.1612 -0.5 88.3 -0.06 0.950 
dforemit04 Unmatched 0.0271 0.0607 -16.4  -2.37 0.018 
 Matched 0.0271 0.0308 -1.8 89.2 -0.26 0.793 
ddoremit04 Unmatched 0.8983 0.8452 15.9  2.46 0.014 
 Matched 0.8983 0.8952 0.9 94.2 0.12 0.902 
incomepc04 Unmatched 4,954.2 5,820.2 -19.1  -2.67 0.008 
 Matched 4,954.2 5,007.5 -1.2 93.8 -0.19 0.851 
living04 Unmatched 13.2 15.8 -27.0  -3.74 0.000 
 Matched 13.2 13.5 -3.0 89.0 -0.46 0.645 
dagri04 Unmatched 0.8780 0.7819 25.8  3.90 0.000 
 Matched 0.8780 0.8862 -2.2 91.4 -0.31 0.757 
ethnic04 Unmatched 0.0983 0.1597 -18.4  -2.81 0.005 
 Matched 0.10 0.12 -5.1 72.3 -0.67 0.505 
hhsize04 Unmatched 4.9797 4.3532 38.0  6.07 0.000 
 Matched 4.9797 4.9483 1.9 95.0 0.22 0.828 
pchild04 Unmatched 0.1577 0.2518 -47.6  -7.29 0.000 
 Matched 0.1577 0.1670 -4.7 90.1 -0.62 0.534 
pelderly04 Unmatched 0.0709 0.1247 -26.4  -3.63 0.000 
 Matched 0.0709 0.0735 -1.3 95.2 -0.21 0.834 
pfemale04 Unmatched 0.4582 0.5158 -30.5  -4.90 0.000 
 Matched 0.4582 0.4654 -3.9 87.4 -0.50 0.620 
agehead04 Unmatched 51.7 48.8 23.3  3.46 0.001 
 Matched 51.7 51.3 3.5 85.1 0.47 0.641 
hhedu04 Unmatched 0.1051 0.1421 -11.2  -1.77 0.077 
 Matched 0.1051 0.1027 0.7 93.6 0.09 0.925 
hsedu04 Unmatched 0.1017 0.0809 7.2  1.26 0.209 
 Matched 0.1017 0.0933 2.9 59.7 0.34 0.732 
anualand04 Unmatched 0.5906 0.7631 -14.3  -1.93 0.054 
 Matched 0.5906 0.6324 -3.5 75.8 -0.60 0.550 
forland04 Unmatched 0.3691 0.2323 6.5  1.10 0.269 
 Matched 0.3691 0.3944 -1.2 81.5 -0.11 0.913 
region3 Unmatched 0.0034 0.0487 -28.7  -3.61 0.000 
 Matched 0.0034 0.0108 -4.7 83.7 -1.07 0.286 
region4 Unmatched 0.2000 0.1109 24.7  4.60 0.000 
 Matched 0.2000 0.1854 4.1 83.5 0.45 0.653 
region7 Unmatched 0.0509 0.1270 -27.0  -3.86 0.000 
 Matched 0.0509 0.0529 -0.7 97.3 -0.11 0.910 
urban0404 Unmatched 0.1492 0.2400 -23.1  -3.56 0.000 
 Matched 0.1492 0.1402 2.3 90.2 0.31 0.759 
Source: Author’s estimation from VHLSS 2004 and 2006. 
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Table 7.13. Testing balance of the conditioning variables for households with work migrants: 
local linear regression matching with bandwidth of 0.05 (Model 2a). 
 
Variable Sample Treated Control % bias % bias 
reduction 
T-statistic P-value 
migration2 Unmatched 0.1593 0.1431 4.5  0.77 0.444 
 Matched 0.1593 0.1525 1.9 58.3 0.23 0.821 
dforemit04 Unmatched 0.0271 0.0607 -16.4  -2.37 0.018 
 Matched 0.0271 0.0271 0.0 100.0 0.00 1.000 
ddoremit04 Unmatched 0.8983 0.8452 15.9  2.46 0.014 
 Matched 0.8983 0.9288 -9.1 42.6 -1.32 0.188 
incomepc04 Unmatched 4,954.2 5,820.2 -19.1  -2.67 0.008 
 Matched 4,954.2 4,917.0 0.8 95.7 0.14 0.892 
living04 Unmatched 13.2 15.8 -27.0  -3.74 0.000 
 Matched 13.2 12.6 5.5 79.7 0.88 0.381 
dagri04 Unmatched 0.8780 0.7819 25.8  3.90 0.000 
 Matched 0.8780 0.9017 -6.4 75.3 -0.92 0.358 
ethnic04 Unmatched 0.0983 0.1597 -18.4  -2.81 0.005 
 Matched 0.10 0.1017 -1.0 94.5 -0.14 0.891 
hhsize04 Unmatched 4.9797 4.3532 38.0  6.07 0.000 
 Matched 4.9797 5.0271 -2.9 92.4 -0.30 0.761 
pchild04 Unmatched 0.1577 0.2518 -47.6  -7.29 0.000 
 Matched 0.1577 0.1630 -2.7 94.3 -0.36 0.717 
pelderly04 Unmatched 0.0709 0.1247 -26.4  -3.63 0.000 
 Matched 0.0709 0.0831 -6.0 77.4 -0.92 0.356 
pfemale04 Unmatched 0.4582 0.5158 -30.5  -4.90 0.000 
 Matched 0.4582 0.4710 -6.8 77.7 -0.90 0.370 
agehead04 Unmatched 51.7 48.8 23.3  3.46 0.001 
 Matched 51.7 51.9 -1.6 93.2 -0.21 0.832 
hhedu04 Unmatched 0.1051 0.1421 -11.2  -1.77 0.077 
 Matched 0.1051 0.0780 8.2 26.6 1.14 0.254 
hsedu04 Unmatched 0.1017 0.0809 7.2  1.26 0.209 
 Matched 0.1017 0.0780 8.2 -13.8 1.01 0.314 
anualand04 Unmatched 0.5906 0.7631 -14.3  -1.93 0.054 
 Matched 0.5906 0.5036 7.2 49.6 1.55 0.122 
forland04 Unmatched 0.3691 0.2323 6.5  1.10 0.269 
 Matched 0.3691 0.2339 6.4 1.2 0.84 0.403 
region3 Unmatched 0.0034 0.0487 -28.7  -3.61 0.000 
 Matched 0.0034 0.0102 -4.3 85.0 -1.00 0.316 
region4 Unmatched 0.2000 0.1109 24.7  4.60 0.000 
 Matched 0.2000 0.2068 -1.9 92.4 -0.20 0.838 
region7 Unmatched 0.0509 0.1270 -27.0  -3.86 0.000 
 Matched 0.0509 0.0441 2.4 91.1 0.39 0.699 
urban0404 Unmatched 0.1492 0.2400 -23.1  -3.56 0.000 
 Matched 0.1492 0.1220 6.9 70.1 0.96 0.337 
Source: Author’s estimation from VHLSS 2004 and 2006. 
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Table 7.14. Testing balance of the conditioning variables for households with non-work 
migrants: 1 nearest neighbour matching (Model 2b). 
 
Variable Sample Treated Control % bias % bias 
reduction 
T-statistic P-value 
migration Unmatched 0.0773 0.0687 3.3  0.77 0.444 
 Matched 0.0773 0.0822 -1.9 42.4 -0.32 0.751 
hhsize04 Unmatched 5.5197 4.2079 72.2  18.10 0.000 
 Matched 5.5197 5.3553 9.1 87.5 1.44 0.150 
pchild04 Unmatched 0.1803 0.2561 -38.5  -8.10 0.000 
 Matched 0.1803 0.1565 12.0 68.7 2.40 0.017 
pelderly04 Unmatched 0.10 0.12 -11.8  -2.38 0.017 
 Matched 0.10 0.09 1.9 83.8 0.44 0.661 
pfemale04 Unmatched 0.53 0.51 10.9  2.37 0.018 
 Matched 0.5291 0.5275 0.8 92.4 0.15 0.882 
agehead04 Unmatched 53.0 48.4 35.3  7.66 0.000 
 Matched 53.0 53.1 -0.8 97.7 -0.15 0.880 
married04 Unmatched 0.7829 0.8176 -8.7  -2.03 0.042 
 Matched 0.7829 0.7944 -2.9 66.9 -0.49 0.623 
living04 Unmatched 13.0 16.0 -29.4  -5.95 0.000 
 Matched 13.0 13.8 -7.6 74.3 -1.62 0.106 
region4 Unmatched 0.0905 0.1217 -10.1  -2.21 0.027 
 Matched 0.0905 0.0872 1.1 89.5 0.20 0.840 
region6 Unmatched 0.0576 0.0624 -2.0  -0.45 0.649 
 Matched 0.0576 0.0395 7.6 -277.3 1.47 0.142 
Source: Author’s estimation from VHLSS 2004 and 2006. 
 
 
Table 7.15. Testing balance of the conditioning variables for households with non-work 
migrants: 5 nearest neighbour matching (Model 2b). 
 
Variable Sample Treated Control % bias % bias 
reduction 
T-statistic P-value 
migration Unmatched 0.0773 0.0687 3.3  0.77 0.444 
 Matched 0.0773 0.0799 -1.0 69.3 -0.17 0.865 
hhsize04 Unmatched 5.5197 4.2079 72.2  18.10 0.000 
 Matched 5.5197 5.4036 6.4 91.1 1.02 0.306 
pchild04 Unmatched 0.1803 0.2561 -38.5  -8.10 0.000 
 Matched 0.1803 0.1665 7.0 81.8 1.39 0.163 
pelderly04 Unmatched 0.0990 0.1247 -11.8  -2.38 0.017 
 Matched 0.0990 0.0962 1.3 89.2 0.29 0.769 
pfemale04 Unmatched 0.5291 0.5088 10.9  2.37 0.018 
 Matched 0.5291 0.5275 0.8 92.4 0.15 0.879 
agehead04 Unmatched 53.0 48.4 35.3  7.66 0.000 
 Matched 53.0 53.4 -3.3 90.7 -0.61 0.544 
married04 Unmatched 0.7829 0.8176 -8.7  -2.03 0.042 
 Matched 0.7829 0.7829 0.0 100.0 0.00 1.000 
living04 Unmatched 13.0 16.0 -29.4  -5.95 0.000 
 Matched 13.0 13.3 -3.1 89.3 -0.68 0.497 
region4 Unmatched 0.0905 0.1217 -10.1  -2.21 0.027 
 Matched 0.0905 0.0901 0.1 98.9 0.02 0.984 
region6 Unmatched 0.0576 0.0624 -2.0  -0.45 0.649 
 Matched 0.0576 0.0510 2.8 -37.2 0.51 0.613 
Source: Author’s estimation from VHLSS 2004 and 2006. 
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Table 7.16. Testing balance of the conditioning variables for households with non-work 
migrants: kernel matching with bandwidth of 0.05 (Model 2b). 
  
Variable Sample Treated Control % bias % bias 
reduction 
T-statistic P-value 
migration Unmatched 0.0773 0.0687 3.3  0.77 0.444 
 Matched 0.0773 0.0815 -1.6 51.6 -0.27 0.789 
hhsize04 Unmatched 5.5197 4.2079 72.2  18.10 0.000 
 Matched 5.5197 5.3886 7.2 90.0 1.14 0.254 
pchild04 Unmatched 0.1803 0.2561 -38.5  -8.10 0.000 
 Matched 0.1803 0.1753 2.5 93.4 0.50 0.620 
pelderly04 Unmatched 0.0990 0.1247 -11.8  -2.38 0.017 
 Matched 0.0990 0.0983 0.3 97.1 0.08 0.939 
pfemale04 Unmatched 0.5291 0.5088 10.9  2.37 0.018 
 Matched 0.5291 0.5319 -1.5 86.2 -0.27 0.784 
agehead04 Unmatched 53.0 48.4 35.3  7.66 0.000 
 Matched 53.0 53.1 -1.1 96.8 -0.21 0.834 
married04 Unmatched 0.7829 0.8176 -8.7  -2.03 0.042 
 Matched 0.7829 0.7759 1.7 80.0 0.29 0.770 
living04 Unmatched 13.0 16.0 -29.4  -5.95 0.000 
 Matched 13.0 13.3 -2.4 91.8 -0.53 0.599 
region4 Unmatched 0.0905 0.1217 -10.1  -2.21 0.027 
 Matched 0.0905 0.0866 1.3 87.6 0.24 0.812 
region6 Unmatched 0.0576 0.0624 -2.0  -0.45 0.649 
 Matched 0.0576 0.0515 2.5 -25.7 0.46 0.644 
Source: Author’s estimation from VHLSS 2004 and 2006. 
 
 
Table 7.17. Testing balance of the conditioning variables for households with non-work 
migrants: local linear regression with bandwidth of 0.05 (Model 2b). 
  
Variable Sample Treated Control % bias % bias 
reduction 
T-statistic P-value 
migration Unmatched 0.0773 0.0687 3.3  0.77 0.444 
 Matched 0.0773 0.0822 -1.9 42.4 -0.32 0.751 
hhsize04 Unmatched 5.5197 4.2079 72.2  18.10 0.000 
 Matched 5.5197 5.3553 9.1 87.5 1.44 0.150 
pchild04 Unmatched 0.1803 0.2561 -38.5  -8.10 0.000 
 Matched 0.1803 0.1565 12.0 68.7 2.40 0.017 
pelderly04 Unmatched 0.0990 0.1247 -11.8  -2.38 0.017 
 Matched 0.0990 0.0949 1.9 83.8 0.44 0.661 
pfemale04 Unmatched 0.5291 0.5088 10.9  2.37 0.018 
 Matched 0.5291 0.5275 0.8 92.4 0.15 0.882 
agehead04 Unmatched 53.0 48.4 35.3  7.66 0.000 
 Matched 53.0 53.1 -0.8 97.7 -0.15 0.880 
married04 Unmatched 0.7829 0.8176 -8.7  -2.03 0.042 
 Matched 0.7829 0.7944 -2.9 66.9 -0.49 0.623 
living04 Unmatched 13.0 16.0 -29.4  -5.95 0.000 
 Matched 13.0 13.8 -7.6 74.3 -1.62 0.106 
region4 Unmatched 0.0905 0.1217 -10.1  -2.21 0.027 
 Matched 0.0905 0.0872 1.1 89.5 0.20 0.840 
region6 Unmatched 0.0576 0.0624 -2.0  -0.45 0.649 
 Matched 0.0576 0.0395 7.6 -277.3 1.47 0.142 
Source: Author’s estimation from VHLSS 2004 and 2006. 
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Table 7.18. Impacts of work migration on household welfare in 2006. 
 
Impact of work migration 
(Propensity score estimated from 
Model 2)  
Impact of non-work migration 
(Propensity score estimated from 
Model 4)  
 
1 nearest 
neighbour 
matching 
5 nearest 
neighbours 
matching 
Local linear 
regression 
matching 
with 
bandwidth of 
0.05  
1 nearest 
neighbour 
matching 
5 nearest 
neighbours 
matching 
Local linear 
regression 
matching 
with 
bandwidth 
of 0.05  
1.0 0.2 -0.9 1.7 1.5 1.6Ratio of members engaged in 
productive activities to the total 
household members older than 14 
years old (%) 
[2.4] [1.9] [1.6] [1.9] [1.6] [1.4]
30.8 5.9 -8.4 46.1 43.2 47.4
Annual working hours per capita  
[53.1] [40.0] [31.7] [44.1] [34.5] [29.3]
92.1 41.2 27.3 115.1* 118.1** 121.5***Annual working hours per working 
member [76.9] [60.7] [49.4] [61.8] [48.0] [42.2]
548.3*** 344.5*** 340.6*** 388.4*** 387.8*** 390.8***
Per capita internal remittances 
[143.6] [108.4] [95.3] [110.5] [95.6] [85.5]
668.5* 721.7* 683.1* -38.9 -34.0 -23.6
Per capita international remittances 
[392.7] [380.9] [379.4] [186.2] [134.1] [100.7]
1,216.8*** 1,066.2*** 1,023.7*** 349.4* 353.7*** 367.1***Per capita remittances (both 
international and internal)  [426.5] [405.2] [401.1] [211.9] [160.0] [128.5]
1,136.0** 1,005.1** 885.2** 211.7 213.2 262.7Per capita income (household 
income divided by household size) [548.6] [476.5] [420.4] [395.8] [292.2] [246.8]
2756.4* 2569.8* 2746.1** 289.3 305.8 402.6Household income divided by the 
number of working members (above 
14 years old)  
[1,519.9] [1,439.3] [1,389.4] [898.0] [664.3] [558.8]
-342.6 -194.8 -153.1 -201.3 -176.0 -127.2Household income excluding 
remittances divided by the number 
of working members (above 14 
years old) 
[674.1] [483.3] [348.7] [698.6] [542.3] [479.7]
0.9 0.0 -0.2 -1.7 -1.6 -1.4Ratio of non-farm income to total 
income (%) [2.3] [1.8] [1.5] [1.6] [1.3] [1.1]
-6.0*** -7.0*** -6.8*** -3.3* -3.3** -3.0***Ratio of non-farm income (excluding 
remittances) to total income (%) [2.7] [2.2] [1.9] [1.7] [1.4] [1.2]
0.0415** 0.0218 0.0130 0.0062 0.0062 0.0062Simpson index 1 (all income 
sources) [0.0202] [0.0154] [0.0115] [0.0146] [0.0113] [0.0094]
-0.0139 -0.0166 -0.0282** -0.0174 -0.0171 -0.0177*Simpson index 2 (income sources 
excluding remittances) [0.0203] [0.0161] [0.0125] [0.0156] [0.0120] [0.0100]
257.0 259.9* 311.8** 511.1** 522.2*** 530.8***
Per capita consumption expenditure 
[220.0] [160.2] [116.4] [220.0] [173.3] [151.7]
878.9* 745.2* 573.4 -299.4 -309.0 -268.1Difference between impact on per 
capita income and impact on per 
capita expenditure [494.3] [439.6] [394.8] [335.7] [242.9] [194.9]
-80.8 -61.1 -138.5 -137.8 -140.6 -104.4Difference between impact on per 
capita income and impact on total 
remittances per capita  [359.3] [268.2] [188.7] [341.3] [262.4] [222.1]
Note: Because of limited space, this Table reports only the difference-in-differences estimates (similar to the figures in the last 
column of Table 3). For the observed outcomes of the treated group, see Table 3. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Standard errors in brackets. Standard errors are corrected for sampling weights and estimated using bootstrap (non-
parametric) with 500 replications. 
Source: Author’s estimation from VHLSS 2004 and 2006. 
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Table 7.19. Impacts of work migration on poverty and inequality in 2006. 
 
Impact of work migration 
(Propensity score estimated from Model 2)  
Impact of non-work migration 
(Propensity score estimated from Model 4)  
 
1 nearest 
neighbour 
matching 
5 nearest 
neighbours 
matching 
Local linear 
regression 
matching 
with 
bandwidth of 
0.05  
1 nearest 
neighbour 
matching 
5 nearest 
neighbours 
matching 
Local linear 
regression 
matching 
with 
bandwidth of 
0.05  
Poverty of households with migration 
P0 -0.0360 -0.0340 -0.0331 -0.0896** -0.0913*** -0.0931*** 
 [0.0408] [0.0311] [0.0247] [0.0433] [0.0357] [0.0323] 
P1 -0.0168 -0.0162* -0.0161** -0.0412** -0.0415** -0.0421** 
 [0.0147] [0.0085] [0.0074] [0.0215] [0.0173] [0.0152] 
P2 -0.0088 -0.0083* -0.0082* -0.0238** -0.0237** -0.0240** 
 [0.0085] [0.0045] [0.0044] [0.0143] [0.0113] [0.0100] 
All poverty 
P0 -0.0022 -0.0021 -0.0020 -0.0123** -0.0125*** -0.0128*** 
 [0.0025] [0.0019] [0.0015] [0.0060] [0.0049] [0.0044] 
P1 -0.0010 -0.0010* -0.0010** -0.0056* -0.0057** -0.0058** 
 [0.0009] [0.0006] [0.0004] [0.0030] [0.0024] [0.0021] 
P2 -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0033* -0.0033** -0.0033** 
 [0.0005] [0.0004] [0.0003] [0.0020] [0.0016] [0.0014] 
All inequality 
Gini -0.0013 -0.0013* -0.0013** -0.0045** -0.0046*** -0.0047*** 
 [0.0011] [0.0007] [0.0005] [0.0022] [0.0018] [0.0016] 
Theil L -0.0017 -0.0017* -0.0018** -0.0073* -0.0073** -0.0074*** 
 [0.0015] [0.0011] [0.0009] [0.0041] [0.0032] [0.0029] 
Theil T -0.0016 -0.0016* -0.0016** -0.0056** -0.0056** -0.0057*** 
 [0.0013] [0.0009] [0.0007] [0.0028] [0.0022] [0.0019] 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Standard errors in brackets. Standard errors are corrected for sampling weights and estimated using bootstrap (non-
parametric) with 500 replications. 
Source: Author’s estimation from VHLSS 2004 and 2006. 
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Appendix 7.2 Simpson index 
 
Simpson's diversity index (also known as Species diversity index) is an index which is often 
used to measure the biodiversity of a habitat in ecology. It takes into account the number of 
species present, as well as the relative abundance of each species. In economics, it can be 
widely used to measure the income diversification. It takes into account both the number of 
source and the relative amounts of sources. In this chapter, the Simpson index (SI) of income 
diversity is defined as: 
∑
=
−=
k
i
iRSI
1
21  (1) 
where Ri is the ratio of income from source i to the total income, and k is the number of all 
possible income sources. SI is calculated for all households in the sample data. SI varies 
between 0 and (1 – 1/k), and larger SI means more income diversification. SI will be equal to 
0 if there is only one source of income. On the contrary, SI will be highest at (1 – 1/k) if there 
are k equal sources of income. In this chapter, k is equal to 7, thus SI will be from 0 to 
0.857.43  
                                                 
43 Other diversity indexes can be Shannon-Weaver Index and Herfindahl index. Discussion and application can 
be found in several studies such as Barrett et al. (2000), Barrett and Reardon (2000), Joshi et al. (2003), Minot et 
al. (2006). 
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Chapter 8 Conclusions 
 
 
8.1 Research objective and questions 
 
Vietnam has committed itself to a ‘growth with equity’ strategy of development. The country 
has achieved high economic growth, with annual GDP growth rates of around 6 percent over 
the past 10 years. At the same time, poverty rates declined remarkably from 58 percent to 16 
percent between 1993 and 2006. The incidence of food poverty or ultra poverty decreased 
from 25 percent to 7 percent during that same period. Unlike other countries such as China, 
where high economic growth and fast poverty reduction are often associated with a high 
increase in inequality, Vietnam has achieved this remarkable decrease in poverty with only a 
slight increase in inequality. The Gini index based on expenditure per capita increased from 
0.33 in 1993 to 0.36 in 2006. 
In order to reduce poverty, the government of Vietnam has implemented an extensive 
public safety net with a large number of poverty alleviation programs. An important program 
of the public safety net is the micro-credit for the poor, which is run by the Vietnam Bank for 
Social Policies (VBSP). Public transfers to targeted households and people are also an 
important tool for poverty and inequality reduction. In addition to public programs, private 
flows such as informal credit, private transfers, remittances and migration are encouraging 
sources for income growth and poverty reduction. 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the objective of this study is to examine how well economic 
flows such as micro-credit, public and private transfers, international remittances and 
migration reach the poor and to measure the extent to which these factors affect household 
welfare, poverty and inequality in Vietnam. More specifically, the study focuses on four main 
empirical research questions: 
- How extensive is the access of the poor to governmental micro-credit and informal 
credit? And what is the impact of these credit sources on consumption expenditure, 
poverty and inequality? 
- How effectively do public transfers and domestic private transfers reach the poor? 
And to what extent do public and private transfers affect household consumption 
expenditure, poverty and inequality? 
- How extensive is the access of the poor to international remittances? And what is the 
impact of international remittances on household consumption expenditure, poverty 
and inequality? 
- What is the pattern of work and non-work migration of the poor? And what is the 
impact of work and non-work migration on household consumption expenditures, 
poverty and inequality? 
 
8.2 Main empirical findings 
 
The thesis is structured into eight chapters. Except for Chapters 1 and 8, which are the 
introduction and conclusion, respectively, the chapters are written as independent essays on 
impact evaluation. Chapter 2 reviews the most popular methods of quantitative impact 
evaluation, which are used to address the problem of program selection. Among the impact 
evaluation methods, the matching method receives special attention and has been increasingly 
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used in recent years. The traditional literature often deals with the impact evaluation of a 
single program. However, in reality people can participate in several programs 
simultaneously. Thus, Chapter 3 contributes to the literature on program impact evaluation by 
discussing the impact evaluation of multiple programs using regression and matching 
methods. 
The research questions on poverty targeting and the impacts of different economic flows 
including governmental credit (operated by Vietnam Bank for Social Policies (VBSP)), 
informal credit, public and private transfers, international remittances, work and non-work 
migration on poverty and inequality in Vietnam are addressed in Chapters 4 through 7. 
Poverty is measured by three Foster-Greer-Thorbecke poverty indexes, while inequality is 
measured by the Gini coefficient, Theil’s L and Theil’s T indexes. Per capita expenditure is 
used as a welfare indicator for calculation of poverty and inequality measures. Data used in 
this study come from Vietnam Household Living Standard Surveys (VHLSS) in 2004 and 
2006, which are the most recent nationally representative household surveys. 
Regarding the methodology, the study uses fixed-effect regressions to estimate the 
average effect of credit, transfers and remittances on work effort, income and expenditures of 
receiving households. The estimation of the impact of credit, transfers and remittances on 
expenditure poverty and inequality is carried out in several steps. Firstly, we estimate the 
impact of a program (or an economic flow) on expenditure (using fixed-effect regressions) 
and construct the counterfactual expenditure in the absence of the flow. Secondly, we estimate 
a poverty measure or an inequality measure in the state of no-program using this 
counterfactual expenditure. Thirdly, we assess the impact of the program on the poverty or 
inequality measure by calculating the difference in the poverty or inequality measure in the 
presence of the program and the counterfactual poverty or inequality measure in the absence 
of the program. For migration, which – contrary to the other flows – is defined as a binary 
variable, we apply difference-in-differences with propensity score matching method instead of 
fixed-effects regression and otherwise follow the same procedure. 
Chapter 4 shows that the impact of governmental credit provided by VBSP on 
consumption expenditure and poverty is limited. Although VBSP credit is a micro-credit 
program which is targeted at the poor, the poor receive less VBSP credit than the non-poor. 
Less than 30 percent of VBSP loans end up in the hands of the poor, which means that up to 
70 percent of VBSP loans are obtained by the non-poor. The VBSP program covers only 15 
percent of the poor, while informal credit reaches 21 percent of the poor. Not surprisingly, we 
therefore find that informal credit is more effective in decreasing poverty: it reduces the 
poverty incidence of borrowers by 1.4 percentage points from 21.1 percent to 19.7 percent. 
However, the effect of formal credit on total poverty is extremely small and not statistically 
significant. Regarding VBSP credit, evidence of its effect on poverty is not found. It is 
possible that the effects of VBSP credit may only be measurable over a longer time period, 
despite the short-term nature of the loans. 
Chapter 5 analyzes the poverty targeting and impacts of public and private transfers. It 
is found that public transfers do not reach the poor well. Only 14 percent of the poor receive 
public transfers, while 19 percent of the non-poor obtain these public transfers. In addition, 
the non-poor receive much higher amounts of transfers per recipient household. Since the 
non-poor account for a large proportion of the population, they receive around 97 percent of 
all public transfers. It should be noted that public transfers defined in this study are not 
limited to transfers provided for the poor. Public transfers can include contribution-based 
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transfers, e.g. pensions, which reach more non-poor than poor people. Although public 
transfers increase current income of the recipients substantially, they increase current the 
recipients’ expenditures only slightly. As a result, the impact of public transfers on poverty is 
negligible due to low coverage of poor and relatively low amounts transferred to the poor. 
Domestic private transfers are much more successful in reducing poverty. They reduce 
the poverty rate of the receiving households by 2.1 percentage points from 17.8 percent to 
15.7 percent. In addition, private transfers also reduce the incidence of total poverty by 1.8 
percentage points from 17.8 percent to 16 percent. Decreases in the depth and severity of 
poverty due to private domestic transfers are quite substantial. This is because around 88 
percent of the poor receive private transfers, and private transfers have a high impact on 
current expenditures. 
Chapter 6 shows that international remittances have a smaller effect on poverty 
reduction. Yet, international remittances lead to a substantial increase in income and also an 
increase in consumption. Thus, the main reason for the negligible effect on current 
expenditure poverty is that in Vietnam mainly the non-poor are remittance recipients. Less 
than 2 percent of the poor receive international remittances. Moreover, it appears that the 
direct impact of international remittances on per capita consumption is small since a 
substantial part of international remittances is saved and invested. 
In Chapter 7, we show that both work migration and non-work migration have a 
positive and significant impact on per capita consumption expenditure of migrant-sending 
households. Increased expenditure due to migration, both work and non-work, leads to a 
reduction in poverty. It is interesting that non-work migration is more successful in reducing 
poverty than work migration, because non-work migration covers a larger proportion of the 
poor and leads to a higher increase in consumption expenditure than the work-migration. 
Non-work migration reduces the poverty rate of migrant-sending households by 8.9 
percentage points from 21.7 percent to 12.8 percent. Non-work migration reduces the 
incidence of total poverty by 1.1 percentage points from 17.1 percent to 16 percent. 
In this study, the empirical findings on the impact of the economic flows on expenditure 
inequality are mixed. Both VBSP credit and informal credit have a very small and not 
statistically significant impact on inequality. It is unexpected that public transfers and 
international remittances increase inequality slightly. Conversely, domestic private transfers 
and migration lead to a decrease in inequality. 
In short, a flow will have a large impact on poverty and inequality reduction if it covers 
a large proportion of the poor and has a positive impact on consumption expenditure. In this 
study, the private flows including informal credit, private domestic transfers and migration are 
found to lead to a reduction in expenditure poverty. In addition, private domestic transfers and 
migration reduce inequality. Meanwhile, two public policies on micro-credit and income 
transfers, which are investigated in this study, do not have the expected effects on poverty and 
inequality. International remittances are not successful in reducing poverty and inequality 
either. However, we must keep in mind that this study focuses on an evaluation of the short-
run impacts. Credit and transfers can be saved or invested and may thus lead to future 
increases in income and consumption, which is outside the scope of this study. 
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8.3 Policy implications 
 
It seems that governmental micro-credit and public transfers are not a strong policy tool to 
reduce poverty and inequality in the short term. One reason for their low impact on poverty is 
the low coverage of the poor. In addition, these programs covered a large proportion of the 
non-poor. Thus, better poverty targeting can increase the effect of the programs on poverty 
reduction. Improving program targeting requires more accurate classification of household 
poverty, and more efficient program administration. Disaggregated measures of poverty such 
as poverty maps at the commune and district levels can be an important tool for the poverty 
targeting. A recent study by Elbers et al. (2007) shows that the impact of budget transferring 
on poverty is greater when geographic targeting units are smaller such as districts and 
villages. These findings are also mentioned in other studies, e.g. Baker and Grosh (1994), 
Bigman and Fofack (2000). 
Similarly, international remittances may have positive economic effects, such as 
enhancing production and investment, especially in the longer run, but are certainly not a 
panacea for poverty reduction in the short term. To reduce poverty and inequality in the short 
run, the government of Vietnam would be better to rely on income distribution and poverty 
reduction programs which are targeted at the poor more directly. 
Our results imply that the private flows informal credit, domestic private transfers and 
migration are more effective in poverty and inequality reduction than public flows. Informal 
credit is a more likely candidate for poverty reduction in the short-run than government 
subsidized credit: it already reaches more poor people, provides them with more money, and, 
contrary to VBSP credit, increases their expenditure. While not directly under public control, 
financial intermediation through informal lenders is not immune to public policies. 
Governments can facilitate intermediation by providing an important basic infrastructure, 
such as a system of laws and courts to support the creation and enforcement of property rights 
and contracts, credit bureaus to publicize information, and prudential regulation of financial 
institutions (Conning and Udry, 2005). In addition, the government should have measures to 
facilitate money transfers between relatives and friends. 
Work and non-work migration are important ways to reduce poverty and inequality. 
Migration leads to increased private transfers and remittances. There are several measures and 
policies to increase migration. Improvement of transportation and roads can promote not only 
local markets but also the probability of migration from rural to urban areas. Vocational 
training programs can provide rural people with production and business skills, and make 
them more likely to find employment in urban areas. The government can support migrants 
with social security programs and protective policies for the migrants in the destination areas. 
 
8.4 Limitations and research outlook 
 
This study has several limitations, and further research can be conducted to overcome these. 
Firstly, we use fixed-effect regression and difference-in-differences with matching to estimate 
the impact of credit, transfers, remittances and migration on household expenditures, and 
subsequently assess their impact on poverty and inequality. In doing so, we intend to 
eliminate the potential bias caused by differences between participants and non-participants in 
the various flows. Fixed-effects regression only eliminates endogeneity bias caused by 
unobserved variables that remained unchanged between survey rounds and that have an 
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additive effect on the outcome. We feel that it is reasonable to assume that the relevant 
household-level variables, such as business and production skills or motivation for higher 
income and expenditure consumption, were time-invariant during the two periods covered in 
this study. Fixed-effect regressions will, however, fail to eliminate all endogeneity bias if the 
unobserved variables which affect expenditures (outcome) and the flows are not time-
invariant. It is expected that the estimation bias resulting from these factors is small relative to 
the bias eliminated by using fixed-effects regression. Yet the availability of valid instrumental 
variables could improve the accuracy of impact estimates. However, finding good 
instrumental variables is not an easy task. 
Secondly, the study focuses on the short-term impacts of programs. It is possible that 
credit, cash transfers, and remittances are invested in productive assets. For example, various 
empirical studies show that international remittances are used to buy land and houses and are 
invested in financial assets and microenterprises (Adams, 1991, 1996; Dustmann and 
Kirchkamp, 2002; Woodruff and Zenteno, 2004; Osili, 2007). Cash transfers are also found to 
have positive impacts on saving and production (Gertler et al., 2006; Soares et al., 2008). If 
credit, cash transfers and remittances are used in production, it is difficult to detect a 
significant impact on current income and expenditure in the short term. In this study, we do 
not estimate the impacts of credit, cash transfers, and remittances on production and assets, 
since we focus on the impacts on expenditure poverty and inequality. 
Thirdly, it should be noted that our estimates only show direct effects. The estimates do 
not allow for spill-over effects. If credit, transfers and remittances are used productively, 
indirect effects on the poor may be particularly dramatic. For example, credit, transfers and 
remittances can be used to finance micro-enterprises, thereby generating employment for the 
poor. Estimation of the spill-over effects is difficult using household surveys. Alternative 
methods such as computable general equilibrium (CGE) models could be used. 
Fourthly, we must keep in mind that our poverty and inequality estimates do not cover 
all effects of transfers on welfare. For example, it is found that remittances and public 
transfers result in a decrease in work effort and thus an increase in leisure, which – like 
consumptive expenditures – adds to current welfare, but is not accounted for in our poverty 
calculations. 
Finally, like many countries in the world Vietnam has experienced an economic 
slowdown since 2008. The empirical findings from this study, which are based on data from 
before the economic slowdown, might not be valid in the context of a stagnating economy. 
The economic crisis may have caused a structural break in the economy. Capital flows such as 
transfers and remittances may have decreased or reach different people, and behaviours of the 
beneficiaries (recipients of programs) may also have changed. When new data become 
available, these issues can be addressed.  
Estimating the long-run effect, indirect and spill-over effects, using different welfare 
indicators, and investigating how economic crisis can change the effects of credit, transfers, 
remittances and migration are beyond the scope of the study, but certainly important for future 
research. 
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Summary 
 
 
Vietnam is often mentioned as an example of a country successful in poverty reduction. 
According to the Vietnam Household Living Standard Surveys, the poverty incidence fell 
from 58 percent in 1993 to 29 percent in 2002, and continued to decrease to 16 percent in 
2006.44 In order to reduce poverty, the government of Vietnam has implemented an extensive 
public safety net with a large number of poverty alleviation programs. An important program 
within the public safety net is micro-credit for the poor, which is run by the Vietnam Bank for 
Social Policies (VBSP). Public transfers to targeted households and people are also an 
important tool for poverty and inequality reduction. In addition to public programs, private 
flows such as informal credit, private transfers, remittances and migration are encouraging 
sources of income growth and poverty reduction. 
The main objective of this study is to examine how well economic flows including 
micro-credit, public and private transfers, international remittances and migration reach the 
poor and to measure the extent to which these economic flows affect household welfare, 
poverty and inequality in Vietnam. This study uses data from the two most recent Vietnam 
Household and Living Standard Surveys (VHLSS) of 2004 and 2006 to estimate the impact of 
different economic factors. 
The present thesis is structured into eight chapters. Except Chapters 1 and 8 (the 
chapters on introduction and conclusions, respectively), the main contents of Chapters 2 
through 7 are written as separate essays on impact evaluation. Chapter 2 reviews several 
popular methods of impact evaluation, which are used to address the problem of program 
selection in impact estimation. In addition to a randomization-based method, the impact 
evaluation methods are categorized into methods assuming ‘selection on observables’ and 
methods assuming ‘selection on unobservables’. Two popular indicators of program impacts 
discussed in this chapter are the Average Treatment Effect (ATE) and the Average Treatment 
Effect on Treated (ATT). The chapter discusses how different impact evaluation methods 
measure ATE and ATT under various identification assumptions. These assumptions are 
presented in a unified framework of a counterfactual and a two equation model. 
Among the impact evaluation methods, the matching method receives special attention 
and has been increasingly used in recent years. Under the assumption about conditional 
independence between potential outcomes and program assignment, program impacts 
measured by ATE and ATT can be identified and estimated using cross-section regression or 
propensity score matching (PSM). Traditional impact literature often deals with the impact 
evaluation of a single program. In reality, one can participate in several programs 
simultaneously and the programs may be correlated. Thus, Chapter 3 contributes to the 
literature on program impact evaluation by discussing cross-section regression and PSM 
methods in this general context. It is shown that under the PSM method, the impact of a 
program of interest can be measured as a weighted average of program impacts on groups 
with different program statuses. Estimation of impacts of multiple overlapping programs is 
illustrated using Monte Carlo simulation. 
                                                 
44 The poverty line is equivalent to the expenditure level that allows for nutritional needs with food consumption 
securing 2100 calories per day per person and some essential non-food consumption such as clothing and 
housing. This poverty line is estimated by General Statistics Office of Vietnam and World Bank in Vietnam. 
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It should be noted that Chapters 2 and 3 do not address the main research questions of 
the study on the impacts of credit, transfers, remittances and migration on poverty and 
inequality. These chapters are independent essays which present the literature on program 
impact evaluation. 
The research questions on poverty targeting and the impacts of different economic flows 
including governmental credit, informal credit, public and private transfers, international 
remittances, work and non-work migration on poverty and inequality in Vietnam are 
addressed in Chapters 4 through 7. Poverty is measured by three Foster-Greer-Thorbecke 
poverty indexes, while inequality is measured by the Gini coefficient, Theil’s L and Theil’s T 
indexes. Per capita expenditure is used as a welfare indicator for calculation of poverty and 
inequality measures. 
Regarding the methodology of impact evaluation, the study uses fixed-effect regressions 
to estimate the average effect of credit, transfers and remittances on work effort, income and 
expenditures of receiving households. The estimation of the impact of credit, transfers and 
remittances on expenditure poverty and inequality is carried out in several steps. Firstly, we 
estimate the impact on expenditure (using fixed-effect regressions) and construct the 
counterfactual expenditure in the absence of the flow. Secondly, we estimate a poverty 
measure or an inequality measure in the state of no-program using this counterfactual 
expenditure. Thirdly, we assess the impact of the program on the poverty or inequality 
measure by calculating the difference in the poverty or inequality measure in the presence of 
the program and the counterfactual poverty or inequality measure in the absence of the 
program. For migration, which – contrary to the other flows – is defined as a binary variable, 
we apply difference-in-differences with propensity score matching method to instead of fixed-
effects regression and otherwise follow the same procedure. 
Chapter 4 shows that the impact of governmental credit provided by VBSP on 
consumption, expenditure and poverty is limited. Although VBSP credit is a micro-credit 
program which is targeted at the poor, the poor receive less VBSP credit than the non-poor. 
Less than 30 percent of VBSP loans end up in the hands of the poor, which means that up to 
70 percent of VBSP loans are obtained by the non-poor. The VBSP program covers only 15 
percent of the poor, while informal credit reaches 21 percent of the poor. Not surprisingly, we 
therefore find that informal credit is more effective in decreasing poverty: it reduces the 
poverty incidence of borrowers by 1.4 percentage points from 21.1 percent to 19.7 percent. 
However, the effect of the informal credit on total poverty is extremely small and not 
statistically significant. Regarding VBSP credit, evidence of its effect on poverty is not found. 
It is possible that the effects of VBSP credit may only be measurable over a longer time 
period, despite the short-term nature of the loans. 
Chapter 5 analyzes the poverty targeting and impacts of public and private transfers. It 
is found that public transfers are ineffective at reaching the poor. Only 14 percent of the poor 
receive public transfers, while 19 percent of the non-poor obtain these public transfers. In 
addition, the non-poor receive much higher amounts of transfers per receiving households. 
Since the non-poor account for a large proportion of population, they receive around 97 
percent of all public transfers. It should be noted that public transfers defined in this study are 
not limited to transfers provided for the poor. Public transfers can include contribution-based 
transfers, e.g. pensions, which reach more non-poor than poor people. Although public 
transfers increase the current income of the recipients substantially, they increase the 
recipients’ current expenditures only slightly. As a result, the impact of public transfers on 
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poverty is negligible due to low coverage of the poor and relatively low amounts transferred 
to the poor. 
Domestic private transfers are much more successful in reducing poverty. They 
decrease the poverty rate of the receiving households by 2.1 percentage points from 17.8 
percent to 15.7 percent. In addition, private transfers also reduce the incidence of total poverty 
by 1.8 percentage points from 17.8 percent to 16 percent. Decreases in the depth and severity 
of poverty due to private domestic transfers are quite substantial. This is because there are 
around 88 percent of the poor receiving private transfers, and private transfers have a high 
impact on current expenditures. 
Chapter 6 shows that international remittances have a lesser effect on poverty reduction. 
Yet, international remittances lead to a substantial increase in income and also an increase in 
consumption. Thus, the main reason for the negligible effect on current expenditure poverty is 
that in Vietnam the non-poor are the main remittance recipients. Less than 2 percent of the 
poor receive international remittances. Moreover, it appears that the direct impact of 
international remittances on per capita consumption is small since a substantial part of 
international remittances is being saved and invested. 
In Chapter 7, we show that both work migration and non-work migration have a 
positive and significant impact on per capita consumption expenditure of migrant-sending 
households. Increased expenditures due to migration, both work and non-work, lead to 
reduction in poverty. It is interesting that non-work migration is more successful in reducing 
poverty than work migration, because non-work migration covers a larger proportion of the 
poor and leads to a higher increase in consumption expenditure than the work-migration. 
Non-work migration decreases the poverty rate of migrant-sending households by 8.9 
percentage points from 21.7 percent to 12.8 percent. Non-work migration reduces the 
incidence of total poverty by 1.1 percentage points from 17.1 percent to 16 percent. 
In this study, the empirical findings on the impact of the economic flows on expenditure 
inequality are mixed. Both VBSP credit and informal credit have a very small and not 
statistically significant impact on inequality. It is unexpected that public transfers and 
international remittances increase inequality slightly. In contrast, domestic private transfers 
and migration lead to a decrease in inequality. 
Chapter 8 presents the main empirical findings on the research questions which are 
posed by this study. It also proposes some policy implications which are based on the main 
empirical findings of the study. Finally, a discussion on the limitations of the study and the 
outlook for future research completes the study. 
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Samenvatting 
 
Vietnam wordt vaak genoemd als voorbeeld van een land dat succesvol is geweest in de strijd 
tegen armoede. Volgens de Vietnamese huishoud-levensstandaardenquête (LSMS) is het 
percentage armen gedaald van 58 in 1993 tot 29 in 2002 en vervolgens tot 16 procent in 
2006.45 Om de armoede te verminderen heeft de Vietnamese overheid een uitgebreid stelsel 
van sociale zekerheid doorgevoerd met een groot aantal armoedebestrijdingsprogramma’s. 
Een belangrijk programma binnen dit stelsel is microkrediet voor de armen, dat beheerd wordt 
door de Vietnamese Bank voor Sociaal Beleid (VBSP). Publieke overdrachten aan 
geselecteerde huishoudens en personen zijn ook een belangrijk middel om armoede en 
ongelijkheid te verminderen. 
Het belangrijkste doel van deze studie is om te analyseren hoe goed economische 
stromen zoals microkrediet, publieke en private overdrachten, internationale overschrijvingen 
en migratie de armen bereiken en om te meten in hoeverre deze stromen het welzijn van 
huishoudens, armoede en ongelijkheid in Vietnam beïnvloeden. Deze studie maakt gebruik 
van data van de twee meest recente VHLSS van 2004 en 2006 om het effect van verschillende 
economische factoren te bepalen. 
Het proefschrift is verdeeld in acht hoofdstukken. Behalve hoofdstuk 1 en 8 (het 
introductie- en conclusiehoofdstuk) zijn de hoofdstukken geschreven als afzonderlijke essays 
over effectmeting. Hoofdstuk 2 behandelt een aantal populaire effectbepalingsmethodes, die 
gebruikt worden om het probleem van programmaselectie bij effectschattingen op te lossen. 
De evaluatie methodes zijn geclassificeerd als methodes gebaseerd op randomizering, 
methodes uitgaande van selectie op basis van geobserveerde variabelen en methodes 
uitgaande van selectie op basis van niet-geobserveerde variabelen. Twee populaire 
effectsindicatoren die in dit hoofdstuk besproken worden zijn: het gemiddelde 
behandelingseffect (ATE) en het gemiddelde behandelingseffect voor de behandelden (ATT) 
In het hoofdstuk wordt besproken hoe verschillende effectbepalingsmethoden ATE en ATT 
meten bij verschillende aannames over indentificatie. Deze aannames worden gepresenteerd 
in een uniform stramien van een hypothetisch alternatief zonder programma en een model met 
twee vergelijkingen. 
De steeds populairder wordende matching methodes krijgen speciale aandacht. Onder 
de aanname van conditionele onafhankelijkheid tussen potentiële uitkomsten en 
programmatoewijzing kunnen de programma-effecten gemeten door ATE en ATT worden 
geïdentificeerd en geschat door middel van cross-sectie regressie of ‘propsensity score 
matching’ (PSM). De traditionele effectliteratuur behandelt meestal de effectmeting van een 
individueel progamma. In werkelijkheid kan iemand tegelijkertijd deelnemen aan 
verschillende programma’s en die programma’s kunnen met elkaar gecorreleerd zijn. 
Hoofdstuk 3 draagt bij aan de literatuur over effectbepaling door cross-sectie regressie en 
PSM methodes in deze algemene context te bediscussiëren. Het laat zien dat bij de PSM 
methode het effect van het programma gemeten kan worden als gewogen gemiddelde van de 
programma-effecten van groepen met verschillende programmastatussen. Het schatten van het 
effect van verscheidene overlappende programma’s wordt geïllustreerd met Monte Carlo 
simulaties. 
                                                 
45 De armoedegrens is gelijk aan het uitgavenniveau dat een voedselconsumptie van 2100 calorieën per persoon 
per dag en wat essentiële niet-voedselconsumptie, zoals kleding en huisvesting, mogelijk maakt. 
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Hoofdstukken 1 en 2 behandelen niet de hoofdvragen van het onderzoek naar de 
effecten van krediet, overdrachten, overschrijvingen en migratie op armoede en ongelijkheid. 
Deze hoofdstukken zijn onafhankelijke essays die de literatuur over effectevaluatie bespreken. 
De onderzoeksvragen over het bereiken van de armen en het effect van verschillende 
economische stromen zoals overheidskrediet, informeel krediet, publieke en private 
overdrachten, en internationale overschrijvingen, arbeids- en overige migratie op armoede en 
ongelijkheid in Vietnam worden behandeld in Hoofdstukken 4 tot en met 7. Armoede wordt 
gemeten door drie Foster-Greer-Thorbecke armoede-indices, terwijl ongelijkheid wordt 
gemeten door de Gini coefficient, Theil’s L en Theil’s T indices. Uitgaven per hoofd wordt 
gebruikt als een welzijnsindicator voor het berekenen van armoede- en ongelijkheidsmaten. 
Als methodologie gebruikt de studie fixed-effect regressies om het gemiddelde effect te 
meten van krediet, overdrachten en overschrijvingen op arbeidsinspanning, inkomen en 
uitgaven van ontvangende huishoudens. Het schatten van het effect van deze stromen op 
armoede en ongelijkheid is in verschillende stappen gedaan. Ten eerste schatten we het effect 
op uitgaven (door fixed-effect regressies) en bepalen de hypothetische alternatieve uitgaven in 
afwezigheid van de stroom. Ten tweede schatten we een armoedemaat of ongelijkheidsmaat 
voor de hypothetische situatie zonder programma, gebruik makend van dit hypothetische 
alternatief. Ten derde bepalen we het effect van het programma op de armoede- of 
ongelijkheidsmaat door het verschil te berekenen tussen de werkelijke maatstaf met en de 
hypothetische maatstaf zonder programma. In het geval van migratie, die in tegenstelling tot 
de andere stromen gedefinieerd is als een binaire variabele, gebruiken we verschil-in-verschil 
metingen met propensity score matching in plaats van fixed-effect regressie. Verder volgen 
we dezelfde procedure. 
Hoofdstuk 4 laat zien dat het effect van overheidskrediet door VBSP op consumptie, 
uitgaven en armoede beperkt is. Hoewel VBSP een microfinancieringsprogramma is gericht 
op de armen, ontvangen de armen minder VBSP krediet dan de niet-armen. Minder dan 30 
procent van de VBSP leningen bereikt de armen, wat betekent dat meer dan 70 procent van de 
VBSP leningen terechtkomen bij de niet-armen. Het VBSP programma bereikt slechts 15 
procent van de armen, terwijl 21 procent van de armen informeel krediet krijgt. Het is daarom 
niet verassend dat we vinden dat informeel krediet effectiever is voor armoedebestrijding: het 
vermindert het voorkomen van armoede onder leners met 1.4 procentpunten van 21.1 procent 
tot 19.7 procent. Het effect van informeel krediet op de totale armoede is echter 
verwaarloosbaar. We hebben geen effect gevonden van VBSP krediet op armoede. Het is 
mogelijk dat die effecten alleen meetbaar zijn over een langere periode, ondanks dat het om 
kortetermijnleningen gaat. 
In hoofdstuk 5 wordt geanalyseerd in hoeverre publieke en private overdrachten de 
armen bereiken en wat de effecten van deze overdrachten zijn. We vinden dat publieke 
overdrachten de armen niet effectief bereiken. Slechts 14 procent van de armen ten opzichte 
van 19 procent van de niet armen ontvangt publieke transfers. Bovendien ontvangen de niet-
armen veel hogere bedragen per ontvangend huishouden. Omdat de niet-armen een veel groter 
deel van de bevolking vormen, ontvangen zij ongeveer 97 procent van alle publieke 
overdrachten. De publieke overdrachten zoals gebruikt in deze studie omvatten overigens niet 
alleen overdrachten gericht op de armen. Ze behelzen ook overdrachten waarvoor contributie 
vereist is, zoals pensioenen, die meer niet armen dan armen bereiken. Hoewel publieke 
overdrachten het inkomen van de ontvangers substantieel verhogen, hebben ze slechts een 
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klein effect of de uitgaven. Hierdoor en door het geringe aantal armen dat deze overdrachten 
ontvangt, is het effect op armoede verwaarloosbaar. 
Binnenlandse private transfers hebben veel meer effect op armoede. Ze verlagen het 
percentage armen onder ontvangende huishoudens met 2.1 procentpunt van 17.8 tot 15.7 
procent. Bovendien nemen de diepte en hevigheid van armoede nemen sterk af door private 
overdrachten. Dit komt doordat ongeveer 88 procent van de armen private overdrachten 
ontvangen en doordat private overdrachten een sterk effect hebben op bestedingen. 
Hoofdstuk 6 laat zien dat internationale overschrijvingen een veel minder sterk effect 
hebben op armoede. Ze leiden echter wel tot een substantiële verhoging van het inkomen en 
in mindere mate de consumptie. De belangrijkste reden voor het verwaarloosbare effect van 
internationale overschrijvingen op armoede is dan ook dat in Vietnam vooral de niet-armen 
overschrijvingen ontvangen. Minder dan 2 procent van de armen ontvangt internationale 
overschrijvingen. Het effect van internationale overschrijvingen op consumptie blijkt 
bovendien klein te zijn doordat een groot deel wordt gespaard of geïnvesteerd. 
In hoofdstuk 7 laten we zien dat zowel arbeidsmigratie als overige migratie een positief 
en significant effect heeft op de consumptiebestedingen per hoofd van de migrantensturende 
huishoudens. Een toename in uitgave als gevolg van beide typen migratie leidt tot een afname 
van armoede. Interessant genoeg is dit effect het grootst voor niet-werkgerelateerde migratie. 
Het armoedepercentage van migrantensturende huishoudens neemt door dit type migratie met 
8.9 procentpunten af van 21.7 procent to 12.8 procent and het totale percentage armen met 1.1 
procentpunten van 17.1 procent to 16 procent. 
De empirische bevindingen van deze studie over het effect van economische stromen op 
uitgavenongelijkheid zijn gemengd. Zowel VBSP krediet als informeel krediet heeft een zeel 
klein en niet statistisch significant effect op ongelijkheid. 
Tegen de verwachtingen in vergroten publieke transfers en internationale 
overschrijvingen de ongelijkheid enigszins. Binnenlandse private overdrachten en migratie 
daarentegen leiden tot een afname van ongelijkheid. 
De belangrijkste empirische bevindingen over de onderzoeksvragen zoals gesteld in 
deze studie worden gepresenteerd in hoofdstuk 8. Dit hoofdstuk suggereert bovendien een 
aantal consequenties van deze bevindingen voor beleid. Ten slotte worden de beperkingen van 
de studie en een aantal suggesties voor toekomstig onderzoek besproken. 
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